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Abstract 
The present thesis is a commentary on Seneca the Younger’s De constantia 
sapientis, one of his so-called dialogi. The text on which I comment forms 
part of the Oxford Classical Texts edition of the dialogi by L. D. Reynolds.  
The thesis is in two main parts: an Introduction and the Commentary 
proper.  
Before the Introduction, there is a justificatory Preface, in which I 
explain why this thesis is a necessary addition to the scholarship on De 
constantia sapientis, on which the last detailed commentary was published 
in 1950.   
The Introduction covers the following topics: Date; Genre (involving 
discussion of what is meant by the term dialogus and the place of De 
constantia sapientis in the collection of Seneca’s Dialogi as a whole); 
Argumentation: Techniques and Strategies (including a discussion of S.’s 
views on the role of logic in philosophy); Language and Style; Imagery; 
Moral Psychology (an analysis of Seneca’s account of the passions); The 
Nature of Insult (including types of insult, appropriate responses to insults, 
and interpretation of the meanings of two of the verbal insults presented by 
Seneca); and Legal Aspects (the question of the distinction between iniuria 
and contumelia in legal terms and what sorts of actions were pursued by an 
actio iniuriarum in Seneca’s day).  
The commentary itself discusses individual passages in detail. The 
entries cover the following aspects: literary, philosophical (including an 
analysis of the syllogisms in the first half of the work), and historical (e.g. 
4 
 
4 
 
an examination of Seneca’s portrayals of Cato the Younger and Caligula). 
There is also discussion of textual questions (e.g. the crux at 18.18-19); 
disagreements with the text of Reynolds are aired at the relevant points.  
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PREFACE 
 
This thesis is a commentary on Seneca’s De constantia sapientis. I think 
that such a work is very necessary given that existing commentaries are in 
one way or another inadequate. Although Viansino produced a commentary 
(part of his two-volume set of commentaries on the dialogi, following an 
earlier, shorter work in 1968) in 1988, this is a relatively short work and 
leaves much unsaid. A more recent commentary (with translation) by Lana 
(1999) is also brief and not particularly interesting. The most thorough of 
the published commentaries is that by Wichem Klei, written in Dutch and 
published in 1950, which also provides an edition of the text. It is very good 
on the line-by-line commentary and particularly concerning language and 
style, but does not discuss much that needs discussing more generally, and 
of course, given its date, cannot take account of recent work on Seneca. I list 
published commentaries in the Bibliography. 
Although CS is not one of Seneca’s better-known works, there is 
much in it that is of interest. Its addressee, Annaeus Serenus, possibly a 
relative of S. and younger than him (according to Epistle 63), is also the 
addressee of De tranquillitate animi, and possibly of De otio. It is a 
justification of the Stoic paradox that the sage does not accept injury or 
insult (Nec iniuriam nec contumeliam accipere sapientem). Among the 
argumentational techniques S. deploys there is, in the first half of the work, 
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a series of syllogistic arguments designed to show the invulnerability of the 
sage to iniuria. This extensive use of syllogisms is, despite the well-known 
fondness of Stoics for logic, very rare in S. It provides a good example of 
the actual use to which syllogisms were put in a Stoic work. My analysis of 
the form of the syllogisms is something which has never been done before 
in previous commentaries on this work. 
I mentioned legal imagery, but law, primarily as concerns the actio 
iniuriarum, has central relevance to an interpretation of CS. At CS 10.1, S. 
says that Est minor iniuria, quam queri magis quam exequi possumus, quam 
leges quoque nulla dignam uindicta putauerunt. It seems that we may 
have here in CS a snapshot of a particular stage in the development of the 
actio iniuriarum, at which it has moved beyond the purely physical iniuria 
dealt with in the Twelve Tables, via the extension of the remit in the actio 
by the Praetorian Edict, whereby the loss of property and also some forms 
of diminution of social standing could be prosecuted under an actio 
iniuriarum, but not contumelia. I devote an excursus to discussing the legal 
implications of this. As far as I know, no earlier scholar has given much 
attention if any to the legal aspects of this work. 
To conclude, I hope I have shown the main points of interest in the 
thesis I am writing. CS has been neglected work and deserves much more 
attention. This thesis is intended to redress that imbalance.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
I. DATE 
 
The date of CS is not certain. However, the text does provide some 
pointers.
1
  
First, the extensive description of Caligula’s insults at 18 shows that 
it was written after the death of that emperor, which took place in AD 41.  
Second, according to Miriam Griffin (1992: 316 n. 2), it is unlikely 
that the account of Valerius Asiaticus’ outward tolerance of Caligula’s 
boasting of his adultery with Valerius’ wife can have been written before 
the death of Valerius in 47. Griffin does not give reasons for her belief that 
it is unlikely, but possibly the character of Valerius as described by S. 
(ferocem uirum et uix aequo animo alienas contumelias laturum) makes it 
unlikely that S. would dare to write anything about his wife’s adultery while 
he lived.  
Third, the addressee, Annaeus Serenus, died in the reign of Nero, 
probably in the early 60s. Epistle 63.14-15, dating to 63 or 64, mentions the 
death of Serenus.
2
 Assuming the death to be recent, Serenus may be 
                                                          
1
 For an exhaustive examination of the arguments put forward for different dates 
for the work, see Klei 5-24.  
2
 [14] Haec tibi scribo, is qui Annaeum Serenum carissimum mihi tam immodice 
flevi ut, quod minime velim, inter exempla sim eorum quos dolor vicit. Hodie tamen 
factum meum damno et intellego maximam mihi causam sic lugendi fuisse quod 
numquam cogitaveram mori eum ante me posse. Hoc unum mihi occurrebat, 
minorem esse et multo minorem - tamquam ordinem fata servarent! [15] Itaque 
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considered to have died in 62 or 63. According to Pliny the Elder (NH 
22.96), Serenus died of eating poisoned mushrooms, along with ten other 
officers of the vigiles, of which Serenus was praefectus. If Serenus 
succeeded Tigellinus as praefectus vigilum in 62, his death is likely to have 
been in 63, very close to the composition of Ep. 63. Griffin (1992: 447-8), 
however, thinks it more likely that Serenus actually became praefectus 
vigilum in 54, succeeding Laelianus in that post, and that Tigellinus was 
praefectus vigilum by 62, because otherwise he would not have enjoyed the 
influence with Nero to cause the restoration to the Senate of Cossutianus 
Capito, who had been condemned for extortion in 57. If Griffin is right, 
Serenus’ death would have been before 62, perhaps in 61 or 60. In any case, 
we are left with a possible date of Serenus’ death between 60 and 63. It is 
unlikely then that CS was composed at the very latest after 63. 
In Ep. 63, S. describes Serenus as multo minor (much younger) than 
S., which makes his death hard to bear. It may also suggest a possible lower 
limit to the composition of CS. How much minor than S. was Serenus? S. 
was born in 1 BC. For someone to be multo minor than S., he would 
probably have had to be born at least when S. was 20. Assuming Serenus 
was born c. AD 20, he would have been about 42 when he died, an age that 
is quite compatible with being a senator and having held the post of 
praefectus vigilum. Moreover, if we take 47 as the earliest possible date for 
                                                                                                                                                   
assidue cogitemus de nostra quam omnium quos diligimus mortalitate. Tunc ego 
debui dicere, 'minor est Serenus meus: quid ad rem pertinet? post me mori debet, 
sed ante me potest'. Quia non feci, imparatum subito fortuna percussit. Nunc 
cogito omnia et mortalia esse et incerta lege mortalia; hodie fieri potest quidquid 
umquam potest.  
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the composition of CS, then Serenus, if born in 20, would have been 27 in 
AD 47. 
We have a broad span of possible composition dates between 47 and 
63. However, the later we set the composition of CS, the more problems we 
get into if we consider the other works written for Serenus, De tranquillitate 
animi (Tranq.) and De otio (Ot.). First, Tranq. reveals Serenus at a later 
stage of his spiritual development. Whereas in CS, it seems he is (possibly) 
an Epicurean and sceptical about Stoicism, in Tranq. he seems to have 
embraced Stoicism and is worried about his uncertain progress on the path 
to Stoic virtue. If the relevant dates of composition of CS and Tranq. reflect 
the development of the historical Serenus, then Tranq. is later than CS. 
Assuming that the works addressed to Serenus were written for him while 
he lived, then an earlier date for CS is likely, perhaps in the late 50s. Then 
there is the problem of the incompletely preserved De otio. Although it is 
commonly thought to have been addressed to Serenus, nowhere is his name 
to be seen in the surviving text and the name of the dedicatee has been 
erased in the Codex Ambrosianus. The empty space would admit ‘Ad 
Serenum’, but it could equally admit another name. Arguments have been 
made to connect it with the other Serenus dialogues, but nothing is 
conclusive. For a detailed discussion see Williams (2003: 12-18). If, though, 
it is to Serenus, and if, as some think, it dates to S.’s period of exile (post-
62), it is the latest of the three works to Serenus and cannot be later than 63. 
Again, too, this would suggest the late 50s for the composition of CS at the 
latest.  
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However, there is no guarantee that S. was composing the Serenus 
dialogues in chronological order of the historical Serenus’ moral 
development. Indeed, if the Serenus addressed is rather, as Griffin thinks he 
might be (contra Abel), who thinks the dialogues reflect actual 
conversations between the two men), a literary persona, S. could have 
composed Tranq. before CS. 
Another pointer for dating is the reference to Corbulo insulting Fidus 
Cornelius in the senate (CS 17.1). S.’s vidimus might indicate the event was 
quite recent at the time of writing. It certainly suggests that Serenus and S. 
were both present in the senate when it happened. If this is the famous 
Corbulo, the general of Nero, a Neronian dating is quite possible. Griffin 
(1992: 44 n. 4) thinks the bare mention of ‘Corbulo’ in S.’s text makes it 
more likely that the younger Corbulo is referred to and that the father was 
already dead. Otherwise, she thinks, the reference would be ambiguous. 
However, in saying this, she contradicts her earlier statement in the same 
notes in which she says that ‘Seneca rarely mentions the living’. This will 
have to be a rare instance of mentioning the living. In Dio 59.15.3 we read 
of a Gnaeus Domitius Corbulo, who was road commissioner and in return 
for his services was to be made suffect consul in AD 39. PIR (141) has this 
man as the general’s father, but Griffin (ibid.) thinks the consul ‘must be the 
younger’. There is a possibility, argued by Syme (cited in Griffin) that the 
road commissioner could have been the father and the consul the son. 
However, Dio’s text does suggest that the same person is road 
commissioner and suffect consul.  
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Unfortunately, we have no information on Fidus Cornelius apart 
from CS 17.1 (see Klei 169). Ovid’s daughter, according to Tristia 4.10.75, 
was twice married with children from each marriage. If one of these 
husbands was Fidus Cornelius, and assuming that he was the more recent 
one, they will have been married at the latest by AD 12 (the date of the last 
of the Tristia poems). It is quite possible then that Fidus Cornelius was still 
alive in the reign of Caligula and maybe into the reign of Claudius. He is 
much less likely to have been alive in the reign of Nero. The incident in the 
senate could well have been early Claudian, then, which is quite compatible 
with a date after 47 for CS, given that the incident may be assumed to be 
fairly recent. In that case, it matters less whether the ‘Corbulo’ is the father 
or the son, for the father could have still have been in the senate up to AD 46 
(assuming he was 40 in AD 21 and the retirement age for senators of 65).
3
  
The CS 17.1 passage, then, cannot yield firm indications as to the 
date of CS, but certainly is compatible with a post-47 composition. 
A Neronian date might be suggested by the reference to Vatinius at 
17.3. Of course, the Vatinius referred to is the Vatinius who was the 
contemporary of Cato the Younger and Cicero. However, Tacitus, Annals 
15.34 mentions a Vatinius, whose body was deformed and who was given to 
the witticisms of a scurra.
4
 Given that S. describes the first-century BC 
Vatinius as a scurra, the combination of facetiae scurriles and physical 
                                                          
3
 Griffin (1992: 44 n. 4).  
4
 Vatinius inter foedissima eius aulae ostenta fuit, sutrinae tabernae alumnus, 
corpore detorto, facetiis scurrilibus; primo in contumelias adsumptus, dehinc 
optimi cuiusque criminatione eo usque valuit ut gratia pecunia vi nocendi etiam 
malos praemineret. 
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deformity is striking. There are differences: Tacitus’ Vatinius seems to be 
fond of making insults, while S.’s Vatinius is portrayed as more assured in 
warding off insults than giving them.
5
 Still, were CS to be of Neronian date, 
there would be resonances between the republican Vatinius and the present-
day scurra. Given that the republican Vatinius was prominent among Cato's 
enemies, it is more likely to be a coincidence than an intentional allusion to 
contemporary events. 
To conclude, as I said at the beginning the date of CS is not certain. 
From the indications I have reviewed, it is very likely that it was not written 
before 47, and may be as late (though I think that less likely) as 62.  
 
 
                                                          
5 
See further, Commentary ad loc. 
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II. GENRE 
 
CS is included in a collection of S.’s works called the Dialogi. However, 
with the possible exception of De tranquillitate animi, none of the works 
included in this collection is a dialogue in the sense that the philosophical 
works of Plato and Cicero are. There are no parts assigned to two or more 
speakers. De tranquillitate animi comes the nearest to a dialogue in that it 
consists of two parts, the first ‘spoken’ by Serenus in propria persona, the 
second (and much the longer part) being S.’s reply to him. However, the 
two parts are monologic, and read more like an epistolary correspondence. 
Clearly, if the description of these works as dialogi is more than a mere 
error on the part of whoever collected them for publication, S.’s idea of a 
dialogue differed somewhat from the ‘traditional’ one. 
First, though, we must note that the dialogi, for all their superficially 
monological form, do contain the elements of a dialogue, if we look in the 
right way. First, there is a named addressee (we do not know who that is 
with De otio). This person is not merely addressed at the beginning, but S. 
intersperses his arguments with further addresses to the person, sometimes 
calling them by name, often addressing them by tu. There is thus a sort of 
conversion being conducted, even though it has the outwards appearance of 
a lecture. Sometimes S. conjures up imaginary objections that the addressee 
might make to his argument, often introducing the objection by inquis (e.g. 
Prov. 3.2). At times, it is not clear that the second-person objector actually 
20 
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is the addressee of the work, or someone else, some ‘general’ objector. At 
other times, an imaginary objection in the third person (introduced by 
inquit) is cited (e.g. CS 7.3). At still other times, S. addresses vos. In the 
case of the latter part of CS, vos are probably Serenus and his Epicurean 
friends.
6
 In other places, for instance CS 9.4 and BV 6.4 and 7.7,
7
 it is not so 
clear who vos refers to. For CS 9.4, Abel (1967: 127) suggests ‘die 
allgemeine Leserschaft’. For the BV passages, it seems that the addressees in 
6.4 may be the plures of 6.3, who appear fortunate to others, butin reality 
hate their lives.
8
 For 7.7, it is the occupati, the people whose lives are taken 
up with everyday concerns, leaving them no time for philosophy.
9
 It is as if 
S. is addressing, beyond the named addressee of the work, others who are 
sitting and listening and being brought into the discussion. We might think 
here of a seminar or class, in which one of the students (the addressee) is 
singled out for special attention, while the others watch and listen to the 
moral therapy applied to him (or her). A modern, non-academic and non-
philosophical, analogy might be that of the chat show, in which a guest is 
                                                          
6
 CS 15.4, 16.3, 17.4; cf. Abel (1967: 126-7). 
7
 Vestra me hercules uita, licet supra mille annos exeat, in artissimum contrahetur: 
ista uitia nullum non saeculum deuorabunt; hoc uero spatium, quod quamuis 
natura currit ratio dilatat, cito uos effugiat necesse est; non enim apprenditis nec 
retinetis uel ocissimae omnium rei moram facitis, sed abire ut rem superuacuam ac 
reparabilem sinitis. 
7.7 : Quidni non liceat? Omnes illi qui te sibi aduocant tibi abducunt. Ille reus quot 
dies abstulit? Quot ille candidatus? Quot illa anus efferendis heredibus lassa? 
Quot ille ad irritandam auaritiam captantium simulatus aeger? Quot ille potentior 
amicus, qui uos non in amicitiam sed in apparatu habet? 
8
 Superuacuum est commemorare plures qui, cum aliis felicissimi uiderentur, ipsi 
in se uerum testimonium dixerunt perosi omnem actum annorum suorum; sed his 
querellis nec alios mutauerunt nec se ipsos: nam cum uerba eruperunt, affectus ad 
consuetudinem relabuntur.  
9
 For a discussion of S.’s switching of the scope of personal address in BV and 
other works, see Williams (2003: 27, 154). 
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asked questions by the host, while the studio audience looks on and is 
sometimes addressed by the host and asked to make their views known 
(albeit in a perfunctory way, like a show of hands, acclamation, etc.). As 
Williams (2003: 27(ii)) says, with specific reference to the shifts in 
addressee in BV: ‘This free-ranging technique allows him to engage his 
wider readership [. . .] while still addressing Paulinus [the addressee of BV] 
as well as the individual reader [. . .] He thus extends the “personal” 
relevance of Breu. to a universal as well as a more private audience, while 
the intrusive persistence of his second-person imperatives in particular 
guides each reader to self-scrutiny’. 
Looked at in this way, we could say that the dialogues of Plato and 
Cicero are binary dialogues, modelled ultimately on the stage play (although 
also reflecting in stylized fashion the nature of philosophical debate, dispute 
and discussion), the interlocutors being actors with their parts to play and 
lines to deliver. By contrast, the dialogi of S. are dialogues in a more subtle, 
multilayered way. Although ‘delivered’ by one person, this speaker alludes 
to, or sometimes directly quotes, the contributions of the addressee and 
possibly the audience. Hirzel calls them ‘Halbdialoge’.10  
Until the second half of the twentieth century, there was a view that 
S.’s dialogi were examples of a genre of moral-philosophical work called a 
‘diatribe’, dialogus being a loose and inaccurate transliteration of διατρίβη. 
The general scholarly consensus now, however, is that there was no such 
                                                          
10
 Hirzel, vol. 2, p. 25. 
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genre, and that Oltramare, the advocate of the ‘diatribe’ thesis, was wrong.11 
The Greek word διατριβή applied only to an informal conversation held by a 
philosopher with his pupils, for instance Epictetus’ Diatribai, which were 
copied down by his pupil Arrian.
12
  
The ‘conversational’ elements in S.’s works have led commentators 
such as Miriam Griffin (1992: 412-15) to argue that S.’s dialogi are so 
called because διάλογος was an alternative term for προσωποποιία, or 
personification, the attribution of speech to real or fictive persons or even 
things, whose Latin term is sermocinatio. So Quintilian (9.2.31): 
 
Ac sunt quidam qui has demum προσωποποιίας dicant in quibus 
et corpora et verba fingimus: sermones hominum adsimulatos 
dicere διαλόγους malunt, quod Latinorum quidam dixerunt 
sermocinationem. 
 
Although dialogus strictly speaking in this context applies to the figures of 
speech, in which S.’s works abound, the very abundance in S.’s dialogi of 
such figures as inquit/inquis statements led someone (Seneca?) to name 
them dialogi, by a form of terminological synecdoche. According to Griffin 
(1992: 415), to call (some at least of) his works dialogi may have made it 
easier for them to be accepted into the canon of great philosophical works, 
such as Plato’s and Cicero’s real dialogues.  
                                                          
11
 Although Schenkeveld (1997) does use the term and thinks that it is useful. See 
especially pp. 230-1.  
12
 See Trapp (2007: 196-7).  
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However, to base the designation dialogus on the use of 
sermocinatio may be too restrictive. Certainly, in another passage, 
Quintilian (10.1.29) says that S. wrote dialogues: nam et orationes eius et 
poemata et epistulas et dialogos. As Griffin says (1992: 413 n. 2), dialogi 
here seems to cover all the rest of S.’s philosophical oeuvre besides the 
dialogi, so: Naturales Quaestiones, De Clementia, De Beneficiis, as well. 
Indeed, it might be that dialogus was used, perhaps somewhat loosely, to 
designate a philosophical treatise in general, and not specifically one 
divided into speakers' parts in the manner of Plato. Certainly, the dialogi, 
looked at individually, do seem to present a varied collection of works. We 
have the three consolations, addressed to Polybius, Marcia and Helvia. 
There are the three books of the De Ira, 89 pages in the OCT, which seems 
as if it could stand as a separate book itself. There are the two Stoic 
paradoxes of CS and De providentia. Moreover, the latter, which is 
addressed to Lucilius, does look as if it could have formed one of the letters 
in the Epistles, despite the paradox that is its title in the Codex 
Ambrosianus. As said before, De tranquillitate animi has the character of 
correspondence between Serenus and Seneca. Unlike the Epistles and 
Naturales Quaestiones, which stem from the last three years of S.’s life, the 
dialogi seem to have been composed at various points in his life, the Ad 
Marciam, the earliest one of them, in the reign of Caligula. The 
consolations, although like the other dialogi they advocate the Stoic 
philosophy and attitude to life, do nevertheless have a specific function of 
consolation, whereas the other dialogi concentrate on a particular topic, the 
24 
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Stoic take on which S. seeks to explain to the addressee. Moreover, there are 
striking stylistic differences between some of the dialogi: Ad Helviam, for 
instance, has no inquit/inquis objections, whereas De Ira has nearly fifty. 
This kind of diversity within the Senecan dialogi may suggest that dialogus 
was used as a portmanteau term for a philosophical work in general, a 
treatise, rather than a specific genre in particular. 
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III. ARGUMENTATION: TECHNIQUES AND 
STRATEGIES 
 
In CS, S. seeks to demonstrate the following proposition which is stated 
before the main text commences:
13
 nec iniuriam nec contumeliam accipere 
sapientem. It is repeated throughout the work, with slightly different 
wording each time, so that it is syntactically integrated with the surrounding 
text.
14
 Through repetition, it is kept before the mind of the reader and 
thereby also contributes to the unity of the work.  
The work itself has a clear structure, comprising an exordium (1), 
narratio (2-4), and a division (5.1-2), which introduces the discussion of 
iniuria-part (5-3-9.3), which is rounded off by an internal, ‘false’ peroration 
(9.4-5). Then comes the contumelia-part (10-18), rounded off by the full 
peroration (19).
15
 
What is striking about the iniuria-part of the argument is the 
dominant role that syllogisms play in it. This in itself is hardly remarkable 
in a work of Stoic philosophy, for the early Stoics in particular were famous 
for their interest in and development of propositional logic.
16
 Syllogisms are 
also used in Ben. 4.1.3, 5.12.3-14, 7.4-11 (see Griffin (2013) ad loc.) and 
Ep. 87 (see Inwood (2007b: 239-60)). Given that Stoic paradoxes are being 
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 It was probably the original title of the work: See Introduction, § II. 
14
 See the note in the Commentary on the propositio that forms the title of CS. 
15
 Grimal (1949) proposes a slightly different analysis, taking the first four sections 
as a unity.  
16
 See Mates (1953), Kneale & Kneale ([1964] 1984: ch. III), Frede (1974). 
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justified in CS and also the passages of De beneficiis just cited, it is not 
surprising that syllogisms are used in these works; however, it is at variance 
with S.’s prevailing attitude to syllogisms in other works, which is 
predominantly sceptical (cf. Epp. 48, 85, 87). In Ep. 48, for example, S. 
ridicules Lucilius’ attachment to the methods of istis subtilibus (‘those 
subtle dialecticians of yours’, tr. Gummere (Loeb)), which he thinks is 
incompatible with the high and true aims of philosophy. At Ep. 48.6 he 
provides a caricature of syllogistic reasoning: ‘“Mouse” is a syllable. Now a 
mouse eats cheese; therefore, a syllable eats cheese’ (tr. Gummere 
(Loeb)).
17
 What S. seems to be criticising here, and in several other passages 
in the Epistles that are apparently hostile to logic,
18
 may be, as Barnes 
(1997: 14ff.) argues, not syllogisms and logic altogether, but rather the use 
of trivial syllogisms and conundrums of the kind just quoted from Ep. 48, 
where a valid deduction can nevertheless have a perverse conclusion.
19
 In 
this, Barnes thinks, S. is following Cicero, who also disdained what he 
called ratiunculae (Tusc. 2.12.29; ‘foolish syllogisms’, tr. King (Loeb)). 
Similarly (but not mentioned by Barnes), in the preface to his Paradoxa 
Stoicorum (proemium 2), Cicero rejects Cato the Younger’s practice of 
using proofs of minutae interrogatiunculae (‘tiny little interrogatory pin-
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 Mus syllaba est. Mus autem caseum rodit; syllaba ero caseum rodit. 
18
 The hostile attitude is particularly to be found in the Epistles. Wilson (2001: 186 
n. 43), in addition to Ep. 48 passage discussed, lists Epp. 45.5-13, 49.8-10; 82.8-10; 
83.8-12; 85; 87.41; 88.42-5; 102.20; 106.11; 111.18-20 as passages apparently 
hostile to logic. For a recent discussion of S.’s ambivalence to logic, see Griffin 
(2013: 133-4).  
19
 Barnes (1997: 13) thinks S. may be trying to counteract an excessive predilection 
on Lucilius’ part for such trivial syllogisms. 
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pricks’, tr. Rackham (Loeb)),20 which should probably be taken to refer to 
syllogisms,
21
 in favour of a rhetorical, persuasive style without syllogisms.
22
 
In this, Cicero is not at variance with the Stoic view of logic, which is 
broader than the modern one. For Stoics, logic consisted of both rhetoric 
and dialectic, of which syllogisms (part of what we call logic) formed a part. 
So if one dispenses with dialectics, including syllogisms, in favour of an 
exclusive use of rhetoric, one is still doing ‘logic’.23 
However, that fact remains that, if S. follows Cicero in the Epistles, 
in the earlier work CS he seems to follow Cato’s practice and makes 
extensive use of syllogisms. S.’s syllogisms certainly cannot be said to be 
trivial interrogatiunculae, but are integral to the argument of the first part of 
CS. Why this should be so cannot be answered conclusively, but it may have 
to do with Serenus’ sceptical attitude to Stoic paradoxes as expressed in CS 
3.1, where he ridicules what seem to be paraphrases of the paradoxes that 
(a) only the sage is rich, (b) only the sage is sane, and (c) only the sage is 
free.
24
 As the subject of CS is one such Stoic paradox, S. may have through 
it appropriate to demonstrate its truth to Serenus using syllogisms. Abel’s 
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 minutis interrogatiunculis, quasi punctis, quod proposuit efficit. OLD translates 
the word interrogatiuncula as: ‘An insignificant question or argument’. 
21
 So Wright; however, her bare translation ‘syllogisms’ ignores Cicero’s 
disparaging tone. 
22
 Another explanation is offered by Brad Inwood (2007b: 218-19), who in his 
discussion of the ‘dialectical’ Epistles 82, 83, 85, 87, suggests that S. may be being 
ironic (as is his wont) in his dismissal of dialectic. Inwood is talking issue in 
particular with John Cooper (2004), who, on the basis of the general non-use of 
hard logical argumentation in his works, and a prevalent overt hostility to logic in 
the Epistles in particular, questions S.’s entitlement to be considered a philosopher 
at all, rather than a moralist or ‘spiritual adviser’. 
23
 See Protopapas-Marneli (2002: 12). 
24
 See Commentary ad 3.1-3.2. 
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(1967: 140) suggestion, that S. is using syllogisms to impress the young and 
inexperienced Serenus, would carry more weight if S. used logic heavily 
elsewhere – after all, his other addressees are hardly experienced 
philosophers. Another possibility may be that S. is following the practice 
(mentioned earlier) of the hero of CS, Cato the Younger, who demonstrated 
the truth of paradoxes by means of syllogisms. The prominence of the 
Megarian philosopher Stilbo in CS could provide another clue. The 
Megarians were also interested in logic and influenced Stoics in this 
respect.
25
 Perhaps, therefore, the presence of these syllogisms was 
considered by S. appropriate in a work highlighting a Megarian philosopher 
as a moral exemplar. Another possibility may be that S. is drawing on a 
source now lost which does deploy logic in this way, possibly a work by 
Chrysippus, who systematised Stoic logic.
26
 Although certainty is not 
attainable in this matter, I think that S. has syllogisms in CS because they 
are the traditional method by Stoics sought to justify their paradoxes.  
The second part, by contrast, which deals with insult, does not 
employ syllogisms. In part, this can be explained by the fact that contumelia 
is, as S. says, a minor iniuria. As insult is a lesser injury, and as it has 
already been demonstrated that the sage is immune to injury as the two are 
logically incompatible, it follows that he must also be immune to the lesser 
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 The Megarian Diodorus Cronus, for instance, devised the famous Master 
Argument (Alexander of Aphrodisias, Diss. 2.19.1 Schenkl). See Mates (1953: 38-
9), Kneale & Kneale ([1964] 1984: 119ff.).  
26
 He does cite Chrysippus (17.1), but this is in the second part of CS, on insult, 
which does not employ syllogisms, so there may not be a connection. For a detailed 
analysis of the syllogisms, see the Commentary. For Chrysippus; and Stoic logic, 
see Frede (1974). 
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injury which is insult. It would therefore be superfluous to prove what had 
already been proved earlier. Therefore, to employ syllogistic reasoning for 
contumelia would be unnecessary. 
S., however, has at his disposal other tools of persuasion and 
explanation that enable him to sustain the argument into the second half of 
CS. Towards the end of the iniuria-part (9.3), S. introduces an explanation 
of the sage’s immunity to iniuria that seems to be based on the Stoic moral 
psychology of assent to impressions and the correct tension (tonos) in the 
soul between contraction and expansion.
27
 This passage plays an important 
twofold role in the argument of CS. First, it provides an additional, fresh 
justification of the propositio, one which appeals to Stoic moral psychology 
and physics, and takes the argument in a different direction from that of the 
syllogisms, opening a second front, as it were, in the campaign to persuade 
Serenus. Second, the moral psychology argument bridges the two parts of 
the work. For the moral psychological discussion is continued, and 
amplified, in the first two sections of the contumelia-part (particularly, 10.2-
3 and 11.1-2). Given that contumelia is a ‘lesser injury’ (10.1), the moral 
psychology underlying it is the same as that for injury, although the degree 
of perturbatio is less acute for insult than for injury. In the contumelia-part, 
the language of contraction (non contrahitur, 9.3) from the iniuria-part is 
developed into a contrast between the humilitas of soul (which contracts 
itself) of the non-sage who accepts an insult and the magnitudo 
animi/magnanimitas of the sage, who does not even notice an insult (11.1).  
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The greatness of soul of the sage is not, however, something that S. 
plucks out of thin air at the moment when he discusses it. Already he has 
introduced it gradually; first at 3.3 (magnitudinem), without reference to the 
soul of the sage specifically, where S. says that despite the invulnerability of 
the sage, there will still be those who will attempt to attack his greatness. 
The next mention of the sage’s greatness, at 6.2 (tantam animi 
magnitudinem), where S. introduces Stilbo’s big speech (on which see 
below), does specifically mention of his soul. Stilbo’s greatness of soul, we 
are to infer (S. does not specifically explain why), is shown by his 
indifference to the loss of externals (e.g. property) and defiant declaration in 
his speech to Demetrius Poliorcetes that nothing Demetrius can do will 
harm him (6.3-6.7). Importantly for the unity of CS, when he introduces 
Stilbo’s speech he mentions his magnitudo animi, a quality of the sage that 
will be explained in the contumelia-part of CS (8.5, 15.3). He mentions also 
firmitas, which had already been mentioned (3.3, 13.1, 17.1); magnitudo 
animi too, the synonym of magnanimitas, occurs just before the end of the 
iniuria-part (9.4), providing another link between the two parts.  
To explain the nature of insult and why the non-sage shows 
humilitas in accepting an insult S. makes use of an etymological argument, 
stating that contumelia is derived from the word contemptus. This is because 
the person who insults someone is motivated by contempt for that person. 
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Etymology was commonly used by Stoics in argument.
28
 Given the Stoics’ 
belief in the interconnectedness of all things in nature, they saw language as 
a reflection of nature, and hence analysis of the meanings of words, as in 
etymology, could aid understanding of the true nature of reality.  
Notable is the use of exempla, which are anecdotes taken from 
history which exemplify behaviour or qualities to follow and copy (positive 
exempla) and those to avoid (negative exempla).
29
 Indeed, there are three 
major exempla in CS which help to define the structure of the entire work. 
First, in in section 2, there is the exemplum of Cato the Younger. His 
maltreatment by the mob is the occasion of Serenus’ indignation and thus 
the starting point for the discussion in CS. The exemplum of Cato serves a 
crucial role in that gives a concrete illustration of the sage being unaffected 
by injuries or insults, and thereby allows the reader to visualize on an 
immediately comprehensible level what will later be argued for on a more 
abstract level later.
30
 Of importance is the fact that Cato is a Roman 
exemplum, whom S. considers more appropriate as a model of a sage than 
the heroes of myth (2.1). He is a figure admired by Serenus, who is 
indignant at his maltreatment by the mob. He is therefore a very suitable 
example to use in order to introduce Serenus to the propositio whose truth 
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 Chrysippus, for instance, wrote a seven-book treatise Περὶ τῶν ἐτυμολογικῶν 
πρὸς Διοκλέα (D.L. 7.200). Cf. Cic. ND 3.62, where the Stoic practice of providing 
etymologies for gods’ names is held up to ridicule. 
29
 See Mayer (2008) for a general discussion of the use of historical exempla in S. 
Turpin (2008: 363-73) for the Roman Stoics’ use of exempla, with particular 
emphasis on S. Also, for pre-Senecan background, see van der Blom (2010) on 
Cicero’s use of exempla. 
30
 On the question whether it is just contumelia that Cato is subject to, see the 
Commentary on 1.3. 
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will be argued for in CS. Serenus’ admiration for Cato does not exist in a 
vacuum, however. In the course of the reigns of the Julio-Claudian 
emperors, Cato came to be seen and admired as a model of Republican 
virtue, both for Stoics, of whom he was one, and for non-Stoics who 
admired his courageous defence of the Republic in its dying days.
31
  
The next three sections (3-5.5) are free of exempla as S. responds to 
Serenus’ objections to the claim that the sage is immune to injury and 
explains, after the divisio (5.1), what iniuria is; and at 5.3 the syllogisms 
start. Then, at 5.6, after the passage (5.4) in which he asserts that the sage 
cannot lose anything (injury involving loss), because he has his virtue, S. 
introduces another exemplum, that of Stilbo and his confrontation with 
Demetrius Poliorcetes. Its function is to illustrate the claim that the sage, 
whatever other physical and personal possessions he may lose, can never 
lose his virtue, his defining and inalienable possession. Although essentially 
a chria, a type of moral example that is usually short, S. expands the Stilbo 
anecdote into an extensive portion of CS (5.6-6.7), which forms a dramatic 
rounding-off of the rather sober syllogisms of the first section of the iniuria-
part. It is itself divided into parts. After the initial short narrative outlining 
the situation and containing Stilbo’s reply to Demetrius, S. draws out the 
lesson (5.7-6.2), viz. that, though defeated, Stilbo has defeated his 
conqueror Demetrius by showing himself unconcerned at the loss of his 
material and external goods, which are given him by fortune, because he 
still possesses his virtue (his true goods). At 6.1, S. draws out the relevance 
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 See Gowing (2005: 76-81), Wirszubski (1950). 
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of the exemplum to the propositio: if the master of siege warfare cannot 
inflict an injury on Stilbo, how much less a thief, slanderer, or a rich man 
without issue who lords it over those who seek to be named in his will. S. 
thus brings the discussion down from the horrific heights of the sacking of a 
city – one of the worst things a person could experience in the ancient 
world, with the attendant loss of property, liberty, and potentially life itself – 
to the mundane vexations of everyday life. In an age of almost universal 
political peace, as the first half of the first century AD was, such everyday 
inconveniences were commonplace, whereas being the victim of a siege was 
very rare.  
The exemplum of Stilbo would seem by now to have served its 
function, but S. prolongs it with the long speech of Stilbo. This speech does 
not add much more to what has already been said, but rather amplifies it. 
The horrors of the sack of Megara are vividly brought to life (e.g. 6.3: 
dolores . . . frementium; 6.5: ruinis . . . sanguinem; 6.7: qui flent . . . fugiunt) 
in an amplification of 6.2 (Inter micantis . . . cadentium). Again, 6.6-7 
(Caduca . . . habeo) amplifies 5.7 (habebat enim . . . possessio est). Also, 
the listing of types of siege engine and techniques at 6.4 (arietis . . . 
aggerem) amplifies and illustrates egregiam artem quassandarum urbium 
(6.1). The function of the speech seems to be to embed the content of 6.1-2 
more firmly in Serenus’ and the readers’ minds. It also forms a kind of 
peroration to the Stilbo exemplum.  
The exemplum of Stilbo has provided an intense and highly dramatic 
episode giving a vivid concrete illustration of the invulnerability of the sage 
34 
 
34 
 
to injury. With its association of sage with siege, it provides the springboard 
for a set of very short, almost allusive, exempla in 6.8, where S. uses the 
stories of impregnable cities that were nevertheless entered by enemies – 
Babylon, Carthage, Numantia, and the Roman Capitol itself – in order to 
support the image he introduces of the sage’s bona being protected as if by 
impenetrable fortifications. Unlike these places, his citadel will never be 
captured. Finally, at 7.1, S. rounds off the sequence of exempla (which 
started at 5.6) by bringing the discussion back to Cato, the exemplum with 
which CS began (a cuius mentione haec disputatio processit).  
Hereafter, with the possible exception of the small anecdote about 
Cato’s response to a cuff in 14.3, exempla play no further part in CS until 
very near the end when a number of them – some very short – appear in 
rapid succession (17.1-18.6). Broadly, their theme is response to insult, 
some showing the incorrect way to respond (i.e. to react to the insult), others 
showing the correct response.  
The first of them concerns Fidus Cornelius (17.1), the man who 
burst into tears on being called a depilated ostrich.
32
 This negative 
exemplum shows how weakness of mind (animorum inbecillitas) leads a 
man to take an insult to heart in a ridiculous (hoc tam absurdum) and 
irrational (ubi ratio discessit) manner.  
The next exemplum, that of Vatinius, provides a positive example of 
an effective and appropriate way of dealing with insults that are directed at 
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 Here S. supplements the anecdote related by Chrysippus, of the man who was 
angry at being called a marine goat, with a recent Roman exemplum. He updates 
the tradition, as it were. 
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one’s physical appearance. Vatinius’ unusual physical appearance made him 
a natural butt of insults, but his strategy was to pre-empt insults by drawing 
attention to his physical defects, thus denying his enemies the opportunity of 
insulting him. Although S. approves of Vatinius’ methods, the exemplum is 
rather ambivalent in tone, inasmuch as Vatinius is a man ‘born for ridicule 
and hate’, and a scurra.33 In this, he is a contrast to Fidus Cornelius, who, 
despite his weakness in bursting into tears at Corbulo’s insult, had up to 
then shown firmitas in the face of adverse comments on his character. So we 
have two flawed individuals, one of whom has shown strength of character 
in the past but who has a moment of irrationality and weakness; the other of 
much more dubious character, but who knows how to deal with insults. 
There is an advance in competence in handling insults from one exemplum 
to the other. 
These two exempla, however, are the preliminaries to the group of 
exempla concerning the emperor Gaius Caligula (18.1-5). Just as the 
exemplum of Stilbo formed the highlight of the iniuria-part, so the Caligula 
exempla form the culmination of the contumelia-part. Whereas the 
exemplum of Stilbo was positive, that of a sage immune to injury, by 
contrast the Caligula exempla are entirely negative. Through these exempla 
S. presents a portrait of a contumeliosus man, who delighted in dishing out 
insults but couldn’t take them himself (18.4). S. subtly differentiates the 
three examples. The first two examples show Caligula gratuitously insulting 
people, without apparent provocation. First, there is Caligula’s cruel teasing 
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of Valerius Asiaticus by commenting in public on the sexual performance of 
Valerius’ wife, with whom he was having an affair (18.2). Second, S. relates 
how Caligula insulted the tribune of the Guard Chaerea by giving lewd 
watchwords that hinted at Chaerea’s effeminate voice and bearing (18.3). 
The third example,
34
 by contrast, shows Caligula taking offence at 
something someone has said. He is angry with Herennius Macer, who 
addressed him by his formal name of ‘Gaius’, while by contrast a centurion 
was punished for addressing him by his nickname ‘Caligula’ (18.4). In both 
cases, there was no intention to offend – to address him by his formal name 
was presumably considered a mark of respect by Herennius Macer and the 
centurion merely used the nickname by which Caligula was accustomed to 
being called by soldiers.  
The set of anecdotes of Caligula show up different facets of his 
warped character and thereby help to sum up in concrete fashion the various 
small examples (generic, with anonymous participants) of the contumelia-
part. The first two anecdotes show his sadistic malice.
35
 The last two 
anecdotes show up Caligula’s inconstantia (inconsistency), attributed to him 
by S. at Pol. 17.5, and hence the fundamental irrationality of the 
contumelious person. Whatever name one addressed him by, it was the 
wrong one. Caligula’s badness is also brought out by the stress on his 
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 One could say the third and fourth examples, as there are two separate anecdotes. 
However, given that they both relate to ways of addressing him, I consider them 
together as one exemplum.  
35
 This receives its most horrible illustration in the anecdote of Caligula and the 
eques Pastor (Ira 2.33.3-6), who had to smile at a dinner with Caligula, in order to 
save the life of his remaining son, the other son having been executed at Caligula’s 
orders earlier that day. 
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physical appearance.
36
 S. was influenced by the views of Polemon and other 
physiognomists, who held that physical appearance reflected the state of the 
soul.
37
 Thus, physical deformities, such as those in S.’s portrayal of 
Caligula,
38
 indicated a depraved soul.  
Structurally, the exempla of Stilbo and Caligula are parallels. They 
are the highlights of their respective parts. They are counterparts as exempla 
in that one is highly positive, the other highly negative. There are other 
points of contrast, too. The Stilbo exemplum comes very soon after 
beginning of the iniuria-part; by contrast, the Caligula, exempla come 
almost at the end of the contumelia-part. Stilbo is given a lengthy speech, 
through which at times S. himself seems to address the readers.
39
 Caligula is 
given no speech. Stilbo is also given more ‘air time’ than Caligula inasmuch 
as his exemplum, which is based on a single anecdote, takes up 9 sub-
sections (5.6-6.8), bulked out with a speech of 5 sub-sections, whereas 
Caligula is given just 5 sub-sections.  
Pace Rosemary Wright (1974: 63), therefore, I think that the use of 
Caligula as an exemplum is not ‘disproportionately long and only partially 
relevant’ to the argument. First, as I have outlined in the previous paragraph, 
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 Vatinius is no paragon of virtue, but he does at least deal with insults in the right 
way, and does not make them. 
37
 See Swain (2007: 134-6).  
38
 18.1: pallor betraying insanity (tanta illi palloris insaniam testantis foeditas 
erat); savage eyes under an old women’s brow (tanta oculorum sub fronte anili 
latentium toruitas); baldness; bristles on his neck (like a wild boar?); thin legs and 
over-sized feet. 
39
 See Commentary ad 6.4. 
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it performs an important balancing function in the structure of CS, providing 
a foil to the positive exemplum of Stilbo.
40
 
Second, while the Stilbo exemplum shows the lofty ideal of the sage, 
the exemplum of Caligula and Chaerea, with S.’s commentary on it, offers 
much more practical guidance on how Serenus should deal with insults. 
Indeed, it really a positive exemplum, in that it commends the behaviour of 
Chaerea, who does not react immediately to the Caligula’s insults, but bides 
his time.
41
 He responds to the insults of Caligula later, by taking part in the 
successful conspiracy to murder him. S. approves of the action of the 
conspirators, whose swords he characterises as ‘avenging public and private 
wrongs’ (publicas ac priuatas iniurias ulciscentium gladiorum, 18.3).  
S.’s attitude here, though, is problematic. So far, he has argued that 
insults should be ignored, not avenged, or at least the people delivering 
them should be gently chided.
42
 Here, though, S. goes against that advice, 
inasmuch as he approves of Chaerea’s leading participation in a plot to 
assassinate Caligula. There was no love lost between S. and Caligula,
43
 and 
S. clearly cannot help himself in eschewing his Stoicism and commending 
vengeance.  
There may be another reason for S.’s attitude here too: a desire to 
create irony. As Wilcox (2008: 464-73) has argued, Caligula is seen in these 
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 Cf. the two exempla of Octavia and Livia in Marc. 2.2-3.2. The one is presented 
by S. as a negative exemplum of reacting to the death of a son, the other as a 
positive exemplum. See Wilcox (2006: 82-7); Edwards (2007: 189-91).  
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 See Wilcox (2008: 467) on this. 
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 Cf. CS 12.2. 
43
 Nowhere in his extant writings does S. speak well of Caligula. See also 
Introduction, § IV, on their literary rivalry. 
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exempla as an ironist, but one whose efforts at irony at others’ expense are 
his undoing. Thus, he insinuates that Chaerea is effeminate while dressed 
like a dancer or a prostitute. He wears tragic buskins (coturnatus, 18.4) but 
is soon to become the hero of his own tragedy, struck down by those he has 
toyed with.  
Structural balance is provided again by two brief, but pertinent, 
exempla of patientia in dealing with an insult. Socrates merely smiles when 
his wife pours dirty water over him; Antisthenes, in response to the 
accusation that his mother was a barbarian and a Thracian, replies that even 
the mother of the gods was Idaean (i.e. Thracian). They follow the Caligula 
exempla in the same way as the climax of the Stilbo exemplum was 
followed by the three very brief examples of cities that had been taken.  
Having examined techniques of argument in CS, I now wish to 
examination two recent interpretations of CS, those of Liebersohn (2005) 
and Baraz (2016) respectively.  
First, Liebersohn. His position is that CS, although it has iniuria in 
the propositio, is not actually about iniuria, but about contumelia. He thinks 
that the discussion of iniuria is really an indirect way of getting at the real 
subject, viz. contumelia: S. is physician who treats the patient for a more 
serious condition in order to make him completely invulnerable to a less 
serious ailment. He considers that for a man like Serenus who aspired to a 
career in public life, contumelia (e.g. ‘an unpleasant word from the 
emperor’; Liebersohn (2005: 380)) can be much worse than iniuria (e.g. 
dying), which would normally be considered more serious. 
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The starting point of his argument is the absence of any mention of 
iniuria in 1.3, where the indignities (uoces inprobas et sputa et omnis alias 
insanae multitudinis contumelias) heaped upon Cato are described. I agree 
that these treatment described amount to insult rather than injury, inasmuch 
as they are of such a trivial nature (although unpleasant) that it is unlikely 
either that someone in Cato’s position would consider taking out an actio 
iniuriarum or that an urban praetor would allow it to come to trial.
44
  
 
Multum autem interest utrum sapientem extra indignationem an 
extra iniuriam ponas. Nam si dicis illum aequo animo laturum, 
nullum habet priuilegium, contigit illi res uulgaris et quae 
discitur ipsa iniuriarum adsiduitate, patientia; si negas 
accepturum iniuriam, id est neminem illi temptaturum facere, 
omnibus relictis negotiis Stoicus fio. (3.2) 
 
This refutes Liebersohn. Serenus is here talking of iniuria, not contumelia. 
Now I shall consider the interpretation of Yelena Baraz (2016). 
Baraz sees in CS a tension between two hierarchies: the true hierarchy of 
Stoicism, with the sage at the apex, and the traditional social hierarchy. The 
exemplum of Demetrius, who is a king, and Stilbo, who is now his slave, 
undermines the validity of the traditional hierarchy, because it is actually 
Stilbo who is superior to Demetrius (Baraz 2016: 163). Although S. holds 
up the sage, who is possessed of greatness of soul, as the ideal which 
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Serenus must strive to become like as he makes his upward progress 
towards virtue, S. cannot, according to Baraz (2016: esp. 167-70), avoid 
thinking in terms of the traditional Roman social hierarchy as he offers his 
advice to Serenus, and this undermines his position. For instance, Baraz 
cites 13.4, where S. expresses his contempt for slave dealers and thereby 
indicates to Serenus that rudeness on their part is nothing to be concerned 
about. In other words, according to Baraz, S. employs traditional social 
attitudes in the service of a moral stance that does not recognise such things 
as morally relevant. I do not think this is a convincing criticism. Serenus 
must live in the Roman society into which he is born. His moral progress 
must therefore be achieved within that society. If, then, his social prejudices 
(against slaves, for instance) can be brought into service to help him 
immunise himself to insults, then I do not see that this is an objection to S.’s 
advice. Serenus’ task is to achieve the mountain peak that is virtue, but to 
make that journey he must still walk first on the unvirtuous foothills. 
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IV. LANGUAGE AND STYLE 
 
Where the bee sucks, there suck I 
William Shakespeare, The Tempest  
 
Ariel’s words are more relevant than they may at first appear to a discussion 
of S.’s language and style. In Epistle 84, where S. recommends that Lucilius 
read widely, he likens his approach in composition to that of a bee which 
gathers pollen and other things from various sources and forms them into a 
new, but coherent whole. So, too, in CS, S. creates a stylistic unity from 
disparate ingredients, giving ample evidence of his wide reading and 
learning gained from varied sources. 
As we read CS, we see changes of stylistic register as the argument 
unfolds. So, in the exordium epic-historical elements express the magnitude 
of the task that confronts Serenus as he begins his ascent to the mountain-
top of virtue. This epic and historical vein is picked up again in the Stilbo 
exemplum, which has stylistic elements that are resonant of ‘tragic history’. 
In the insult-part that follows, the world of sieges, war and 
destruction, gives way to the everyday, humdrum world of the petty insult. 
Different stylistic influences seem to come into play here. So, the obduracy 
of the ostiarius is described in language that recalls that of Latin elegy. The 
world of haughty doorkeepers, disdainful name-callers, the humiliation of 
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not being admitted by one’s patrons are elements in the world of Latin satire 
(satura), and are to be found in the works of Horace, Persius and Juvenal.  
Another stylistic influence is that of Roman comedy. The word of 
Roman comedy can be seen in the discussion immediately following the 
divisio (5.1). Here S. mentions slaves who prefer to be beaten with whips 
than to receive cuffs (colaphi). Slaves and their efforts to avoid beatings are 
part and parcel of Roman comedy, and this is reflected in the use of the 
word colaphus, which occurs frequently in comedy, 
45
 and before S. is only 
found in prose in Valerius Maximus (3.1.3).
46
  
Another notable feature of CS (and of other works by S.) is the direct 
speech by named or unnamed interlocutors or imaginary objectors.
47
 As S. 
says in Ep. 38, he sees his role as offering advice (consilium) to his 
interlocutor, and conversation (sermo) as the best way to do this, ‘because it 
creeps by degrees into the soul’.48 In my discussion of the genre of CS, I 
argued that there is an implicit conversation going on in CS and some of the 
other of the so-called dialogi, which may be a reason why the term was 
applied to them.
49
 Certainly, the general style of parts of CS is an informal, 
conversational one, although the syllogisms of the iniuria-part do bring a 
more formal, disputational tenor. As in his other works, S. addresses a 
named individual in the second person singular, in this case Serenus. From 
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 E.g. Plaut. Capt. 88, Ter. Ad. 200. 
46
 For more on this word, see Commentary ad 5.1 and 14.3. 
47
 In CS: 1.1, 4.1, 7.3, 10.2, 12.3, 14.2, 14.3, 17.4 (unnamed); 3.1-2 (Serenus); 3.3, 
4.1, 4.3 (possibly Serenus); 5.6, 6.4-7 (Stilbo); 13.4 (sage); 16.3 (consipiens). 
48
 . Tr. Gummere (Loeb); Plurime proficit sermo, quia minutatim inrepit animo 
(Ep. 38.1). 
49
 See Introduction, § II. 
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the very beginning of the work, S. addresses Serenus directly by name 
(Serene, 1), and two more such addresses are to be found at the beginning of 
the divisio (5.21) and at the end of the Stilbo exemplum (6.8). The second-
person singular addresses are occasionally interrupted by second-person 
plural addresses (e.g. 9.4), which should probably be imagined as S. 
addressing an audience listening to the conversation.  
This conversational style in S. may be the result of two different 
influences. First, philosophy from Plato onwards was seen as a conversation 
between two or frequently more people, with one of the interlocutors taking 
the leading role, as teacher. So, in Plato, Socrates takes on this leading role, 
refuting the claims of his interlocutors through dialectic, and increasingly in 
the late works also expounding Plato’s own doctrines. Dialogue was 
favoured by Cicero, but a conversational style seems to have been used by 
Greek philosophical writers of the Stoic and Cynic schools. So, the Cynic 
(ex-Academy member) Bion of Borysthenes pioneered a form of 
philosophical writing called ‘diatribe’, which employed a conversational 
style.
50
 The early Stoics (and middle ones too) also favoured a simple style 
of writing, more akin to the everyday speech, in order to be able to put 
across their philosophical positions more effectively than by using abstruse 
and technical writing.
51
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 See Kindstrand (1976), Schenkeveld (1997), Trapp (2007). S. quotes Bion at 
Tranq. 8.3, 15.4, in both cases favourably. In the first passage he praises Bion’s 
elegance of expression (eleganter ait).  
51
 Protopapas-Marneli (2002: 47-61). 
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The second influence on S.’s conversational style is almost certainly 
Latin satire. Exponents of this genre, particularly Horace and S.'s younger 
contemporary Persius, have a chatty style,
52
 usually addressed to a named 
(or sometimes unnamed) interlocutor, often containing pieces of direct 
speech supposedly uttered by this interlocutor or by someone else.  
A good place to start a discussion of S.’s style in CS may be the 
observations of the emperor Caligula, who not only figures prominently in 
CS, but also has the distinction of being probably the first recorded critic of 
S.’s prose style outside S.’s own family.53 Condemning S. for composing 
‘mere display pieces’ (commissiones meras),54 he famously characterized 
his style as ‘sand without lime’ (harena sine calce, Suet. Cal., 53.3).55 The 
allusion seems to be to the ingredients of builder’s mortar.56 The implication 
seems to be that the style lacks cohesion; that the building on which it is 
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 Indeed, in the manuscripts the title for Horace’s satires is sermones 
(‘conversations’). See Coffey (1976: 68-9); Gowers (2012: 12). It is disputed 
whether Roman satire was influenced by Greek diatribe (e.g. whether sermo is a 
translation of diatribē). So, Pennacini (1983) thinks there is a connection, while 
Jocelyn (1982) is highly sceptical. 
53
 S.’s father, who criticizes his S.’ stylistic preferences in Contr. 1, preface, died in 
AD 39/40. His criticisms thus may possibly have predated Caligula’s.  
54
 My translation. The interpretation of this phrase varies. Wardle (p. 343 ad loc.) 
lists a number of them. 
55
 The passage in full reads: Peroraturus stricturum se lucubrationis suae telum 
minabatur, lenius comptiusque scribendi genus adeo contemnens, ut Senecam tum 
maxime placentem "commissiones meras" componere et "harenam esse sine calce" 
diceret. Solebat etiam prosperis oratorum actionibus rescribere et magnorum in 
senatu reorum accusationes defensionesque meditari ac, prout stilus cesserat, vel 
onerare sententia sua quemque vel sublevare, equestri quoque ordine ad 
audiendum invitato per edicta. 
56
 For a detailed description of the production of mortar see Vitruvius 2.5.5-9 and 
the discussion in Adam (1999: 74-6, 337-8). An alternative view (that of Müller), 
cited with reservations by Wardle (p. 344 ad loc.), is that Caligula was referring to 
a racetrack, and meant that S. did not know when to stop (lime marking the edge of 
track). I agree with Wardle that the mortar metaphor is the more plausible 
interpretation, not least because it fits in better with lenius comptiusque. 
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used will collapse, because it lacks an essential component. What this 
component was may be explained by Suetonius’ words earlier in the 
passage, when he says that Caligula despised S.’s ‘gentler and more elegant 
kind of writing’ (lenius comptiusque scribendi genus). It could be that the 
emperor took exception to (and was envious of) a style that contrasted with 
his own functional and less polished one.
57
 He could be saying that S.’s 
style lacked power and vigour, in comparison with his own, which he 
referred to as a weapon (telum).
58
 
Certainly, gentleness and elegance (and with it possibly lack of 
vigour) could accurately describe some aspects of the style of CS and of 
many other works by S. He is speaking to a friend rather than an enemy. He 
is trying to develop and strengthen Serenus’ rather lukewarm interest in 
Stoicism. The tone is, at least at the beginning, has the intimacy of a one-to-
one conversation or even epistolary address.  
More specificity is needed. Moreover, Caligula’s jibe almost 
certainly does not apply to any of the surviving works of S., which (with the 
exception of Ad Marciam) postdate his reign. It is thought, also, that 
Caligula had in mind S.’s speeches rather than prose works intended mainly 
for reading. There is certainly evidence of elegance and careful composition 
in CS. 
Another interpretation of ‘sand without lime’, which I think the 
context of the Suetonius passage makes less likely, may chime more 
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 Functional style: Wardle, p. 342 ad 52.3 (peroraturus … minabatur). 
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 Suet. Gaius 53. 
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harmoniously with other criticisms of S.’s style. Caligula’s jibe, then it 
might point to an aspect of S.’s style that is evident in CS: its diversity and 
variety. Indeed, to speak of the language and style of CS is in part 
misleading, for it implies a single, monolithic style. As I attempt to show 
here, however, it would be truer to speak of the styles of CS. This work 
exhibits a range of registers and styles, which yet in combination seem to 
create a harmonious whole. 
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V. IMAGERY 
 
CS, like other writings by S., is rich in imagery.
59
 How we interpret S.’s use 
of imagery in CS and other works is intimately linked with how we interpret 
him as a philosopher overall. His fondness for imagery, together with the 
sparseness of recognisable logical argumentation,
60
 has proved troublesome 
for some modern scholars of ancient philosophy who have been educated in 
the analytic tradition. For some of them, for example John Cooper,
61
 this is 
one more reason to doubt S.’s right to be considered a philosopher in the 
truest sense, rather than a mere writer, or at best a ‘thinker’.62 This suspicion 
of the use of imagery, and in particular metaphor, in philosophy has long 
roots.
63
 It remained the prevailing view until quite recently among Anglo-
American analytical philosophers, for whom philosophy should be 
concerned solely of logically based argumentation, and all words and 
propositions used should have their literal, not metaphorical, meaning. This 
attitude, however, has been challenged, both within the analytic tradition, 
for instance by Max Black (1962), and outside it, most notably by Lakoff 
and Johnson (1980).
64
 Moreover, this growing revision of long-established 
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 For a detailed listing of the images in S., see the ‘Catalogue de images’ in 
Armisen-Marchetti (1986: 69-201). 
60
 CS may be an exception here: see Introduction, § III. 
61
 See John Cooper (2004) and (2005). 
62
 For more detail on John Cooper’s attack on S., see Introduction, § III.  
63
 For instance, in the early modern era, Thomas Hobbes said that metaphor has no 
place in philosophy (see David E. Cooper 1986: 17).  
64
 For a later articulation of their work, see Lakoff & Johnson (1999). 
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prejudices against the use of imagery and metaphor in philosophy has been 
reflected in an increased and increasing interest in Roman philosophers, 
particularly in S., for the interpretation of whose work the traditional 
approaches are considered both restrictive and irrelevant.
65
 
Fundamentally, this is a question about the aims of philosophy. Is 
philosophy a purely theoretical activity, an exercise in conceptual analysis? 
Or is it a guide to life and a discipline whose aims – any theoretical content 
notwithstanding – are ultimately practical? In the case of S., the Stoics 
generally, and indeed the Epicureans and (probably) the Sceptics (the three 
main Hellenistic schools), their aims were ultimately practical, although 
there was solid theoretical underpinning. S.’s intention is not to do 
conceptual analysis, which is what analytic critics expect of a philosopher, 
but rather to urge the merits of a particular philosophical school, Stoicism, 
as a guide to the moral life, and to make the doctrines and positions of this 
philosophical school attractive to the would-be ‘convert’ or to strengthen the 
commitment of the neophyte.
66
 That is, S.’s aim is paraenetic, practical, not 
theoretical. This is the defence of S.’s use of imagery adopted by Mireille 
Armisen-Marchetti in her Sapientiae facies (1989). Although S. does at 
times discuss Stoic theory and does engage in disputes with theoretical 
positions taken by other (mainly Stoic) philosophers,
67
 he is above all 
concerned to persuade his addressees of the rightness of Stoic philosophy 
and that its doctrines are the ones that should govern their lives. He is trying 
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 So, the essays in Griffin & Barnes (1989).  
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 On this see Nussbaum (2009). 
67
 Cf. e.g. Epp. 58, 65, 121.  
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to make abstract concepts ‘come alive’ in the mind of the addressee, so that 
he or she comes to see what they are ‘about’ in practical terms and (S. 
hopes) begins to form his or her life in accordance with them.
68
 In order to 
make Stoic doctrine comprehensible to novices (such as Serenus), S. seeks 
to turn abstracts into concretes. It is not merely the reason of the addressee 
to which he appeals, but also the imagination.
69
 
In this, S. is following the practice of some previous Stoics who laid 
stress on the usefulness of images as a means by which the student could be 
introduced to Stoic arguments and concepts. So Ariston of Chios (3
rd–4th c. 
BC), a pupil of Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic school, thought up a 
number of Homoiōmata (likenesses, analogies),70 most notably his 
comparison of the sage to a good actor, who could interpret his role in the 
way most appropriate to the situation.
71
 Ariston was an unorthodox Stoic, 
who deserted the Stoa when Zeno was ill, having met Polemo, the head of 
the Academy, and recanted his Stoic views.
72
 Ariston argued that only ethics 
mattered and rejected the importance laid on logic and physics by Zeno; 
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 This might be a deliberate stylistic choice of the Roman Stoics in particular. Cf. 
Reydams-Schils (2005) on how Roman Stoics adapted the Greek Stoic tradition to 
make it relevant to Roman social practices. 
69
 Cf. Lucretius (1.933-50), who likens his use of poetry as a medium for 
presenting philosophy to the practice of healers who smear the rim of a cup of 
wormwood with honey, in order to make the bitter medicine palatable to children. 
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 SVF III.383-403. 
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 See Protopapas-Marneli (2002: 70-5). 
72
 See Curnow (2006: 45). 
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‘dialectical reasonings’ (i.e. logic) he likened to spider’s webs, on the 
(incorrect) grounds that, like spider’s webs, they were useless.73  
Nor was this practice unique to Stoics. The use of concrete images to 
help understanding of philosophical arguments and concepts had been well 
established in philosophical discourse long before S. For instance, in Plato’s 
Republic (436a–e), for instance, Socrates, who is trying to convince his 
interlocutors that the soul is tripartite, and that it can therefore undergo 
opposites at the same time, uses the analogy of a spinning top, which is both 
at rest (i.e. it does not move from its position) and moving (i.e. it spins). The 
Form of the Good (Rep. 508a) is compared to the sun, in that it, like the sun 
in the sensible world, is the source and origin of all that is (i.e. of the other 
Forms in the intelligible world, which are the basis of all that is in the 
sensible world) and enables us to see (i.e. understand).  
Nevertheless, one should be wary of equating the restrained use of 
analogies and comparisons, such as those just cited from Plato, which serve 
to illustrate arguments that had already been expounded and developed 
through the dialectic, with the much more extensive use of imagery that we 
find in S., whose images seem to take on a life of their own and become the 
driving force of his argument. For S.’s imagistic argumentation, the 
approach of Lakoff and Johnson mentioned earlier is interesting. They argue 
that there is a logical coherence underlying the metaphors that human beings 
use in their everyday language, and that, far from being decorative, such 
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 D.L. 7.161; SVF 1.389 and 352; S. Ep. 89.13. S. seems to be of this view in Ep. 
48, although the inclusion of syllogisms does seem to indicate a more orthodox 
approach; see Introduction, § III. 
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metaphors indicate reasoning (albeit of a different kind from the strict logic 
of analytic philosophy) taking place. Given the prevalence of images in S.’s 
writing, their approach could help us in interpreting his work in a more 
sensitive and charitable way than some scholars have hitherto done. For 
instance, according to Lakoff and Johnson, the spatial word ‘up’ can be used 
metaphorically to imply ‘good’, while its antonym, ‘down’, can connote 
‘bad’. Thus, ‘he’s on his way up’ can literally mean someone ascending to a 
higher physical level (e.g. in a higher storey in a building) or can 
metaphorically mean ‘he is enjoying success’ (perhaps in the form of 
achieving promotion to a superior position in the company he works for); 
‘he’s on his way down’ can mean the physical opposite of ‘he’s on his way 
up’ (e.g. he’s coming down from the fifth floor to the second floor (where 
the speaker is)) or, metaphorically, that his career is failing and he is facing 
dismissal or demotion. In evolutionary terms we talk of ‘ascending the 
evolutionary ladder’; in biology generally (before Darwin) one talked of the 
‘higher animals’ (humans, mammals) as opposed to the lower ones (fish, 
worms, etc.).  
Another example is ‘forward’ and its antonym ‘backward’. Apart 
from the literal meanings (simply moving forwards or backwards), there can 
be an implication of making progress or regressing (‘he is going forward’ or 
‘he is going backward’) in some project. So we have ‘forward-looking’ 
(progressive, interested in future improvement, bettering things) and 
‘backward’ (on a lower level of culture or intelligence, retarded).  
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The danger in this approach is that the metaphors are often so well 
used that they have become dead metaphors. A dead metaphor is one whose 
metaphorical force has been lost by frequent use. The metaphorical meaning 
is considered as just another literal meaning of the word or phrase. . So, a 
resentful colleague may well not be thinking of physical elevation in the 
office block when he says ‘he’s on his way up’; rather, he is using the 
‘metaphorical’ expression as a more colourful (and maybe simpler) version 
of ‘he’s (constantly) getting promoted’. Certainly the ‘lip’ of a jug and the 
‘mouth’ of a river are dead metaphors.74  
After these preliminary general remarks, I now turn specifically to 
S.’s use of imagery in CS. S. uses four main categories of imagery in CS: (1) 
height; (2) military/combat; (3) legal; (4) medical.
75
 I shall discuss these 
categories individually.  
 
I 
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 For a discussion of dead metaphor, see David Cooper (1986: 119-39). It should 
be noted, as Cooper discusses, that some philosophers are dubious about the notion 
of ‘dead metaphor’ because they are dubious about the motion of metaphor 
altogether. So, for Donald Davidson, ‘dead metaphors’ are just instances of 
polysemy, of the same word having different meanings. Of course, dead metaphors 
can be revived in certain contexts (e.g. by writers or poets).  
75
 Armisen-Marchetti (1986: 315-19) has a different classification: (1) images of 
aggression (including military); (2) ‘the sage magnified’ (which includes my 
category of height); (3) images of derision (both insults directed at the sage and 
S.’s own disparagement of certain groups of people, e.g. women). I do not consider 
her third category as a valid image category in itself, because it seems to me a 
psychological rather than imagistic category. The unifying factor behind the 
‘images’ of insult (the only ones I can think of being images are ‘marine wether’ 
and ‘depilated ostrich’) is the intention to insult.  
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Imagery of height is used by S. in the exordium, where he likens the path 
that Serenus must take to attain virtue as a difficult and hard ascent up a 
mountain. Virtue is the goal at the top of the mountain (1.1-2).  
 
1. [. . .] Stoici uirilem ingressi uiam non ut amoena ineuntibus 
uideatur curae habent, sed ut quam primum nos eripiat et in 
illum editum uerticem educat qui adeo extra omnem teli iactum 
surrexit ut supra fortunam emineat. 2. 'At ardua per quae 
uocamur et confragosa sunt.' Quid enim? plano aditur 
excelsum? Sed ne tam abrupta quidem sunt quam quidam 
putant. Prima tantum pars saxa rupesque habet et inuii speciem, 
sicut pleraque ex longinquo speculantibus abscisa et conexa 
uideri solent, cum aciem longinquitas fallat, deinde propius 
adeuntibus eadem illa quae in unum congesserat error oculorum 
paulatim adaperiuntur, tum illis quae praecipitia ex interuallo 
apparebant redit lene fastigium.  
 
The image of the path to virtue being arduous and steep is a very old one, 
and goes back to Hesiod (see Commentary ad loc.). The connection of the 
image of the road with philosophical activity is very old and can be seen in 
Parmenides (fr. 2 DK; Kirk, Raven and Schofield 344), where the goddess 
shows him the two ways: the way of truth and the way of falsehood. There 
is also the choice of Hercules (Xen. Mem. 2.1.21): faced with a choice 
between a long life of ease but without virtue, and a short, arduous life of 
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virtue, he chose the latter. In Epistle 51, S. associates virtue with the image 
of being on a mountain top, and moral decline being on the plain. He 
exemplifies this conceit through Hannibal, who (he claims) was virtuous 
when crossing the Alps, but whose moral character declined once he gained 
control of the decadent city of Capua. Being in the mountains is associated 
with not shirking difficulties, testing oneself by overcoming obstacles, and 
hard training.
76
 Soldiers (like Hannibal) who have trained in the mountains 
are tougher and more effective than those who have been on garrison duty in 
the towns.
77
 
In addition to being associated with virtue, which is attained by a 
long and arduous ascent, height is also associated by S. in CS with the 
notion of divinity. The sage, the virtuous man, is similar to a god and as 
such is as invulnerable to the attacks of non-sages as gods are to those of 
mortals. So, at CS 4.1, the metaphorical distance between sage and non-sage 
is expressed in terms of images of height. The sky, where the gods live, 
cannot be reached by the missiles of earthly potentates.
78
 Just as the 
destruction of a temple does nothing to impair the divinity of the god whose 
temple it is, so any attack on the sage (however much physical damage may 
be done to him we are to infer) will be in vain, because (here again we must 
infer this from the passage) it will not affect his virtue.  
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 Cf. Livy 39.1 (and Commentary on CS 1.1-2). 
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 Ep. 51.5-8.  
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 An interesting variation of the height image is the depth image to denote the 
similar inability of oriental tyrants to attack Neptune, god of the sea (CS 8.2). 
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This imagery of height is continued at 6.4, in the exemplum episode 
of Stilbo and Demetrius Poliorcetes (5.5-6.8). Stilbo’s city, Megara, has 
been besieged and taken by Demetrius Poliorcetes (‘the Besieger’). Here, 
though, the vocabulary of height is used literally, not metaphorically, to 
describe high city walls. Demetrius may (literally) be able to make high 
towers (turrium altitudinem) totter by undermining them, or to raise an 
earthen ramp that will equal the height of the highest citadels (editissimas 
arces), but no siege engines can (metaphorically) shake the bene fundatu[s] 
animu[s] of the sage. Fundatus literally means ‘having secure foundations’, 
‘securely established’, ‘firmly founded’ (OLD). The sage’s soul has sound 
foundations, like a strong building, which is contained in the final section of 
the Stilbo episode. Here, there is a move from the imagery of height to the 
imagery of siege warfare, and in 6.8, S. draws the moral of Stilbo’s words, 
this time applying siege imagery directly to the sage. He cannot lose 
anything because he is ‘full of divine and human virtues’. His bona are 
‘encircled by solid and insurmountable fortifications’ (bona eius solidis et 
inexsuperabilibus munimentis praecincta sunt). Unlike the walls of 
Babylon, Carthage and Numantia, which did not prevent the capture of their 
cities, the fortifications that protect the sage’s soul allow no entry: they are 
high, impregnable, on a level with the gods (excelsa, inexpugnabilia, dis 
aequa).  
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The image of the soul as a high citadel (or fortified temple) had been 
used by Roman philosophers (Epicureans as well as Stoics) before Seneca.
79
 
It certainly evokes the tranquil self-sufficiency of the sage (whatever his 
school), fortified by his virtue. However, it also evokes the idea of the Stoic 
city, the ideal polity whose citizens are Stoic sages and the gods, with the 
other humans being inhabitants, rather like the non-citizens (women, 
children, slaves, resident aliens) of the actual Greek or Roman city.
80
 
The thought is found again at CS 8.2. The sage stands as a neighbour 
and closest to the gods (uicinus proximusque dis consistit) (a locational 
image). He proceeds towards (pergens) things that are high (excelsa; 
amongst their other qualities). He will desire nothing that is low (humile: 
literally ‘of earth’).  
Imagery of height reoccurs (though less intensely) in the second part 
of the divisio, which deals with insult. Here S. speaks of the humilitate 
animi . . . supprimentis se ac descendentis (10.3): the person who accepts an 
insult for himself to be lowly, lower than the person who is insulting him. 
The magnanimitas of the sage means that he considers that no one will have 
the audacity tanto excelsiora despicere (11.2). 
S.’s choice of imagery of height in CS is appropriate to the subject 
matter. In Stoicism, the association of the sky with divinity had special 
resonance, in that the divine fire or breath (pneuma), the rational, ordering 
principle that pervades the universe, including the soul of man, dwelt in its 
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 Lucretius (2.6-7); Cicero (PS 27; Div. 1.45 (interpretation of the dream of 
Tarquinius Superbus); Tusc. 2.58). 
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 According to the interpretation of Vogt (2008).  
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pure, unmixed form in the empyrean, beyond the orbit of the moon. In that 
region of the universe were to be found the planets, which were gods or 
goddesses (hence their names). Elsewhere, we find S. interested in the 
connections between the divine and the heavens. The choice of celestial 
phenomena as the focus of his Natural Questions is justified in the Preface 
to Book I of that work by the consideration that contemplation of the 
heavens encourages the development of the soul in the direction of virtue. 
Contemplation of the sereneness of the heavens will inculcate sereneness 
(an aspect of virtue) in the soul of the contemplator. Moreover, the 
contemplator of the heavens will come to realize how insignificant human 
concerns are.  
However, the Stoics adapted imagery that was already common and 
well established. In Greek culture, for example, Mount Olympus was 
thought to be the abode of the gods. Leaving aside ancient cultures, in much 
human language and thought goodness and height generally seem to be 
associated, as are authority and height.  
 
II 
 
The most frequent type of images in CS is military combat, and also combat 
more generally (including boxing and gladiatorial combat);
81
 indeed, we 
have already seen military imagery (e.g. impregnable city walls) combining 
with height imagery in the examples given in the previous section. The 
                                                          
81
 Armisen-Marchetti (1989). 
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ground is prepared for this almost from the very beginning of the treatise in 
the two sections devoted to Cato and his efforts to resist the faction of 
Caesar and finally holding up the tottering Republic as Atlas does the world: 
an allusion to the civil war. The mention of people who destroy temples 
(4.2), coming as it does after a reference to Xerxes (4.2), probably suggests 
the destruction of Greek temples by Xerxes in the invasion of Greece. 
However, the first explicit mention comes at 4.3 when the sage invulnerable 
to injury is compared to a general of a strong army in enemy territory. 
Thereafter military images occur frequently.
82
  
S.’s fondness for military images is not confined to CS.83 An 
interesting use of it appears at Ep. 59. In the context of a broader case for 
the appropriateness of images in philosophical discourse, he cites with 
approval the use of a military image by the Stoic/Pythagorean philosopher 
Sextius, the teacher of S.’s own teacher Sotion, saying that Sextius uses 
‘Greek words, but Roman customs’  
(Graecis verbis, Romanis moribus, Ep. 59.7). S. Quotes Sextius directly: 
 
'Idem' inquit 'sapiens facere debet: omnis virtutes suas undique 
expandat, ut ubicumque infesti aliquid orietur, illic parata 
praesidia sint et ad nutum regentis sine tumultu respondeant.'  
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 See principally 5.6, 6.6, 6.8, 8.3, 9.4, 15.4, 19.3, 19.4. 
83
 See the ‘Catalogue de images’ in Armisen-Marchetti (1986: 69-201); Sommer 
(2005). 
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Apart from the similarity of the imagery with that found in CS 4.3 of the 
general in enemy territory, what is notable is S.’s explanation of how an 
image can serve as an integral part of philosophical paraenetic.
84
 From the 
translated quotation from Sextius, we can see that S. is following a tradition 
of philosophical discourse that uses an image as an illustration of an 
approved mode of behaviour that is expounded on by the writer/speaker. Of 
course, we do not have the full quotation of Sextius from which the image is 
taken, and Sextius may have used other images too, perhaps also used by S. 
Another point of interest is the phrase Graecis verbis, Romanis 
moribus: Sextius philosophised (whatever the medium – spoken word or 
writing) in Greek (the standard language of philosophy), but ‘with Roman 
mores’. In other words, the subject matter of his philosophical discourse was 
Roman. What this meant is suggested by the next sentence, which presents 
the military image of the army advancing in square formation, ready for 
battle. From this passage, therefore, it would seem that military imagery, to 
S.’s mind at least, was something appropriately Roman. This is not to say 
that military imagery may not have been in the earlier, non-Roman tradition 
of Stoic writing. Socrates, who was much admired by the Stoics as a 
paradigm of the virtuous man, did distinguish himself as a soldier.
85
 
However, the scarcity of surviving Stoic writing before Seneca precludes a 
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 [6] Invenio tamen translationes verborum ut non temerarias ita quae periculum 
sui fecerint; invenio imagines, quibus si quis nos uti vetat et poetis illas solis 
iudicat esse concessas, neminem mihi videtur ex antiquis legisse, apud quos 
nondum captabatur plausibilis oratio: illi, qui simpliciter et demonstrandae rei 
causa eloquebantur, parabolis referti sunt, quas existimo necessarias, non ex 
eadem causa qua poetis, sed ut imbecillitas nostrae adminicula sint, ut et dicentem 
et audientem in rem praesentem adducant. 
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 See D.L. 2.23. 
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secure judgement on how frequent military imagery was in early and Middle 
Stoic texts. We therefore cannot be certain how far S. is providing 
something distinctively Roman when he uses military imagery, or is 
following the Stoic tradition(s) he inherited. Perhaps he is doing both 
simultaneously.  
The function of the military imagery in CS has more than one strand. 
The central exemplum of Stilbo shows the sage unaffected by the 
belligerence around him. In the midst of the chaos and violence of the sack 
of Megara, he alone is at peace (pax). His indifference to what is going on 
about him (including personal loss – the rape of his daughters) shows his 
virtuous recognition of what is important: his bona are his virtue, which is 
intact; the other bona (personal possessions) are fortuita and unimportant. 
Here, the military imagery provides the background, the foil, against which 
the sage’s virtue is demonstrated. Stilbo is not a soldier, but a non-
combatant, who is unfazed by the presence of Demetrius Poliorcetes. Virtue 
here is exemplified against military activity. 
Elsewhere, the military imagery is used positively, to illustrate 
behaviour or a state of mind that should be striven for. Thus, as we have 
seen, at CS 4.3 the sage is like a general (whereas in the Stilbo-exemplum 
Demetrius, the general, is the antithesis of the sage) in enemy territory, 
invulnerable to attack. The sage’s invulnerability is emphasized at the end 
of CS (19.3) by the image of the soldier withstanding the spears and stones 
that rattle upon his helmet.  
62 
 
62 
 
A similarly defiant and positive view of combat (if not specifically 
military activity) is provided by the imagery at 16.2, where S. contrasts the 
passivity of the Epicureans with the more positive and active attitude of the 
Stoics. The ‘Epicurean’ gladiator, on receiving a wound, halts and presses it. 
The ‘Stoic' gladiator, by contrast, ignores it, declaring that it is nothing and 
refusing help; he carries on the fight. Overall, though, the military imagery 
does emphasize the ‘passive’, enduring aspects of warfare, rather than the 
‘active’ aspects (e.g. killing). In this, it reflects the purpose of the dialogue: 
to show that the sage does not accept injury or insult. The central quality 
being demonstrated is (metaphorical) invulnerability.  
In this respect, the image of the invulnerable citadel unites the 
images of height as virtuous (discussed earlier) and the notion of 
invulnerability, which is expressed through military imagery. The citadel (a 
military image representing the soul of the sage) is invulnerable to attack 
from (metaphorical) siege engines of all kinds because of the height of its 
walls (i.e. by the virtue of the sage) (6.4).  
Invulnerability, besides being expressed through military images, is 
also suggested by individual words, for instance: firmitas (1.3, 6.2, 13.1, 
17.1
86
), contrasted with infirmus (7.2, 10.3); solidus (3.5, 5.4, 6.8,
87
 11.1); 
robur (3.4, 4.5,
88
 9.5
89
). They could equally well apply to the subcategory of 
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 This time of Fidus Cornelius, who although no sage, had confronted many 
maledicta before he wept at Corbulo’s jibe. 
87
 Bona eius solidis et inexsuperabilibus munimentis praecincta sunt. 
88
 … ita sapientis animus solidus est et id roboris collegit ut tam tutus sit ab 
iniuria quam illa quae rettuli. 
89
 Here an image from boxing: Sic in certaminibus sacris plerique uicerunt 
caedentium manus obstinata patientia fatigando: ex hoc puta genere sapientem, 
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‘hardness’ images and metaphor applied to the sage; for instance where he 
is likened to adamant or jutting rocks that withstand the assault of the seas at 
CS 3.5.  
 
III 
 
A very interesting, but restricted (limited?), use of imagery is the use of 
legal imagery that occurs mainly in the main discussion of injury 
(particularly 5.4-8.1). From this discussion, we can see that legal language 
and imagery is largely restricted to the specific treatment of iniuria in 
sections 5-9. Although it does not drive the argument, it is integral to the 
discussion of the nature of iniuria, which is an offence under the law, and 
the sage’s immunity to it. S.’s choice of imagery is here seen to be 
appropriate to the subject matter, something that is confirmed by the 
scarcity of legally charged words in the second half of the treatise, which 
concerns insult. 
As S. says at 5.4, injury involves loss of social standing, health, and 
physical possessions. These things are the gifts of fortuna and as such are 
unstable; she can take them away as easily as she has bestowed them. The 
sage may possess any or all of the above things, just as may the non-sage; 
and just as the non-sage may lose these things at any time in his life, so may 
                                                                                                                                                   
eorum qui exercitatione longa ac fideli robur perpetiendi lassandique omnem 
inimicam uim consecuti sunt. 
64 
 
64 
 
the sage. By contrast, virtue, the unique distinguishing feature of the sage, is 
securely possessed; once attained, it cannot be lost. 
At this point legal imagery appears: 
 
Itaque nihil perdet quod perire sensurus sit; unius enim in 
possessione uirtutis est, ex qua depelli numquam potest, ceteris 
precario
90
 utitur: quis autem iactura mouetur alieni? (5.5) 
 
The contrast between virtue and other ‘goods’ is seen in terms of legal 
possession. Virtue alone is what the sage possesses (it belongs to him). The 
other things he ‘possesses’, by contrast, he holds by the say-so of another 
(precario), in this case fortune, who could ask for it back when he or she 
wishes.  
The encounter between Stilbo and Demetrius Poliorcetes illustrates 
this contrast between two concepts of possession, the legal/societal and the 
moral. Demetrius, who has besieged Megara and whose troops are sacking 
it, asks Stilbo (doubtless ironically) if he had lost anything. Stilbo says he 
has not: ‘omnia mea mecum sunt’, this despite the fact that patrimonium in 
praedam cesserat . . . et patria in alienam dicionem peruenerat (5.6).  
The point is reinforced at 5.7, which is rich in legal vocabulary: 
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 For discussion of this and other legal terms, see the relevant places in the 
Commentary. 
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At ille uictoriam illi excussit et se urbe capta non inuictum 
tantum sed indemnem esse testatus est; habebat enim uera 
secum bona, in quae non est manus iniectio, at quae dissipata 
et direpta ferebantur non iudicabat sua, sed aduenticia et nutum 
fortunae sequentia. Ideo ut non propria dilexerat; omnium enim 
extrinsecus adfluentium lubrica et incerta possessio est. 
 
Stilbo ‘bore witness’ that he had ‘suffered no loss’. His ‘true goods’ (his 
virtue) lie beyond the ordinary means by which possession is established 
(e.g. manus iniectio). The goods that were said to be have been taken from 
him he did not judge to be his, but things that had come to him by accident; 
possession of them was uncertain.  
Finally, in his speech, Stilbo says (6.5-6): 
 
solus et senior et hostilia circa me omnia uidens tamen integrum 
incolumemque esse censum meum profiteor: teneo, habeo 
quidquid mei habui. 6. Non est quod me uictum uictoremque te 
credas: uicit fortuna tua fortunam meam. Caduca illa et 
dominum mutantia ubi sint nescio: quod ad res meas pertinet, 
mecum sunt, mecum erunt. 
 
His property may have passed into another’s possession; such things are 
transitory, like inheritances that cannot be taken up by the legatee and fall 
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into the possession of the treasury (caduca); but what is truly his remained 
with him. 
Throughout this passage, reinforced by the use of legal imagery, 
there is interplay between the notion of the possession of ‘worldly goods’ 
and the possession of the true goods of virtue. Legally, Stilbo has lost 
everything; morally, he has lost nothing. Legally, he has suffered (accepted) 
iniuria; morally, he has not, for the legal concept of iniuria has no purchase 
in the life of the sage qua sage. 
Technical legal imagery is not used for the next two sections (7-8), 
which are concerned with syllogisms demonstrating the impossibility of the 
sage accepting injury. However, there are general hints: at 8.1 the syllogism 
that ‘proves’ the logical incompatibility of the sage with injustice (and its 
cognate iniuria), although concerned with very abstract moral terms, does 
hint at the legal realm.
91
 And among the mala and false iniuriae that fortune 
can inflict are iratae leges and saeuissimi domini (8.3) and the machinations 
of illis per quae periculum nobis quaesitum est, ut accusatore summisso aut 
criminatione falsa aut inritatis in nos potentiorum odiis quaeque alia inter 
togatos latrocinia sunt (9.2). They remind the reader of the point made 
earlier that the legal system is part of the realm of fortuna. 
From section 10 onwards, we are in the part of the treatise that deals 
with insult. Here, not unexpectedly, legal imagery plays little to no part, 
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 Praeterea iustitia nihil iniustum pati potest, quia non coeunt contraria; iniuria 
autem non potest fieri nisi iniuste; ergo sapienti iniuria non potest fieri. 
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since S. says that contumelia, the minor iniuria, is not punishable by law 
(10.1). 
At 12.3, however, the word contumacia (‘disobedience (of a legal 
summons)’) occurs in the context of the sage good-humouredly 
admonishing adults who try to insult him, just as humans correct horses, 
without taking offence at what they do: sic enim et pecora uerbere 
domantur, nec irascimur illis, cum sessorem recusauerunt, sed 
compescimus, ut dolor contumaciam uincat. Here, however, the legal sense 
of the word seems to be less in play; rather, the more general sense of 
‘disobedience’ is intended. 
Underlying S.’s use of legal imagery in CS is the Stoic notion of 
natural law: a cosmic law that is the rational principle immanent in the 
universe. This natural law is distinct for the laws of individual cities and 
countries, which may differ from each other. By contrast, the natural law is 
the same for all men at all times. On the traditional Stoic view of natural law 
as set out by Zeno in his Republic, only the sages, owing to their perfect 
reason and virtue, could be citizens in the perfect city. As hardly anyone 
was capable of attaining perfect virtue anyway, this divine city was 
probably viewed by Zeno and the early Stoics as an ideal rather than a 
realistic blueprint for a future society (see Schofield 1999; Vander Waerdt 
1994; Vogt 1998).  
 
IV 
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Another category of images that S. uses in CS is the medical. Medical 
imagery and analogies are very common in all the main schools of 
Hellenistic philosophy, and not just the Stoic. In all the schools the 
philosopher is seen as a doctor to the soul; his brand of philosopher – 
whether Stoic, Epicurean or Sceptic – is a purveyor of spiritual medicine 
who purpose is to heal the sick soul of the philosophical neophyte. (See 
Nussbaum (2009) for a full discussion.) The occurrence of medical imagery 
in CS therefore comes as no surprise.  
At CS 1.1 uses medical imagery to contrast the Stoic sages with 
other ones (maybe Epicurean). The ‘other wise men’ (ceteri sapientes) are 
like doctors attached to a household who give soft and bland treatments to 
sick bodies, not because that is the best and swiftest cure, but because that is 
only what they are permitted to do. By contrast, the Stoics offer a virile way 
to virtue. The medical imagery of the house doctors, which is an analogy not 
a metaphor, is not continued when the hard Stoic path is introduced. Of 
more interest to S. is the male/ruling v. female/subservient contrast, which is 
introduced in the first sentence of CS. 
Medical analogy recurs at CS 13.1-2, where S. discusses the correct 
response to insults, i.e. not to be offended, as exemplified by the sage. The 
non-sages who insult the sage are like feverish patients who insult their 
doctors. As the doctor is not provoked by the provocations of sick men, so 
the sage does not get rattled by the insults of the ignorant non-sages. 
Moreover, he behaves towards all non-sages as a doctor behaves with his 
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patients: not being offended by their insults and provocations but firmly 
applying the cure. 
In his description of Caligula’s physical appearance, S. refers to his 
paleness: tanta illi palloris insaniam testantis foeditas erat (18.1).
92
 Pallor 
is used as a medical term by Celsus (e.g. 3.6.7).
93
 However, S. might also be 
alluding to Caligula’s effeminacy (cf. 18.3 for Caligula’s effeminacy in 
dress: perlucidus, crepidatus, auratus). Pliny, for instance (Pan. 48.4), 
speaks of Domitian’s femineus pallor in corpore when angry.  
In the last section of the works (19.3) the medical analogy recurs: 
Diuerso autem remedio utetur sapiens adfectatorque sapientiae. However, 
remedium here may well be a dead metaphor. In the comparison between 
the strategies the novice may use to deal with insults and the sage’s already 
attained victory over insults (19.4), medical analogy or imagery plays no 
role; military imagery predominates. Overall, in CS, medical imagery plays 
a secondary role, in comparison with military and legal imagery. 
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 C. Caesar, inter cetera uitia quibus abundabat contumeliosus, mira libidine 
ferebatur omnis aliqua nota feriendi, ipse materia risus benignissima: tanta illi 
palloris insaniam testantis foeditas erat, tanta oculorum sub fronte anili 
latentium toruitas, tanta capitis destituti et ~emendacitatis~ capillis adspersi 
deformitas; adice obsessam saetis ceruicem et exilitatem crurum et enormitatem 
pedum. 
93
 Langslow (2000: 195) lists it among the 28 Latin words ending in –or used by 
Celsus. 
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VI. MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 
The moral psychology underlying the sage’s immunity to injury and insult 
has to be reconstructed principally from two passages, CS 9.3 and CS 10.3. I 
should say at the outset that the discussion which follows is intended to 
explain the rather brief and sketchy analysis offered by S. in CS. These 
passages in themselves are not, in my view, very helpful in illuminating 
Stoic moral psychology; rather, they are themselves in need of illumination 
in the light of our established knowledge of Stoic moral psychology from 
other works of S. and other ancient writers and from modern scholarship. To 
my knowledge, this is the first detailed discussion of these passages using 
modern scholarship.  
The two passages I shall discuss straddle the end of the first part of 
the divisio, which deals with injury, and the second part, which is concerned 
with insult. The first passage comes at the end of the first half of the section 
(9.3), immediately before the peroration that rounds off that section (9.4); 
the second passage comes almost at the beginning of the insult section. 
Although they deal respectively with injury and insult, it is appropriate that 
they are placed close together as injury and insult are close relatives and the 
moral psychology underlying them is much the same. 
I shall now provide a close paraphrase of both passages, followed by 
an analysis.  
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In CS 9.3, S. says that no one accepts an injury inmota mente 
(‘unmoved mind/soul’): he is disturbed (perturbatur) by the sensus of the 
injury (eius). By contrast, the sage lacks disturbance (caret autem 
perturbatione); he is ‘snatched away’ from errors; he is his own master; he 
is calm and at peace. This is because (Nam) if injury ‘touches’ (tangit) him, 
it also moves and ‘impels’ him; however, he lacks anger, for he only has 
anger if he also has injury, but he knows that injury cannot be done to him. 
Because of this, he is ‘upright’ and happy, raised up by continuous joy. 
However, he is so far from being depressed (contrahitur) at the shocks 
produced by things and by people that he finds injury useful, a means of 
testing himself and his virtue. 
At 10.2, having just described insult as a ‘lesser injury’, S. then says 
that ‘this emotion is moved by the lowliness of a soul that is contracting on 
account of something said or done that is disrespectful’ (Hunc adfectum 
mouet humilitas animi contrahentis se ob dictum factum inhonorificum). 
After citing some imaginary complaints at insulting behaviour, which he 
dismisses as the complaints of a seasick mind (quae quid uocem nisi 
querellas nausiantis animi), uttered by people who are self-indulgent and 
fortunate (delicati et felices), who are too leisured to have worse things to 
worry about; their minds are weak by nature, effeminate, playing around in 
the absence of real injury; and most of these things are the result of the fault 
of the interpreter. Whoever is affected by insult shows want of good sense 
or self-confidence, for he judges that he is despised and this biting occurs in 
conjunction with a cetain lowliness of a mind that is depressing itself and 
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sinking down (hic morsus non sine quadam humilitate animi euenit 
supprimentis se ac descendentis). The sage, however, is despised by no one; 
he knows his own greatness and says to himself that no one is allowed to 
have so great power over him; and all these things, which I would call not 
miseries of the mind but annoyances, he does not defeat, but rather does not 
even feel them (non uincit sed ne sentit quidem). 
Several things emerge from these passages. First, to accept an injury 
involves some sort of mental movement and disturbance (cf. inmota mente 
and perturbatur, 9.3). Mens generally in Latin refers to the reasoning 
faculty, the intellect; also, design and purpose.
94
 It is the rational, cognitive 
capacity, the ability to make judgements.
95
 From S.’s account it seems that 
the mental movement is accompanied by a disturbance (perturbatio) 
prompted by some sensation (sensus). S. is not specific about what this 
sensation could be, but, given the tripartite definition of iniuria given earlier 
(5.1: detriment of status, body, or things placed outside us), it could involve 
physical injury (e.g. feeling a blow), the visual sensation of (e.g.) seeing 
one’s property damaged, or the auditory sensation of (e.g.) hearing a libel 
against oneself. The person who accepts the injury is disturbed at this and 
his mind is moved.  
When S. speaks of perturbatio, he is using the Latin term that Cicero 
uses in the Tusculan Disputations to translate the Greek pathos, which is 
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 OLD 1, 7.  
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 S. may be referring to the hegēmonikon (which he translates as regium principale 
at Ira 1.37), the ‘directive faculty’ (the translation of the Greek used by Graver 
(2007: 21)), but we cannot be sure.  
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translated in English as ‘passion’ (or ‘emotion’, in modern English, 
although ‘passion’ is very frequently used in modern discussions of the 
emotions in ancient philosophy). The passions, of which there are four main 
categories (grief (lupē), fear (phobos), appetite (epithumia) and pleasure 
(hēdonē)),96 are held by the Stoics to be morally dubious, unvirtuous, 
because they are the product of wrong reasoning. Cicero’s translation is 
more vivid and stronger than the Greek, which could just mean 
‘experience’; perturbatio makes explicit the dysfunctional nature of 
passions in Stoic moral psychology. S. often uses the word adfectus, too, to 
denote pathos, as at CS 10.2 and in the De Ira.
97
 The particular perturbatio 
that S. has in mind here is anger (ira),
98
 which seems to fit under grief in the 
list of the four main categories given above. It is also the standard example 
of a passion used both by Stoics and by philosophers of other schools.
99
 The 
sage, by contrast, does not experience anger or any other perturbatio, but 
rather is calm and experiences continuous joy. Here S. is referring to the 
‘good passions’ (eupatheiai), which are exclusive to the sage.100 I shall 
discuss the ‘good passions’ in details later.  
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 Andronicus, De Passionibus 1 (SVF 3.391, part = Long and Sedley 65B). Note 
that lupē and phobos relate to things perceived as bad in the present and future 
respectively, while hēdonē and epithumia concern goods in present and future 
respectively.  
97
 See Busa—Zampolli for listings of the occurrences of both terms. 
98
 This is implied by CS 10.3 (Nam si tangit illum iniuria, et mouet et inpellit; caret 
autem ira sapiens, quam excitat iniuriae species, nec aliter careret ira nisi et 
iniuria, quam scit sibi non posse fieri). Cf. 12.3 (irascimur), 13.1 (irascitur), 16.4 
(irascimur), 18.4 (iratus fuit), 19.2 (Aliquando etiam obirati potentibus detegemus 
hunc adfectum intemperanti libertate) as a reaction to perceived insult. 
99
 In addition to S.’s De ira, cf. Plutarch’s De cohibenda ira. 
100
 Concerning the present: gaudium, joy. Concerning the future: eulabeia, caution 
(bad); boulēsis, wish (good). Note that there is no equivalent of distress/pain 
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For now, I would like to discuss the motions of the soul that take 
place both in the person accepting an injury and in the sage. It should be 
clear by now that the soul of the person accepting an injury is moved by the 
sensation of whatever the injury is. However, to understand this fully, we 
need also to examine what is happening, or rather not happening, to the sage 
in a similar situation. For, it seems the sage does experience something 
when someone seeks to do him an injury. The crucial sentence is this one: 
 
Nam si tangit illum iniuria, et mouet et inpellit; caret autem ira 
sapiens, quam excitat iniuriae species, nec aliter careret ira nisi 
et iniuria, quam scit sibi non posse fieri. (10.3) 
[For if injury touches him, it also moves and pushes him; 
whereas the wise person is without anger, which is aroused by 
the appearance of injury. Nor could he have been without anger 
if he were not also without injury, which he knows cannot be 
done to him. (Ker’s translation)] 
 
Most important is the verb tangit. The injury touches, the sage, i.e. 
something impinges on him from outside. That is quite credible, given that 
injury involves someone doing something to one’s body or property, or 
saying something about one or to one. But et movet et impellit is more 
puzzling: there is some movement, apparently even an impulse to it, but as 
                                                                                                                                                   
among the eupatheiai concerning the present: the sage is never distressed. See 
Brennan 2005: 97-100; Graver 2006: 50-53. 
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the sage lacks anger, nothing further happens. Also, iniuriae species is 
puzzling: what exactly would the ‘appearance of injury’ be? 
De ira 2.3-4 may help us here. Here S. lays out in detail what he 
takes to be the process by which a passion, in this case anger, takes root in 
the mind. The process consists of three consecutive movements of the mind. 
The first type of movement is involuntary, prompted by ‘impressions 
presented to us’ (Kaster’s translation: oblatas rerum species, Ira 2.3.1).101 
Species is usually taken to be a translation of the Greek technical term 
phantasia, a mental impression of something external.
102
 Now, many 
impressions are quite neutral in respect of their influence on action (a tree in 
the distance, perhaps), but some have a bearing on our actions. These latter 
are the type of impression that Stobaeus terms ‘impulsory’ (phantasian 
hormētikēn), that is, their content includes the idea that some action would 
be appropriate.
103
 Thus, in the specific case of anger, the species iniuriae 
(Ira 3.5; cf. CS 9.3) suggests that one has been wronged and that one should 
be angry and seek to avenge oneself. Such species rerum often involve 
instinctive bodily reflex responses to stimuli, such as blushing, hair standing 
on end, trembling, and so on. They can also be quite at variance with the 
normal behaviour of the individuals who experience them; so a brave man 
will tremble when he hears the signal for battle (Ira 2.3-2-3). So, to 
extrapolate from S., if someone receives a blow to the face, he will feel the 
pain of the blow and will feel an initial, instinctive flash of annoyance, 
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 Cf. species iniuriae (Ira 2.3.5). 
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 For a discussion of phantasiai, see Graver (2007: 26-29). 
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 Stobaeus 2.7.9 (86 Wachsmuth). 
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perhaps accompanied by an inclination to retaliate.
104
 These first 
movements are involuntary and not under the control of the person 
experiencing them: he cannot help being moved by them, for instance, jolted 
by the impact of a blow. In other words, it has a bare sensory quality (sensus 
in Latin): the impact, the burning sensation. In modern parlance, they can be 
said to provoke ‘fight-or-flight’ responses. What action that may provoke 
will depend on the state of soul of the individual. However, as S. says, these 
initial movements are not themselves passions, but the preliminaries to 
passions.
105
  
There has been much recent scholarly discussion about the precise 
nature of the so-called ‘pre-emotions’, for which the usual Greek term is 
propatheia.
106
 If one does not assent to this impression, then this is a 
‘movement of a mind still obedient to reason’ (Ira 3.4 (Kaster’s translation): 
motum animi rationi parentem). If one assents to the impression, one 
experiences anger, which is ‘the arousal of a mind that moves willingly and 
deliberately toward the goal of vengeance’ (Ira 3.5 (Kaster’s translation): 
concitatio animi ad ultionem uoluntate et iudicio pergentis). Finally, after 
the assent to the impression of injury, there comes the third movement, 
which S. characterizes as ‘out of control, it desires vengeance not if it’s 
appropriate but come what may, having overthrown reason’ (Ira 4.1 
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 Sorabji (2005: 145-50) thinks that this is very similar to the amygdala responses 
to potentially threatening situations that has been identified by modern 
neuroscientists.  
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 sed omnia ista motus sunt animorum moveri nolentium nec adfectus sed 
principia proludentia adfectibus (Ira 2.2.5). 
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 See Inwood (1985: 127-81); Sorabji (2000: 70-75); Graver (2006: 85-108). 
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(Kaster’s translation): tertius motus est iam inpotens, qui non si oportet 
ulcisci uult sed utique, qui rationem euicit). 
To sum up, on the De ira account, there are three movements: (1) an 
involuntary impression; (2) assent to the impression (a voluntary act of 
reason, but an error, the passion of anger); (3) complete and irrational 
dominance by the passion. I shall next compare this account with what we 
find in CS, then examine both accounts in the broader context of recent 
scholarship on the passions in Stoicism.  
However, for the person to become angry, he must assent to the 
impression that an injury has taken place. In other words, it must exercise its 
reason and make a judgement. The particular judgement in this case is that 
harm has been done to him and that retaliation is appropriate. The person 
decides to take action. However, this is where the person who accepts an 
injury is in error and the sage is not. For, as S. has already said at CS 5.4, to 
accept an injury is to judge that one has suffered loss, in respect of one’s 
social standing, body, or externals. Examples of these are (respectively) 
good reputation, health, and wealth. Their loss leads to (respectively) ill-
repute, illness, and poverty. However, all these things which non-sages 
consider good or bad are neither good nor bad in themselves but instead are 
‘indifferents’ (Gk adiaphora, Lat indifferentia). Although, according to the 
circumstances, some indifferents may be preferred (‘promoted’: Gk 
proēgmena; Lat promota) over others, which are relegated (Gk 
apoproēgmena; Lat remota), indifferents have no intrinsic value. Therefore, 
their loss is no loss. The sage does not accept injury or insult because he 
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knows that they concern only indifferents, not genuine goods. On the Stoic 
view, the only thing that is good is (Stoic) virtue, which is the sole 
possession of the sage, and the only thing that is bad is vice, the opposite of 
virtue.
107
 The sage knows this, and consequently he does not err in his 
judgements concerning indifferents. By contrast, the non-sage holds 
indifferents to have intrinsic value and thus be worth pursuing or avoiding 
for their own sake.  
The judgements informing the sage’s actions are, according to S. 
(CS 9.1), consilia (deliberations). The non-sage, by contrast, does not have 
consilia but is instead prompted to act by fraudes et insidiae et motus 
animorum inconditi (‘deceptions and treachery and unconsidered motions of 
the mind’, tr. Ker); in other words, he assents to the species. So, the sage 
acts on the basis of good judgement and deliberation, whereas the non-sage 
is the prey of deceptions and (moral) snares. His motus animorum inconditi 
are the opposite of consilia, being disorderly, irrational impulses, a poor 
basis for action. The sage considers these impulses to be casus (quos 
casibus adnumerat, 9.1), chance, fortuitous occurrences, things that he 
cannot control but which do not affect him in any way; he, by contrast, 
relies on reason (rationi innixus; 8.3).  
CS 9.3 and the De ira passage cited seem to present the Stoic view, 
originating with Chrysippus (Long 1999; Wildberger 2006), that any 
judgement (moral or otherwise) consists of assent (Gk sunkatathesis; Lat 
assensio; cf. adsensu[s] mentis at Ira 2.3.4) to an impression (Gk 
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 Cf. CS 5.4: omnia in se reposuit, nihil fortunae credit.  
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phantasia). It is likely that species corresponds to the Greek term phantasia. 
An impression is a movement or imprinting of the soul (tupōsis) on the basis 
of which a person forms beliefs (Graver 2007: 24). To assent to an 
impression is to believe that it is true; to withhold assent is either to reject 
the impression as false or to suspend judgement as to its truth or falsehood 
pending further information. Impressions are not under the control of the 
person receiving them; what is under the person’s control is whether to 
assent or not to the impression that he has been suffered an injury. So, in the 
case under discussion, the sage and non-sage alike have no control over the 
occurrence of an injury (e.g. a blow to the mouth), but they do have control 
over whether they assent to the impression or not. So, in the present 
passage, to say that the mens is moved is to say that the non-sage has 
assented to the impression that an injury has been done to him. His act is 
rational, but an error; reason is still in control.
108
  
Having made the error of judging that anger and retaliation are 
appropriate, the non-sage compounds his error by giving full rein to the 
movement of his soul that has been initiated by his decision that anger is 
appropriate. At this point the movement acquires impetus. At this point, full-
blown anger is achieved, and the action of retaliation follows. The second 
movement, assent to the impression of injury, was still rational, albeit a 
cognitive error. However, it was not anger, because the movement of the 
soul was exercising its judgement. But anger is something that goes beyond 
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 Ira 2.4.1: cum uoluntate non contumaci. The word contumax (‘obstinate’, 
‘stubborn’) is often used by S. (CS 12.3; De ira 2.26.5, 3.34.1; Clem. 1.16.4) with 
reference to unruly animals which disobey their herdsman.  
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reason (cf. Ira 2.3.4). So, to accept an injury is a three-stage process, 
involving the initial impression or sensation of harm (the species iniuriae), 
then the assent to this impression, and finally the full-blown expression of 
anger. 
The interpretation I have given of the De ira 2.3-4 passage is that 
followed by most scholars, including Sorabji (2005). However, Margaret 
Graver (2006: 125-32) thinks this interpretation is wrong and that the 
impetus is already included in the second movement, while the third 
movement is the brutishness of people like Phalaris (described at Ira 2.5), 
whose behaviour has passed beyond any sort of reason altogether and is 
savagery (feritas). In this connection she points to Ira 2.1.4, citing in 
translation the words (Graver 2006: 129-30) I have put in bold below:  
 
Nobis placet nihil illam [sc. iram] per se audere sed animo 
adprobante; nam speciem capere acceptae iniuriae et 
ultionem eius concupiscere et utrumque coniungere, nec 
laedi debuisse et uindicari, non est eius impetus qui sine 
uoluntate nostra concitatur. Ille simplex est, hic compositus et 
plura continens: intellexit aliquid, indignatus est, damnauit, 
ulciscitur: haec non possunt fieri, nisi animus eis quibus 
tangebatur adsensus est. 
 
Although Graver does not cite them, the words immediately following the 
words non est eius impetus qui sine uoluntate nostra concitatur do support 
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her argument that the second movement is sufficient for the realization of 
anger, for according to Ira 2.1.4 the second movement contains both the 
judgement that an injury has been done and the judgement that it is 
appropriate, in addition to the impetus. However, Graver’s explanation of 
the third movement is more problematic. She claims that their movement 
mentioned at Ira 2.4.1 (tertius motus est iam inpotens, qui non si oportet 
ulcisci uult, sed utique, qui rationem euicit) is not part of the anger but 
anticipates the feritas that is depicted in Ira 2.5, as does illa est ira quae 
rationem transsilit, quae secum rapit (2.3.4). She argues that the closeness 
of the expressions rationem transsilire and rationem euincere (although the 
latter is definitely stronger) reinforces this link. However, Graver’s 
interpretation is refuted, I think, by a closer reading of Ira 2.5, for although 
the feritas has its origins in the frequent exercise of anger (Origo huius mali 
ab ira est, quae ubi frequenti exercitatione et satietate in obliuionem 
clementiae uenit et omne foedus humanum eiecit animo, nouissime in 
crudelitatem transit), it is clearly not anger, and the connection with 
accepting injury, which is the cause of anger, is not present here, as S. 
himself says: Haec non est ira, feritas est; non enim quia accepit iniuriam 
nocet, sed parata est dum noceat uel accipere (2.5.2). While feritas may 
have its origins in proneness to anger, I think Graver is wrong to identify the 
third movement in S.’s earlier discussion of feritas, I think it belongs firmly 
in the explanation of anger.  
If we take as correct therefore the interpretation that De ira presents 
a three-movement explanation of anger, can such an account be discerned in 
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CS 9.3? The passage itself is probably too sketchy to give a clear indication 
of which interpretation of the movements adumbrated in De ira is 
appropriate here. The key words are: Nam si tangit illum iniuria, et mouet et 
inpellit; caret autem ira sapiens, quam excitat iniuriae species. What is 
striking is that the iniuriae species, the first movement (the impression of 
injury), is placed after mouet et inpellit, which probably refers to the second 
and third movements respectively; inpellit probably refers to the hormē 
(appetitus in Cicero’s terminology), which moves the non-sage to react to 
the injury, e.g. to strike back if someone has hit him. S.’s translation of 
hormē may be impetus, as may be suggested by CS 5.2:(alia quae impetu 
quodam erroris inprouidi refugiunt).
109
 The et . . . et syntax probably 
suggests that two separate movements are being discussed. Certainly, 
unsystematic and sketchy as the CS account is, it is probably compatible 
with the three-movement account explained above.  
Leaving aside the applicability of the three-movement account to 
CS, another difference between sage and non-sage in respect of accepting 
injury is that the non-sage’s perturbatio involves contraction: adeo autem 
ad offensiones rerum hominumque non contrahitur.
110
 This part of the 
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 The full passage reads: Ad tantas ineptias peruentum est ut non dolore tantum 
sed doloris opinione uexemur, more puerorum, quibus metum incutit umbra et 
personarum deformitas et deprauata facies, lacrimas uero euocant nomina parum 
grata auribus et digitorum motus et alia quae impetu quodam erroris inprouidi 
refugiunt. Here, of course, S. is talking about opinio doloris, in effect the confusion 
by delicati of contumelia for iniuria.  
110
 Cf. Cicero: Praesentis autem mali sapientis adfectio nulla est, stultorum 
aegritudo est, eaque adficiuntur in malis opinatis animosque demittunt et 
contrahunt rationi non obtemperanteS. Itaque haec prima definitio est, ut 
aegritudo sit animi adversante ratione contractio (TD 4.6.14); Est ergo a e g r i t u 
d o opinio recens mali praesentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse 
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passage should be read in conjunction with CS 10.2-3, in particular these 
words: Hunc adfectum mouet humilitas animi contrahentis se ob dictum 
factum inhonorificum (10.2); non dubie enim contemptum se iudicat, et hic 
morsus non sine quadam humilitate animi euenit supprimentis se ac 
descendentis (10.3).  
In these passages S. refers to the Stoic view of mental processes as 
physical processes. The Stoics believed that the universe was predominantly 
physical,
111
 composed of the four elements of earth, air, fire and water, held 
together by God, who is fire in its purest, least material form, i.e. heat.
112
 
Each of the elements has tonos (tension; Lat. intentio), which varies from 
element to element according to the proportion of God in it. So fire, which 
is nearly all composed of God, has the highest tension; air next-highest 
tension; water less tension than air; and earth the least tension.
113
 The less 
tension an element has, the denser it is; so fire, which has most tension, is 
the most attenuated, while earth, which has the least tension, is the thickest. 
The elements can transform into one another through contraction (sustasis) 
and expansion (chusis). So, fire (dry and hot), when it contracts, becomes 
                                                                                                                                                   
videatur, l a e t i t i a opinio recens boni praesentis, in quo ecferri rectum esse 
videatur, m e t u s opinio impendentis mali, quod intolerabile esse videatur, l i b i d 
o opinio venturi boni, quod sit ex usu iam praesens esse atque adesse (TD 4.7.14); 
Eodem enim vitio est ecfusio animi in laetitita quo in dolore contractio, eademque 
levitate cupiditas est in appetendo qua laetitia in fruendo, et ut nimis adflicti 
molestia, sic nimis elati laetitia iure iudicantur leves; ... (TD 4.21.66).  
111
 With the exception being the ‘incorporeals’ (asōmata): see Brunschwig (2003: 
212-20). 
112
 So Chrysippus, who modified Zeno’s view that God was ‘creative fire’ (pur 
technikon). See Wildberger (2006: 71). 
113
 Cf. Ep. 66.12 (Ratio autem nihil aliud est quam in corpus humanum pars divini 
spiritus mersa). For a full account of pneuma, see Long (1999: 563-4); Wildberger 
(2006: 75-78). 
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air (moist and hot). Air, when it contracts, becomes water (moist and cold); 
while the contraction of water forms earth (dry and cold). The reverse 
process occurs when an element expands. So, the densest element, earth, 
transforms into water, etc., until the thinnest element, fire, is formed.
114
 
Pneuma (breath), a combination of the two active elements, fire and air, 
forms the active guiding force in the universe. It drives change and 
movement, including the growth and generation of living beings. The force 
of pneuma is provided by the ‘good tension’ (eutonia) between fire and air. 
Thus, movements of the soul are literally movements of the body of the 
person; the heart was considered by the Stoics to be the seat of the soul and 
the origin of psychic movements.
115
 So, when someone accepts an injury, 
that is, undergoes the second and third movements discussed above, his soul 
undergoes contractions; and likewise when he accepts an insult, which is a 
‘lesser injury’ according to S.  
The phrase humilitate animi euenit supprimentis se ac descendentis 
echoes humilitas animi contrahentis se at CS 10.2. In the discussion, the 
vocabulary of contraction seems to occasion a metaphorical contrast 
between the magnanimitas of the sage (who does not accept insult) and 
humilitas animi contrahentis of the non-sage (who does accept insult). So 
great is the magnitudo animi of the sage that he does not even feel an insult, 
which is a minor iniuria, let alone accept it. By contrast, the non-sage 
experiences a morsus (‘biting’). ‘Bitings’ are associated with the sensation 
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 See Wildberger (2006: 62-66, and Abb. 4) for a full discussion of expansion and 
contraction. 
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 See Graver (2006: 22-3). 
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of pain (i.e. an injury) in Cicero’s account in the Tusculan Disputations, 
which is influenced by Stoicism:  
 
Itaque et dolor corporis, cuius est morsus acerrumus, perferetur 
spe proposita boni, et acta aetas honeste ac splendide tantam 
adfert consolationem, ut eos qui ita vixerint aut non attingat 
aegritudo aut perleviter pungat animi dolor. (Tusc. 3.25.61) 
 
Here, the morsus is that of physical pain, which is very acute (acerrumus). 
In CS 10.3, however, the lesser injury insult is at issue, and the following 
passage of Cicero, which concerns the aegritudo of grief, is more relevant: 
 
Hoc detracto, quod totum est voluntarium, aegritudo erit sublata 
illa maerens, morsus tamen et contractiuncula quaedam animi 
relinquetur. (Tusc. 3.34.83) 
 
Here, mental anguish, as opposed to physical pain, is associated with 
contraction of the soul, but a small one (contractiuncula). As Graver (2002: 
125) notes, it is ‘a natural but minuscule emotion corresponding to the 
miniscule [sic] significance of external goods’. From the second passage, 
we can infer that the biting sensation which is associated with contraction 
belongs to the first, involuntary movement of the soul. Although S. does not 
discuss morsus in CS 9.3, I think that the two Cicero passages quoted above 
suggest that it would be equally applicable to the iniuria-account, the 
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morsus there being more acute, in proportion to the greater seriousness of 
iniuria.  
We may ask why S., although he mentions contractions at CS 9.3, 
postpones a fuller discussion of them to the section on insult, although they 
apply equally much to injury. My own view is that he thought the 
metaphorical quality inherent in contrahere and its cognates was better 
suited to his discussion of insult, which, on his view, is only accepted if the 
insulted party judges himself to be inferior to the person issuing the insult. 
His low self-esteem and sense of moral and social smallness are suggested 
by contraction, which involves something becoming smaller than it was 
before.
116
 However, the metaphorical potential in contraction would fit very 
well with his definition of iniuria at CS 5.4: Omnis iniuria deminutio eius 
est in quem incurrit. I think the answer lies not in S.’s view of moral 
psychology, but rather in the fact that he views insult as a lesser form of 
injury. Given this, and that once he has proved that the sage cannot suffer 
injury in the first part of the treatise, the section on insult almost becomes 
superfluous, unless he can keep some of his material back in the first section 
in order to present new material in the second section. This is what he does 
with morsus, and to some extent with contraction.
117
 
So much for the state of soul of the person who accepts injury or 
insult. In the soul of the sage, the only motion that has occurred has been the 
first movement (described at De ira 2.3), the bite and contractiuncula (to 
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 It is interesting that S.’s imagery mirrors Stoic psychophysical theory, although 
it does not discuss it directly, but merely alludes to it. 
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 See Williams (2003: 27) for this method in S.’s writing.  
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use Cicero’s term). However, it would be misleading to say that nothing 
happens at all in the sage’s soul. The sage’s emotional state is quite 
different. He lacks both anger and injury, which are linked: nec aliter 
careret ira nisi et iniuria, quam scit sibi non posse fieri (9.3). The 
knowledge that an injury cannot be done to him means that he will not get 
angry.
118
 Far from being angry, he is erectus laetusque est, inde continuo 
gaudio elatus. The word elatus (‘raised up’/’elevated’) seems to correspond 
to the Greek eparsis (‘raising’/’elevation’), which is the opposite psychic 
motion to contraction and accompanies ‘positive’ emotions like joy and 
pleasure, just as contraction accompanies distress.
119
 As we see in CS 9.3, 
the sage’s joy is also continuous. The non-sage usually alternates between 
distress and joy.  
Whereas the non-sage is experiencing a pathos (passion), the sage is 
experiencing continuous (or continually – continuo is ambiguous here) joy 
(gaudium). On the face of it, gaudium would seem to be no more or less an 
emotion than anger. The non-sage surely experiences joy from time to time 
as well as anger. But the sage’s emotional constitution is different from that 
of the non-sage. He does have emotions, but a special category of emotions 
that the Stoics termed ‘good passions’ (Gk eupatheiai; constantiae 
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 As S. explains later, (16.2): Nec enim est quod dicas hoc naturae repugnare: 
non negamus rem incommodam esse uerberari et inpelli et aliquo membro carere, 
sed omnia ista negamus iniurias esse; non sensum illis doloris detrahimus, sed 
nomen iniuriae, quod non potest recipi uirtute salua.- how does this help? Do you 
need it here? If it is saying something important, should an English explanation 
making the point clear occur in the main text? 
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 See the discussion in Graver (2006: 32-33). 
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(‘consistencies’),120 in Cicero’s translation in TD). Stoic joy (Gk chara; Lat 
gaudium) is, according to S., ‘true’ joy, but unlike the non-sage’s joy (which 
is usually termed laetitia by Cicero, although the sage in CS 9.3 is said to be 
laetus), it is a rather severe, serious, solemn joy (Ep. 23.4: verum gaudium 
res severa est, [etc.]):  
The sage welcomes all attempts to injure him as a test of his virtue 
(ut ipsa illi iniuria usui sit, per quam experimentum sui capit et uirtutem 
temptat). 
The distinction between the constantiae of the sage and the 
perturbationes of the non-sage is outlined by Cicero at Tusc. 4.6.14: Sic 
quattuor perturbationes sunt, tres constantiae, quoniam aegritudini nulla 
constantia opponitur. This difference between the sage and non-sage is 
usually illustrated in the scholarship in the following tabular form: 
 
Time Emotions/passions 
(pathē) 
Eupatheiai 
 Good Bad Good Bad 
Present Pleasure Pain Joy [—] 
Future Desire Fear Volition Caution 
 
Source: Brennan (2005: 110), modified. 
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 S. uses firmitas in CS. Constantia occurs only in the MS title.  
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To each of the passions experienced by the non-sage, there corresponds a 
eupatheia of the sage, with the exception of pain or distress, for the sage is 
never distressed, but is continually joyful, as we have seen.  
To sum up, despite its brevity and sketchiness, the moral psychology 
of CS seems reasonably clear and coherent if it is read in conjunction with 
the very full account in De ira.  
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VII. THE NATURE OF INSULT 
 
For S. insult (contumelia) is a lesser form of injury, inasmuch as someone 
who is insulted is offended, whereas the person injured is harmed: 
 
Prior illa natura grauior est, haec leuior et tantum delicatis 
grauis, qua non laeduntur homines sed offenduntur. (CS 5.1) 
[The former kind of injury is more serious, the latter lighter and 
serious only to tender people, inasmuch as they are not harmed 
by it but offended.] 
 
For S. insult comprises something said or done that is inhonorificum,
121
 
‘dishonourable’, ‘disrespectful’, that is, it is an attack by one person on the 
honos of somebody else. From the definitions of honos in the OLD, 
principally ‘1 High esteem or respect accorded to superior worth or rank, 
honour. b (as enjoyed by the recipient)’, it is clear that honos is relevant 
principally to the higher classes of society, the nobiles and equestrians, who 
usually were holders of public office (definition 5 in OLD). Indeed, as J. E. 
Lendon has argued, honour (however it may be termed – Lendon gives 
auctoritas, dignitas, and gloria as other Latin synonyms: 2005: 30-31) was a 
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 Hunc adfectum mouet humilitas animi contrahentis se ob dictum factum 
inhonorificum (10.2). Also 10.3: non dubie enim contemptum se iudicat, et hic 
morsus non sine quadam humilitate animi euenit supprimentis se ac descendentis. 
You could get away with just saying ‘see also 10.3’ if word count becomes an 
issue. 
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vital element in the functioning of administration and society more 
generally in the Roman world. The more honour one had, essentially the 
higher the esteem in which was held, the greater one’s social and political 
influence. An insult, something which according to S. impugns someone’s 
honour, could therefore be perceived as a serious assault on a person’s 
social standing and respect, and hence his ability to function successfully as 
a social being. Diminution of honour could lead to a reduction of the 
existimatio in which a person was held.
122
  
As Lendon notes (2005: 32), honour is important in societies where 
the state is remote or weak, as in modern Mediterranean ones (see ibid. n. 4 
for references), and disputes have to be settled by the parties without 
recourse to law or the intervention of the state. Although one hesitates to 
call the state of the Roman Empire remote or weak, it was not characterized 
by the all-pervasive and sometimes intrusive bureaucracy that is a common 
feature of most modern states. Indeed, in modern welfare states, a great deal 
of everyday life is regulated or overseen by the state to a degree that was 
unknown in the ancient world, even in autocratic polities. Certainly, the 
extra-legality of insult is remarked on by S. when he says that contumelia is 
not covered by the laws as iniuria is.
123
 I discuss the legal aspects of insult 
in section VIII, where I argue that insult was often the subject of an actio 
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 When we talk of honour in the context of Roman society we must be careful not 
to confuse it with honour-codes of the kind that were common in early modern 
Europe. For instance, there seems to have been no equivalent of the early modern 
European institution of duelling, which chiefly among aristocrats and army officers 
was a standard way of settling disputes that arose from insults. See Kiernan (1988) 
for a full treatment of duelling in European history. 
123
 CS 10.1: Est minor iniuria, quam queri magis quam exequi possumus, quam 
leges quoque nulla dignam uindicta putauerunt.  
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iniuriarum in S.’s day, although there was no formal lex covering it. 
However, this legal ambiguity means that insult and reaction to it are as 
much subject to regulation by society as by the courts, and hence is an area 
where honour plays the major role.  
With notions of honour and its impairment went certain emotions. 
For instance, pudor (shame or embarrassment), a sense of having done 
something wrong, could be felt by someone whose own inadequacies were 
made publicly evident, for example by an insult (Kaster 2005: 35-38).
124
 
Closely associated with pudor, of which it is sometimes used as a 
synonym,
125
 is uerecundia (‘a disposition to respect’). The uerecundus 
person would show respect for others, whatever their social status, ‘by 
avoiding offense to others, by avoiding improper assertion of the self’ (ibid. 
17), but would also have a sense of self-respect and would not expect to be 
treated by others in a way that he would not wish to treat them. It is also 
akin to modesty.
126
 By contrast, Caligula, who was contumeliosus (prone to 
insult people), is seen as the opposite of uerecundus. So Suetonius (Gaius 
29.1) recounts how Caligula boasted of his ‘ἀδιατρεψίαν, hoc est 
inuerecundiam’ (the gloss is Suetonius’).127 We can see Caligula’s 
inuerecundia in CS in his cruel and tasteless comments to Valerius Asiaticus 
on the sexual performance of Valerius’ wife. Clearly Caligula would not 
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 On this, see also Barton (2001). What does Barton add to the discussion? 
125
 Cf. VB 12.5: peccandi uerecundiam (shame at wrongdoing). See OLD for the 
range of possible meanings. 
126
 See Mayer on Hor. Ep. 7.37.  
127
 Rolfe’s Loeb translation of inuerecundiam is ‘shameless impudence’. 
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expect to be addressed in this fashion himself; nevertheless, he does not 
hesitate to do it to others. 
By the time of S., many traditional Roman social norms had been 
incorporated into Stoicism through the work of middle Stoics, principally 
Panaetius (see Brunt 2013). So, Cicero, in De officiis, a work strongly 
influenced by Panaetius, lists uerecundia as one of the parts of honestas 
(‘honourableness’, ‘moral rectitude’).128 S.’s discussion here seems to 
conflate two levels of debate, the Stoic one and the conventional Roman 
social one.
129
 
Despite the desirability of behaving uerecunde, there was a type of 
abuse – invective – that was commonly practised by advocates (usually for 
the prosecution) in trials as a means of undermining the opponent and his 
case. Cicero (Cael. 6; see Corbeill 2005: 17) argued that, provided that it 
avoided slander (maledictio), it was acceptable; otherwise it was merely 
contumelia.
130
 The tradition of mocking physical appearance and 
mannerisms was well established by the late Republic. As Cicero said in the 
De oratore, deformity and faults of the body provided material for jokes in 
speeches.
131
 Indeed, Cicero’s prosecution speeches In Verrem, In Pisonem, 
In Vatinium, and the Philippica contain withering personal abuse of the 
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 Sequitur ut de una reliqua parte honestatis dicendum sit, in qua uerecundia et 
quasi quidam ornatus vitae, temperantia et modestia omnisque sedatio 
perturbationum animi et rerum modus cernitur. hoc loco continetur id, quod dici 
latine decorum potest; Graece enim prepon dicitur (Off. 1.93). 
129
 On ‘two-level’ discourse, see Inwood (2005: 90). 
130
 He is implying that the opposing advocate is merely slandering the character of 
his client, Clodius.  
131
 Est etiam deformitatis et corporis uitiorum satis bella materies ad iocandum 
(Or. 2.239). 
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accused. Corbeill (2005: 23-25) suggests that such abuse had an ethical 
function, of exposing the evil characters of bad citizens.
132
 Attitudes to 
insult in the Roman society into which S. was born therefore seem to have 
been complex. On the one hand, morally upright people should not indulge 
in it; on the other hand, it was permissible in certain contexts like trials.  
Despite these complexities, S.’s attitude to insult is that it is 
unimportant and that both the person making the insult and the person who 
accepts it are in error. The motivation for making an insult, according to S., 
is the contempt felt by the insulter for the insulted, and is thus an expression 
of the insulter’s sense of his superiority to the insulted. The insulter does not 
show the insulted the respect that the latter (one assumes) would consider 
his due. Likewise, on S.’s ‘strong’ interpretation of accipere, the insulted 
does not simply ‘accept an insult’ in that someone simply says something 
uncomplimentary to him, i.e. it is said to him, done to him, whatever his 
own view of the matter (just as on the weak interpretation of accipere as he 
would accept an injury because it had been done to him). On the contrary, S. 
in CS has a strong sense of accipere, which is connected to the Stoic notion 
of assent,
133
 for the insulted person to be offended, i.e. to accept the insult, 
he needs not only to have been addressed or treated disrespectfully, but he 
must also both believe that he has been insulted and also agree with the 
insulter’s low opinion of him. He does not have any practical intelligence 
(prudentia) or self-assurance (fiducia). In a sense, then, the acceptance of an 
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 Isak Hammar (2013) examines in detail the importance that late Republican 
politicians laid on trying to prove the alleged immorality of their opponents. 
133
 It should be noted, though, that this is not ‘strong assent’. See Section VI. 
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insult involves a kind of collusion between insulter and insulted. The 
insulted accepts the insulter’s high self-opinion and correspondingly accepts 
the insulter’s low opinion of the insulted himself. Whatever the insulter’s 
social status, in respect of the insult at least, the insulter is someone whose 
opinion matters for the insulted, but not necessarily vice versa (we assume). 
As S. says at CS 13.5, the man who accepts an insult would be equally 
delighted if the insulter had shown him respect.
134
 The person who accepts 
an insult shows his humilitas animi.
135
 By contrast, the sage, who does not 
accept insult, exhibits magnanimitas (magnitudo animi). He does not even 
feel the insult, let alone accept it. Conversely, the person who is most likely 
to accept an insult is also most likely to want to make one, as exemplified 
by Caligula.
136
 Rather than simply think that the insult should not have been 
directed at him given his status. 
The context in which an insult is made can influence the way we 
deal with it. So, insults spoken to guests and host at a dinner party by slave 
boys specially trained for this purpose are taken as witticisms (argutiae) and 
laughed off, whereas if spoken by a friend such remarks would cause 
offence (11.3). Likewise, ‘in the presence of one person’ (the insulter?) we 
merely laugh at something said; but ‘in the presence of more people’ we are 
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 CS 13.5: necesse est enim, a quo quisque contemni moleste ferat, suspici 
gaudeat.  
135
 To use modern psychological jargon, he could be said to have an ‘inferiority 
complex’ or ‘suffers from low self-esteem’, often as a result of adverse experiences 
in early childhood. However, we should be wary of applying this type of 
terminology of to S.’s moral psychology. The humilitas animi of the man who 
accepts an insult is caused by the physical contraction of his body (see section V on 
‘Moral Psychology’). 
136
 CS 18.4: At idem Gaius omnia contumelias putabat, ut sunt ferendarum 
inpatientes faciendarum cupidissimi. 
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indignant.
137
 So, an insult often has a wider societal dimension. The public 
aspect of insult is closely connected with the notion of honour.  
Although many insults are intended, some are unintentional and 
whatever has been said or done (or not done) may be interpreted as an insult 
by the insulted party. Examples of this include someone not returning the 
greeting because he has not noticed the greeter or knocking against someone 
in a crowded room.
138
 
What such disrespect involved may be seen from the many examples 
of insult that S. offers in CS. These range from snubs (deliberate or 
intentional) to outright verbal abuse and name-calling.
139
 They include, in 
Stewart’s (1994: 54-63) terminology, both horizontal insults, i.e. those 
aimed at social equals, and vertical insults, i.e. those aimed at either social 
superiors or social inferiors.  
We can tabulate Stewart’s terms in this way: 
 
intentional or unintentional 
Vertical Horizontal 
superior  inferior inferior  superior between equals 
 
                                                          
137
 CS 16.4: Coram uno aliquid dictum ridemus, coram pluribus indignamur. 
138
 For not noticing a greeting, see CS 13.2.3: […] nec contumeliam iudicabit, si illi 
homo plebis ultimae salutanti mutuam salutationem non reddiderit, sic ne suspiciet 
quidem, […]. For knocking against someone in a crowd, see Ira 2.32.2: M. 
Catonem ignorans in balineo quidam percussit inprudens; quis enim illi sciens 
faceret iniuriam? Postea satis facienti Cato,'non memini' inquit 'me percussum.' 
Melius putauit non agnoscere quam uindicare. 
139
 For a discussion of terms of abuse and name-calling in Latin see Dickey (2002: 
163-85). The practice of name-calling is pretty universal across cultures. See (e.g.) 
the list of insults in Shakespeare cited in Neu 2009: 118-19. 
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The first category of vertical insult, viz. from social superior to inferior, is 
somewhat problematic, because in most societies the respect due to a social 
superior from an inferior is greater than vice versa. However, there are 
limits to how far a superior can ‘lord it’ over an inferior. These limits are 
clearly exceeded in the case of Caligula. His behaviour as depicted in CS 18 
is an abuse of the position of primus inter pares of the princeps. Thus, 
having slept with the wife of Valerius Asiaticus, he comments on her sexual 
performance in the presence of her husband and all the other guests at a 
banquet.
140
 Valerius, who is ferox and not a man to put up with insults, 
cannot retaliate. Such humiliation of dinner guests is characteristic of kings 
and tyrants,
141
 the classic case being Dionysius I of Syracuse as exemplified 
in his treatment of Damocles. Thus at CS 15.1 the imaginary interlocutor 
asks what the sage will do if a king seats him below the table so that he has 
to eat with the slaves. Slightly lower down the social scale, at 10.2 we have 
an unspecified person (probably a client) complaining that an unspecified 
man (probably his patron) did not admit him to an audience, although he 
admitted someone else. Many wealthy people may look down on the sage 
(13.3). 
Examples of the second type of vertical insult often involves the 
failure (perhaps deliberate) of an inferior to show due deference to a 
superior. So at 13.3 a man of the ultima plebs, the lowest rank of citizen, 
may fail to return a sage’s greeting; and a slave dealer may not address the 
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 18.1: in conuiuio, id est in contione. 
141
 E.g. Caligula’s cruel humiliation of Pastor (Ira 2.33.6) and Cambyses’ of 
Praexaspes (Ira 3.14). 
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sage by name. Some people are offended by the behaviour of slaves (14.1). 
Thus a slave responsible for curling hair may knock against them (probably 
unintentionally); a doorman may be awkward and refuse entry (and at 14.2 
we have the durus ianitor, again who refuses entry); an announcer of names 
may be arrogant (how?); and a chamber-slave may be supercilious.
142
 
Notably, perhaps reflecting the relative inarticulateness of these social 
inferiors, the offences they can cause arise from actions (or non-actions, 
such as the failure to carry out tasks effectively), rather than from verbal 
insults.  
Some men may even take offence from women, all of them animalia 
inprudentia, whatever their accomplishments (CS 16.1). S. does not detail 
the types of insult one could receive from women. I have not been able to 
find any. Given the relative paucity of written evidence for the views of 
women in ancient Roman society, this is not surprising.
143
 S. may have had 
in mind rebukes and reproaches of husbands by their wives, which would 
not usually become known outside the home and which could doubtless (as 
in all cultures) be very wounding and upsetting for men of a sensitive 
nature. 
S. provides fewer examples of horizontal insults. However, at 10.2 
we have someone complaining that he was placed at dinner in the imum 
lectum, not the medium lectum. The host is unspecified, but it could be a 
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 A cubicularius was a slave of the bedchamber (cubiculum), which was also used 
for receiving visitors, for example clients at the patron’s morning levee (salutatio). 
See Goldbeck (2010: 100). 
143
 See Morgan (2007: 286-90). 
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social equal. At 17.1 Fidus Cornelius is called by Corbulo a ‘depilated 
ostrich’ and Vatinius is described as victim of Cicero’s wit at 17.3 (although 
this may be a case of vertical insult as Cicero was a former consul and hence 
a more distinguished senator than Vatinius). Characteristically, insults 
between equals are more likely to be verbal than those between people of 
different social levels.  
So much for the direction of insult. I shall now focus on the content 
of verbal insults. Broadly, verbal insults can concern someone’s physical 
appearance, or character, or social status, or a combination of all three. At 
16.4, S. mentions thinning hair, poor eyesight, thin legs and lack of height 
as possible occasions for mockery; while at 17.2 imitation of someone’s 
manner of speaking, gait, and impairments of body and speech are possible 
causes of offence. Indeed, these attitudes seem to have persisted into the 
first century AD, as we see in S. in Ep. 52.12 opining that physical gestures 
and mannerisms are an argumentum morum, as omnia rerum omnium . . . 
indicia sunt.
144
 This physiognomist view, which was presented by Cicero in 
his Laws (1.27-29; see Corbeill 1994: 30-35), is close to the Stoic view that 
nature is a rationally coherent whole and that parts of it can, if properly 
interpreted, lead us to a broader understanding of the whole. However, at CS 
17.2, S. seems to cast doubt on the validity of this physiognomist outlook 
(Quid quos offendimur, si quis . . . imitatur . . . exprimit?), and approves of 
the example of Vatinius, a man ‘born for ridicule and hate’ on account of his 
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 Omnia rerum omnium, si observentur, indicia sunt, et argumentum morum ex 
minimis quoque licet capere: impudicum et incessus ostendit et manus mota et 
flexus oculorum; inprobum risus, insanum vultus habitusque demonstrat. 
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physical appearance and the butt of Cicero’s jokes, who pre-empted 
mockery of his feet (S. does not specify what was wrong with them) and 
fauces concisae (‘scarred jaws’ (Loeb)) by joking about them himself. 
Clearly, for S. in CS, physical peculiarities are not all that important as a 
guide to character and that it is the attitude one takes towards them which 
shows one’s true character.  
In the male-dominated elite culture of late Republican and early 
imperial Rome a particular source of offence could be an imputation of 
effeminacy. In particular, depilation was thought to betoken effeminacy, this 
being a favourite practice of cinaedi, or passive male homosexuals 
(catamites). The ‘depilated ostrich’ taunt directed at Fidus Cornelius in the 
senate (see above) may well contain an imputation of effeminacy (17.1; see 
Commentary ad loc.), no doubt confirmed by Fidus’ tearful reaction. 
Throughout his career Julius Caesar was dogged by insinuations that he had 
been the passive lover of King Nicomedes of Bithynia.
145
 And Caligula 
makes innuendos to Chaerea, a tribune, alluding to his high-pitched voice 
and insinuating that he is effeminate. Chaerea, by virtue of his position, 
cannot retaliate, although he does get his own back later (18.3).  
 
Dealing with insults 
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 Suet. Iul. 49. 
. 
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The sage has no problem with insults: he does not even notice them. He 
feels no shame – internally because he is morally perfect and had nothing to 
reproach himself with; externally because taunts about his appearance etc. 
concern only externals and have no bearing on his intrinsic moral worth. 
However, because of this, he cannot serve as an exemplar for dealing with 
insults. To ‘despise insults’ a sage is not needed, but a consipiens, a man of 
sound mind. When he is insulted, he asks himself: utrum merito mihi ista 
accidunt an inmerito? Si merito, non est contumelia, iudicium est; si 
inmerito, illi qui iniusta facit erubescendum est (16.3). That is, he first 
considers whether he is ‘deservedly’ or ‘undeservedly’ insulted. It is not 
entirely clear what S. means by ‘undeservedly’ and ‘deservedly’ here, but I 
think it likely that they concern the truth of the content of the insult. If true, 
then the insult is deserved, and the insulted should consider the insult a 
correct judgement on his character, or physique, or social standing; if 
untrue, the person making the insult is at fault and should be ashamed of 
himself. The burden of shame rests with the insulter, not the person he is 
seeking to make ashamed by means of insult. So, if someone mocks one’s 
physical appearance, it is no insult, because it concerns what is obvious to 
see (quod apparet, 16.4). S. amplifies this thought at 17.1: if someone 
imitates one’s speech or gait, one should not be offended, because another’s 
imitation does not make better known something we do ourselves. 
Moreover, some people don’t like to be called old or white-haired, although 
many pray to live to a great age. And it is only the man who wants to hide 
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his poverty (because he is ashamed of being poor) who is upset at being 
taunted with poverty.  
The prime example of not being troubled by insults aimed at one’s 
physical appearance in CS is, as we have seen, Vatinius, who pre-empted 
comments on his ugly features by joking about them himself. As S. says, 
you take away the opportunity for those who would insult you by seizing it 
yourself beforehand. This approach is similar to that adopted by the pimp 
Ballio in Plautus’ Pseudolus (359-70, 1080-86), who happily accepts the 
names that he is called by Calidorus and Pseudolus, for example (359-363): 
 
CAL. Ingere mala multa. PS. Iam ego te differam dictis meis. 
impudice. BAL. Itast. CAL. Sceleste. BAL. Dicis vera. PS. 
Verbero. 360 
BAL. Quippini? CAL. Bustirape. BAL. Certo. PS. Furcifer. 
BAL. 
  Factum optume. 
CAL. Sociofraude. BAL. Sunt mea istaec. PS. Parricida. BAL. 
Perge tu. 
CAL. Sacrilege. BAL. Fateor. PS. Periure. BAL. Vetera 
vaticinamini. 
 
Ballio not only freely admits that he is all the things that his interlocutors 
hold him to be, but he even (ll. 360ff.) suggests names that they can call 
him. He is not angry at being called bad, wicked and a liar, because he 
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knows that he is all those things. (Admittedly, as a pimp, he has no 
reputation to lose.)  
Vatinius’ and Ballio’s pre-emptive technique is an extreme form of 
handling insults. It is perhaps akin to the more recent tactic employed by 
minority groups of adopting the names they are called and using them as 
terms of honour (so ‘queer’).146 More common is waiting for an insult to be 
made, and then deftly deflecting it or even turning it back on the insulter. 
An example of this in CS is Antisthenes, who, taunted with having a 
barbarian and Thracian mother, does not deny it (he could not, realistically), 
but declares that Cybele, the mother of the gods, was also from Mount Ida 
(which is in Thrace) (Antistheni mater barbara et Thraessa obiciebatur: 
respondit et deorum matrem Idaeam esse, 18.6). The insult is thus turned: 
Thracian origins can mean divine origins too, not solely servile ones.  
A similar example can be found in Suetonius (Iul. 22). When Julius 
Caesar as proconsul had obtained from the senate the extended province of 
Cisalpine Gaul, Illyricum and Gallia Comata, he boasted in the senate that 
he would ‘jump on all their heads’ (‘insultaturum omnium capitibus’) in a 
few days’ time. A senator responded ‘per contumeliam’ that that would be 
difficult for any woman to do. He thereby hints that Caesar is a passive 
homosexual (‘femina’), this no doubt being an allusion to the story that 
Caesar slept with King Nicomedes of Bithynia in his youth. Caesar’s 
response is not to deny the slur, but, accepting it implicitly, to comment in 
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 See Culler (1997). 
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jest (quasi adludens) that Semiramis (i.e. a woman) was a queen and that the 
Amazons once possessed a great part of Asia.
147
 
A related example comes from De ira 3.23.2. An Athenian, 
Demochares, who was notoriously outspoken, was a member of an embassy 
to Philip of Macedon. When Philip asked them what he could do to please 
the Athenians, Demochares replied ‘hang yourself’. Although the 
bystanders were indignant, Philip told them to be quiet and send ‘that 
Thersites’148 away. He asked the other delegates to tell the Athenians that 
those who say such things are much more arrogant than those who hear 
things said with impunity.  
From the above examples, we can identify a standard approach to 
dealing with verbal insult. First, the insult is delivered; next, the insulted 
person does not deny the content of the insult (whether it concerns his 
appearance, or behaviour, or whatever) as might be expected, but accepts 
the truth of the content. He then highlights a good aspect of this true 
content, so turning an intentional insult into an unintentional compliment. In 
this discussion we can make use of the distinction formulated by J. L. 
Austin (1955) between ‘constative’ and ‘performative’ utterances. The 
former are statements of fact, which may or may not be true. The latter are 
‘speech-acts’, which, like constatives, may or may not be true, but are 
                                                          
147
 quo gaudio elatus non temperauit, quin paucos post dies frequenti curia 
iactaret, inuitis et gementibus aduersaris adeptum se quae concupisset, proinde ex 
eo insultaturum omnium capitibus; ac negante quodam per contumeliam facile 
hoc ulli feminae fore, responderit quasi adludens: in Suria quoque regnasse 
Sameramin magnamque Asiae partem Amazonas tenuisse quondam. See 
Corbeill 1996: 196 and Williams for further discussion of this passage.  
148
 An allusion to the insolent Greek common soldier in the second book of the 
Iliad who spoke impudently to Agamemnon and was thrashed by Odysseus. 
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intended to have some effect on the person addressed. The philosopher Paul 
Grice provides a modified form of this view when he draws a distinction 
between ‘natural meaning’ and ‘non-natural meaning’ (Grice 1989: 213-23). 
The former concerns utterances whose meanings hold independently of the 
context of utterance and whose elements together form a logical entailment; 
here meaning is purely semantic. The latter, by contrast, are dependent on 
the context of utterance for their interpretation; here ‘meaning’ is not so 
much semantic as related to intention and the intended effect on an audience 
(which in Grice’s view could be just one interlocutor) of an utterance. The 
audience must recognise the speaker’s intention if the desired effect is to be 
produced. 
On Austin’s terminology, then, an insult is a performative, whose 
purpose is to offend the addressee. Let us suppose that someone is bald, and 
someone else taunts him about this (‘Baldy!’). The insult, taken as a 
constative, is true, because the person is bald. It is also a performative, 
because it is intended to offend. If the addressee is offended, then the insult 
has achieved its purpose. However, if the addressee is not offended (leaving 
aside for the moment how this lack of offence may be manifested) the insult 
has failed to achieve its purpose; in Austin’s terminology, it has ‘misfired’. 
The addressee has accepted the insult as a constative that is true, but has 
refused to accept its performative force. Another way to look at it might be 
to say that the addressee has converted a performative into a constative.
149
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 For a discussion of the interplay between constatives and performatives and 
how they may be interchanged, see Culler (1997: 100-2). 
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So far I have discussed responses to verbal insults. What of physical 
insults? Two examples of physical insult can be seen at De ira 3.38.1.
150
 
In the first case, the Cynic philosopher Diogenes, lecturing on anger, 
is spat at by an impudent youth (adulescens proteruus), who presumably 
wants to make him angry. Not provoked, he says he is not angry, but doubts 
whether he should be angry anyway. The implication is probably that being 
spat at is a matter of no importance (particularly not for a Cynic 
philosopher, who would be indifferent to physical uncouthness and would 
despise those who think it a matter for concern). 
The second example concerns Cato the Younger, who is spat at by 
the factiosus et inpotens
151
 Lentulus. Again, Cato is not provoked, but wipes 
the saliva off his face and declares that those who say Lentulus has no cheek 
(a pun on a transferred sense of os ‘mouth’) are wrong.152 S. finds Cato’s 
response better, perhaps out of Stoic loyalty (Cato is noster), or because he 
generally finds Cato superior to most other people,
153
 or maybe because the 
reply is wittier and also contains more of a dig at the insulter. One can 
imagine that the response drew some laughter.  
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 1. Contumeliam tibi fecit aliquis: numquid maiorem quam Diogeni philosopho 
Stoico, cui de ira cum maxime disserenti adulescens proteruus inspuit? Tulit hoc 
ille leniter et sapienter: 'non quidem' inquit 'irascor, sed dubito tamen an oporteat 
irasci.' 2. Quanto <Cato> noster melius! qui, cum agenti causam in frontem 
mediam quantum poterat adtracta pingui saliua inspuisset Lentulus ille patrum 
nostrorum memoria factiosus et inpotens, abstersit faciem et 'adfirmabo' inquit 
'omnibus, Lentule, falli eos qui te negant os habere.'  
 
151
 (‘factious and unruly’, tr. Basore (Loeb); ‘seditious and turbulent’, tr. Davie). 
152
 Being spat at is one of the things Cato has to endure at CS 1-2.  
153
 Cf. CS 2.1: Catonem autem certius exemplar sapientis uiri nobis deos 
inmortalis dedisse quam Vlixem et Herculem prioribus saeculis; 7.1: Ceterum hic 
ipse M. Cato, a cuius mentione haec disputatio processit, uereor ne supra nostrum 
exemplar sit. 
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A third related example, but with a more retaliatory character to the 
response to the insult, is to be found at Helv. 13.7.
154
 Aristides the Just is 
being led to execution, when someone spits in his face. Instead of taking 
offence, Aristides wipes his face and smiling asks the accompanying 
magistrate: ‘Warn that man not to yawn so foully in future’.155 As S. 
comments: ‘This was making an insult to insult itself.’ In other words, an 
insult is responded to with a counter-insult.  
Two things are noteworthy here. First, in each case the response to 
the physical insult is not physical, but verbal. The insult is turned back upon 
the insulter by means of verbal wit. The insulted shows himself to be 
superior to the vulgar insulter by not replying to him in like coin: he does 
not ‘spit back’.156 Second, S. considers Cato’s handling of the physical 
insult to be better than that of Diogenes: Quanto <Cato> noster melius! S. 
gives no explicit reason for this judgement.  
Another thing to note about S.’s examples of successful retorts to 
insults is that they involve to a two-stage process: insult, followed by retort. 
There are no examples (as far as I can see) that involve a multi-stage 
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 Ducebatur Athenis ad supplicium Aristides, cui quisquis occurrerat deiciebat 
oculos et ingemescebat, non tamquam in hominem iustum sed tamquam in ipsam 
iustitiam animaduerteretur; inuentus est tamen qui in faciem eius inspueret. 
Poterat ob hoc moleste ferre quod sciebat neminem id ausurum puri oris; at ille 
abstersit faciem et subridens ait comitanti se magistratui: 'admone istum ne postea 
tam inprobe oscitet.' Hoc fuit contumeliam ipsi contumeliae facere. 
155
 Translation based on Costa (Penguin): ‘Warn that fellow not to give such a 
vulgar yawn another time’. Compare Basore (Loeb): ‘Remind that fellow not to 
open his mouth so offensively another time’. 
156
 Except metaphorically: at CS 11.1 S. says that the sage’s magnanimity is a 
means by which he can ‘spit back’ (respuat) istum adfectum inflatum of the superbi 
insolentesque who seek to insult him. 
108 
 
108 
 
sequence of insult and response, a bit like the Ballio scene in Plautus’ 
Pseudolus cited above. 
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VIII. LEGAL ASPECTS 
 
Some aspects of Roman law, in particular the question of the circumstances 
in which a plaintiff could take out an actio iniuriarum, must be considered 
in relation to CS (a) because S.’s distinction between iniuria and contumelia 
depends, in part at least, on the latter not being a legal offence, and (b) 
because legal imagery occurs in the first half of CS. I consider legal imagery 
in the excursus on imagery (§ V). Here, I discuss the legal aspects of iniuria 
and contumelia. I think such a discussion is very necessary, not only 
because the legal background to CS has been ignored by previous 
commentators, but also because Roman law has been receiving more 
attention recently as an important influence on the ways in which Roman 
philosophers articulated philosophical concepts.
157
 
In his introduction to the discussion of contumelia (CS 10.1) S. 
defines contumelia so:  
 
Est minor iniuria, quam queri magis quam exequi possumus, 
quam leges quoque nulla dignam uindicta putauerunt. 
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 On this, see Griffin (2013a). 
110 
 
110 
 
Insult is a lesser injury, which we can complain about more than 
we can pursue, and which the laws too have not thought worthy 
of any punishment.
158
 
 
This definition is an amplification of the initial one given at CS 5.1:  
 
haec [sc. contumelia] leuior et tantum delicatis grauis, qua non 
laeduntur homines sed offenduntur. 
Insult is slighter and serious only for those who are soft; people 
are not harmed by it but offended.  
 
I shall start with the 10.1 definition first, as this brings up the 
question of the legal relevance of contumelia, with which this section is 
concerned. So, for S. contumelia is a kind of iniuria, but a lesser one which 
is not punishable in law. It is, as he says, a matter for complaint rather than 
prosecution.
159
 This could mean that there was no offence of contumelia 
recognised by Roman law in S.’s day. Another possibility is that ‘leges’ 
refers specifically to the body of formally enacted statute law, the ius civile, 
of which the fifth-century BC Twelve Tables are the first example. Since 367 
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 Ker translates ‘lesser than injury’, which I argue against in the Commentary ad 
loc.  
159
 For exsequi in the sense of ‘prosecute’, cf. Ira 1.12.1: Pater caedetur: 
defendam; caesus est: exequar, quia oportet, non quia dolet; Livy 5.11: publici 
priuatique doloris exsequendi ius; Pl. Ep. 3.4.5: Veniebat in mentem priores 
nostros etiam singulorum hospitum iniurias uoluntariis accusationibus exsecutos; 
Just. Dig. 29.5.3.3 (Ulpianus 50 ad ed.): Si tamen maritus in adulterio 
deprehensam occidat, quia ignoscitur ei, dicendum est non tantum mariti, sed 
etiam uxoris servos liberandos, si iustum dolorem exsequenti domino non 
restiterunt; 34.9.22.  
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BC, the exercise of the law was administered by the urban praetor. The job 
of an urban praetor was to decide whether lawsuits (legis actiones) brought 
before him should be admitted for trial or rejected. If the actio was covered 
by one of the leges, then he was obliged to admit the actio. If, however, the 
actio was not covered by any existing lex, then the praetor had to make a 
decision, which would be recorded in the Edict. The urban praetorship was 
an annual magistracy, and the Praetorian Edict was a listing of the actiones 
(together with suggested remedies) approved by the urban praetors; each 
new praetor would add to it in the course of his year of office. Faced with an 
actio not covered by the leges, a praetor would consult the Edict to see 
whether a similar actio was recorded there. If he found a relevant actio, he 
would follow the Edict and approve the actio before him; if he found no 
previous relevant actio in the Edict, he would make a decision of his own; if 
he approved the actio before him, it would be recorded in the Edict. The 
Praetor’s Edict thus provided a supplementary body of law apart from the 
statute law.
160
  
To return to CS, it has been suggested
161
 that when S. says that the 
‘laws’ do not think an insult worthy of prosecution he does not necessarily 
mean that contumeliae were not actionable, but rather only that there was no 
lex covering them, but that an actio iniuriarum might be permissible under 
the Praetor’s Edict. I shall return to this suggestion when I discuss 5.4, but I 
think that it may be too forced.  
                                                          
160
 For more on the development of statute law and praetorian law see Riggsby 
(2010: 25-33) and Du Plessis (2015: 29-35).  
161
 By Professor Jonathan Powell (personal communication). 
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From 5.1 we see that the crucial distinction is between harm and 
offence. Given that he says that contumelia is covered by the laws, we are 
justified in thinking that this distinction was reflected in Roman law too. 
Although the two verbs can sometimes overlap in meaning, with laedere 
sometimes meaning ‘displease, offend, vex’ (OLD laedō 2) and offendere 
sometimes meaning to harm (OLD offendō 5), generally laedere refers to 
either physical harm, damage, or injury to a person or thing (OLD laedō 1), 
or harm to someone’s interests (OLD laedō 3; also verbal castigation: 4), 
whereas offendere has connotations of hurting feelings (OLD offendō 7: ‘To 
give offence to, displease, annoy, vex’). Although both offendere and its 
corresponding nouns offensa and offensio can refer to the infringement of a 
law,
162
 usually it has no legal sense. Nor does laedere/laesio form a legal 
category in itself, although it appears twice in the Digest in the context of 
iniuria.
163
 Nevertheless both words do have distinct meanings, and S. is 
clearly describing two fundamentally different things when he distinguishes 
iniuria and contumelia in the two passages discussed above.  
The legal relevance of iniuria becomes clearer when we consider 
5.4, where S. gives a full definition of iniuria:  
 
                                                          
162
 OLD offendō 6; offensio 5; offensa 4a ‘An offenced committed agains a person, 
injury, wrong’, 4b ‘an offence against a law, misdemeanour, transgression’. 
163
 Digest 47.7.8 pr. (Paulus 39 ad ed.): facienda aestimatione, quanti domini 
intersit non laedi; 47.10.15.27 (Ulpian 77 ad ed.): aut si carmen conscribat uel 
proponat uel cantat aliquod, quod pudorem alicuius laedat.  
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Omnis iniuria deminutio eius est in quem incurrit, nec potest 
quisquam iniuriam accipere sine aliquo detrimento uel 
dignitatis uel corporis uel rerum extra nos positarum. 
All injury is a diminishing of that which it assails, nor can 
anyone receive an injury without some damage to status, or 
body, or to things placed outside us. 
 
The second type of iniuria in S.’s list, detrimentum corporis, is covered by 
the fifth-century BC codification of Roman law, the Twelve Tables (Tabula 
VIII, 2-4 Schoell, Bruns (FIRA); I, 13-15 Crawford):
164
 
 
I, 13: Si membrum rup<s>it, ni cum eo pacit, talio esto.  
I, 14: Si os fregit libero, CCC, <si> seruo, CL poena<e> 
su<n>to.  
I, 15: Si iniuriam ?alteri? faxsit, uigintiquinque poenae sunto. 
(Crawford 1996: 2.578) 
 
I, 13 (VIII, 2) If he has maimed a part (of a body), unless he 
settles with him, there is to be talion. 
                                                          
164
 The reconstruction of the text of the XII Tabulae is by no means certain or 
agreed upon. For instance, Hagemann (1998: 2, reference on p. 1 n. 2) gives the 
text of Bruns (1909), reads: 
Tab. VIII, 2: Si membrum rup[s]it, ni cum eo pacit, talio esto.  
Tab. VIII, 3: Manu fustive si os fregit libero, CCC, si seruo, CL poenam subito.  
Tab. VIII, 4: Si iniuriam [alteri] faxsit, uigintiquinque poenae sunto.  
Tab. VIII, 4 is the essentially the same as Crawford’s I, 13, although Bruns has 
‘[alteri]’ and Crawford ‘?alteri?’. Hagemann makes no mention of Crawford 
(1996) in his book and does not cite it in his bibliography.  
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I, 14 (VIII, 3) If he has broken a bone of a free man, 300, if of a 
slave, 150 (asses) are to be the penalty. 
1, 15 (VIII, 4) If he do (any other) injury ?to another?, 25 (asses) 
are to be the penalty. (Translation: Crawford 1996: 2.579) 
 
Essentially, this is a set of regulations compensating varying degrees of 
physical injury.
165
 The breaking of a part of the body is the most serious.
166
 
There is the option of coming to an agreement (pactio), whether monetary 
or some other kind of compensation, or, if that fails, breaking the 
defendant’s limb in return as compensation in kind (talio). The second 
clause is vaguer in respect of the injury and also presents problems of 
interpretation – is it a bone or a face that is supposed to have been broken? 
Given that the injury in question could apply to either a free man or a slave, 
I am inclined to take a broken bone (probably to a limb) to be the injury in 
question, given that this would prevent someone from working.
167
 The third 
clause, the only one to use the term iniuria, is even vaguer than the 
preceding one as to the injury in question. The fact that the penalty is only 
twenty-five asses clearly indicates that the level of injury in question is 
considerably less than that those in I, 13 and I, 14, which involve breakage 
(rup<s>it, I, 13; fregit, I, 14). The testimony of the second-century AD 
                                                          
165
 In Crawford’s view (Crawford 1996: 607), these should all have been 
understood as deliberate actions intended to cause injury, although none of the 
three delicts as presented indicates this.  
166
 It is disputed whether membrum should be taken narrowly to refer specifically 
to a limb, or widely to refer to any part or organ of the body (see Hagemann 1998: 
10-11).  
167
 This is the view of the scholars cited by Hagemann (1998: 12-13). The level of 
injury would have to have been high and not just a broken toe for instance. 
115 
 
115 
 
writer Gellius,
168
 who relates how one Veratius went around the Forum 
slapping any citizen he chose in the face and offering him 25 asses in 
compensation from the sack of coins his slave carried, suggest that the 
injury envisaged was certainly physical, but was unlikey to have involved 
serious damage (like a broken leg).
169
 
In addition to the Twelves Tables, by S.’s day there was another 
piece of statute law covering physical injury. This was the Lex Cornelia de 
iniuriis, passed in 81 BC, which covered physical assault involving beating 
or thrashing, or breaking and entering.
170
 
The third of the elements in S.’s definition of iniuria is damage to 
res extra nos positae. The word res has many meanings in Roman law (see 
Berger 1953: 676 on res), but a very important one is that of ‘property’, and 
I think it is the intended meaning here. One should compare S. Tranq. 11.1, 
where S. explains how the sage counts slaves, possessions, dignity and body 
as precaria. Given the closeness of S.’s list of indifferents at Tranq. 11.1 to 
CS 5.4, and also the language of legal possession that follows in CS 5.5,
171
 I 
think S. means possessions – both slaves and animals, and inanimate 
possessions – when he talks of res extra nos positae. Assuming that S. is 
talking of possessions in the context of iniuria here, it is likely that he has in 
mind the delict of damnum iniuria datum. Although this delict was covered 
                                                          
168
 Noctes Atticae 20.1. 
169
 The purpose of Veratius’ action was to show up how ridiculous the penalty of 
25 asses was in proportion to the crime, given inflation.  
170
 Digest 47.10.5 pr. (Ulpianus 56 ad ed.): Lex cornelia de iniuriis competit ei, qui 
iniuriarum agere volet ob eam rem, quod se pulsatum verberatumve domumve 
suam vi introitam esse dicat. On this law, see Du Plessis (2015: 351-2). 
171
 See Commentary ad 5.5 (precario). 
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in the Twelve Tables, the most important development was the passing of 
the Lex Aquilia in 287 BC.
172
  
From the foregoing discussion, it should be clear that damage to the 
body and to external things was covered by statute law. With dignitas, 
however, matters are more complicated.  
Dignitas means ‘(social) standing’ or ‘rank’ (OLD 3) and also 
honour or esteem (OLD 4). So loss of dignitas indicates something more 
subtly harmful to a person than a (mere) physical injury or loss of property. 
It is interesting that S. puts it first in the list, as if to indicate that it is the 
most serious type of iniuria that someone can suffer. Indeed, for a Roman 
citizen involved in public life, loss of honour or status was likely to be more 
serious than the other two elements in S.’s definition.173 Indeed, the 
development of the scope of the actio iniuriarum in the four centuries from 
the promulgation of the Twelve Tables to S.’s day testifies to this. As 
Hagemann (1998: 59) explains, four special praetorian edicts are examples 
of this expansion of the actio iniuriarum to include social harm. They are: 
 
1. De convicio (Ulpian, Digest 47.10.15.2): 
Ait praetor: ‘qui adversus bonos mores convicium cui fecisse 
cuiusve opera factum esse dicetur, quo adversus bonos mores 
convicium fieret: in eum iudicium dabo.’  
                                                          
172
 For an outline of the history and provisions of this law, see Nicholas (1962: 
218-22), Du Plessis (2015: 327-37). 
173
 A point made by Liebersohn (2005: 374). 
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The praetor says: ‘One who is said to have loudly shouted at 
someone contrary to sound morals or one through whose efforts 
such shouting is effected contrary to sound morals, against him I 
will give action.’ (tr. Watson, in Mommsen & Krueger 1985: 
776-7) 
 
2. De adtemptata pudicitia (Lenel’s reconstruction of a lost 
text: Lenel, p. 400, § 192):  
Si quis matrifamilias aut praetextato praetextataeue comitem 
abduxisse siue quis eum eamue aduersus bonos mores 
appellare adsectatusue esse dicitur. 
If any mistress of a household is said to have seduced the 
companion of a male or female citizen, or if anyone is said to 
accuse him or her of acting against sound morals or to have been 
a companion.  
 
3. Ne quid infamandi causa fiat (Ulpian, Digest 47.10.15.25): 
Ait praetor: ‘ne quid infamandi causa fiat. Si quis adversus ea 
fecerit, prout quaeque res erit, animadvertam.’ 
The praetor says: ‘In order that nothing be done that is shaming, 
if anyone act to the contrary, I will deal with it according to the 
nature of the issue.’ (tr. Watson, in Mommsen & Krueger 1985: 
778) 
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4. Qui servum alienum (Ulpian, Digest 47.10.15.34): 
Praetor ait : ‘Qui servum alienum adversus bonos mores 
verberavisse deve eo iniussu domini quaestionem habuisse 
dicetur, in eum iudicium dabo, item si quid aliud factum esse 
dicetur, causa cognita iudicium, dabo.’ 
The praetor says: ‘Where a man shall be said to have thrashed 
another man’s slave or to have submitted him to torture, 
contrary to sound morals, without the owner’s consent, I shall 
give an action. Equally, if it be said that something else be done, 
I will, having heard the circumstances, give an action.’ (tr. 
Watson, in Mommsen & Krueger 1985: 778) 
 
There is a common concern here with things said and done that are aduersus 
bonos mores. It is not immediately obvious precisely to what this phrase 
refers. Is it the boni mores of the person who is the target of the alleged 
offence, or is it more broadly an infringement of public morals generally, to 
lessen by the very act the overall level of morals in society? 
A helpful example may be found in Seneca the Elder, Controversiae 
10.1. Here, an actio iniuriarum is prompted by behaviour that the plaintiff 
considered harmful to his political career: 
 
Lugens Diuitem Sequens 
1. INIVRIARVM SIT ACTIO.  
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Quidam, cum haberet filium et diuitem inimicum, occisus 
inspoliatus inuentus est. Adulescens sordidatus diuitem 
sequebatur; diues eduxit in ius eum et postulauit ut si quid 
suspicaretur accusaret se. Pauper ait: 'accusabo cum potero' et 
nihilominus sordidatus diuitem sequebatur. Cum peteret honores 
diues, repulsus accusat iniuriarum pauperem.  
 
The Grieving Poor Man’s Son Who Followed the Rich Man 
 
An action may lie for injury. 
 
A man who had a son and a rich enemy was found killed, 
though not robbed. The youth, dressed in mourning, began to 
follow the rich man about. The rich man took hinm to court, and 
demanded that if he had any suspicions he should accuse him. 
The poor man said: ‘I shall accuse when I can,’ and continued to 
follow the rich man in mourning clothes just the same. The rich 
man stood for office, but was rejected; he accuses the poor man 
of injury. (tr, Winterbottom (Loeb)) 
 
Presumably, the young man held the rich man responsible for his father’s 
murder and wanted to make his suspicions publicly known (or perhaps to 
prick the rich man’s conscience so that he might admit to being behind the 
murder). The rich man clearly thought the young man’s behaviour impaired 
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his reputation. This is therefore probably a case of detrimentum dignitatis. 
From the colores on the controversia it is clear that Seneca the Elder thinks 
that the charge contra/aduersus bonos mores is at issue in this controversia 
(10.9): 
 
Latro sic diuisit: an in re iniuria sit. nulla, inquit, iniuria est <si> 
sordidatus sum: quam multi faciunt! Omnia iniuriae genera 
<lege> comprehensa sunt: pulsare non licet, conuicium facere 
contra bonos mores non licet.  
Hoc loco Scaurus dixit: nova formula iniuriarum componitur: 
'quod ille contra bonos mores fleuit.'  
 
Latro’s division went like this: Is there any injury in the case? 
‘There is no injury if I am in mourning: how many do it! The 
law specifies all the types of injury: one cannot strike another, 
one may not abuse contrary to good morals.’ 
 It was at this point that Scaurus said: ‘A new wording for 
injuries is being formulated. That he did weep contrary to good 
morals.’ (tr. Winterbottom (Loeb)) 
 
Latro thinks that contra bonos mores does not apply; Scaurus by contrast 
thinks that a new formulation of iniuria is being created.  
This is an example of the sort of case that would have to be decided 
on by the urban praetor. He would have to decide whether it was admissible 
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under the principle contra bonos mores in the Edict, and it not, whether he 
should modify the formulation to let the case come to trial. I think that this 
example from his father helps us understand the kind of case that would 
come under the category of loss of dignitas that S. included in his tripartite 
definition of iniuria. 
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COMMENTARY 
 
NEC INIURIAM NEC CONTUMELIAM ACCIPERE SAPIENTEM: 
‘That the wise man receives neither injury nor insult’: the paradox which is 
the subject of the treatise. This sort of accusative/infinitive clause is found at 
the head of the last three of Cicero’s Paradoxa Stoicorum. Nec iniuriam nec 
contumeliam accipere sapientem is repeated with variations at intervals 
throughout the treatise (e.g. nullam enim sapientem nec iniuriam accipere 
nec contumeliam posse, 2.1; Tutus est sapiens nec ulla adfici aut iniuria aut 
contumelia potest, 2.3).  
 The two key concepts of iniuria and contumelia (insult) are here 
introduced. Iniuria is physical injury, often as a resultant of physical 
violence (cf. Greek ὕβρις). Contumelia in this treatise means mainly verbal 
insult and abuse, although see LSJ for instances of it meaning almost the 
same as iniuria. At 5.1, S. says that iniuria is ‘gravior’ and contumelia 
‘levior’, although many men think contumelia is worse. For a fuller 
discussion of iniuria and contumelia, see Introduction, §§ VII, VIII.  
 
1.1-1.2: Exordium 
 
S. asserts the difficulty of starting on the path to virtue, but the 
worthwhileness of attaining the goal.  
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As Abel (1967: 135) points out, this exordium is what rhetoricians termed 
an exordium uulgare (‘general exordium’) (Ad Her. 1.7; Cic. Inv. 1.18.26; 
Quint. Inst. 4.1.71), which has no direct or obvious relevance to the subject 
to be discussed.  
 
1.1: ceteros sapientiam professos: ‘others who have taught wisdom’. 
Participial phrase of the kind used in Greek, where it is usually introduced 
by the definite article. Other examples in S. are: prospicienti senectutem 
(Ep. 33.7); liberalia professi (Ep. 95.23); cf. Stoici uirilem ingressi uiam. 
However, mostly, this usage is confined in S. to neuter singular and plural: 
see Summers, pp. lix–lxii.  
 Ciceronian Latin would normally use a relative clause, e.g. ‘ceteros, 
qui sapientiam professi sunt’. Minissale (p. 49) suggests the participial 
phrase is equivalent to ceteros professores sapientiae (‘other teachers of 
wisdom’). She thus interprets profiteri here to mean ‘teach’. The example 
from Ep. 95 cited above (but not cited by Minissale) supports this 
interpretation. However, this may be too strong an interpretation for the 
present passage. It would imply that the non-Stoic philosophers actually 
taught wisdom, i.e. that they actually knew it, but from a Stoic point of view 
they cannot know what wisdom is. For this reason, I think ‘lay claim to’ is 
the better interpretation: cf. Cic. Pis. 71 (quam (sc. philosophiam) si 
profitetur gravissimam mihi sustinere personam uidetur, cited in OLD 
profiteor 4; neither OLD nor TLL X.2, fasc. XI cites the CS 1.1 passage). 
They may claim they have wisdom, but they are wrong. 
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1.1: feminas et mares: ‘females and males’. Although the phrase 
feminae et mares (and variants thereof) is often used of men and women 
(e.g. Plaut. Rud. 104; Most. 1047; Hor. Carm. 1.21.10; Plin. NH 20.114), it 
can refer to male and female animals (e.g. reindeer at Caes. Gal. 6.26.2). On 
its own, besides denoting human males (e.g. S. NQ 7. 33. 2), mas is used of 
male horses at Lucr. 4.1198, of a male dove at Ov. Am. 2.6.56, and of a 
sacrificial bull at Lucan 1. 609; it can be applied to plants too (e.g. Plin. NH 
16.47 (trees); 20.114, 27.78 (ferns); see OLD c for more examples). 
Likewise with femina, which can denote female plants (e.g. parsley: Plin. 
NH 20.114; see OLD 3b for more examples). From his vocabulary here, 
then, S. seems to be thinking of a general distinction between male and 
female throughout the universe, one which is not confined to humans. The 
contrast between male and female/men and women/virile and effeminate 
recurs throughout CS. Viansino (1988: 381) thinks there may be an echo of 
Sallust’s Catilinae coniuratio 1.2, where Sallust says humans employ the 
mind to rule, the body to serve. 
 
1.1: utraque turba: ‘each group’, i.e. both females and males. S. seems to 
use turba here in a non-pejorative sense, as at Ov. Am. 1.1.5 (Pieridum 
uates, not tua, sum; see McKeown ad loc. for parallels); cf. also Ep. 65.11 
(turba causarum – many causes). The pejorative sense of ‘mob’ is found 
frequently in S. (e.g. Ep. 7. 1; 40. 4); in this sense it is equivalent to vulgus.  
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1.1: uitae societatem: ‘partnership of life’, possibly marriage (Germans 
might say ‘Lebensbϋndnis’). Stoic and non-Stoic philosophers are 
complementary, as the man and wife are in a relationship, but the man is 
born to command, the women to obey: altera pars ad obsequendum, altera 
imperio nata sit (1.1). However, uitae societatem may have a more specific 
reference, perhaps including brothers and sisters, and legal guardianship of 
women. In this sense, it may mean something like ‘the fabric of society’. 
The association of non-Stoic schools of philosophers, especially the 
Epicureans, with women and effeminacy can be seen in S.’s discussion of 
the Epicureans in De Vita Beata, in which he compares the school to a 
man’s body (Epicurus himself) dressed in women’s clothing (the followers 
of Epicurus) (VB 13.2). 
 
1.1: Ceteri . . . licet: an adaption of the analogy in Plato’s Laws (720b–e, 
857c–e) where Plato contrasts the methods of doctors’ assistants (mostly, 
but not exclusively, slaves themselves, 720d), whose skill is based on 
experience only and not on systematic medical knowledge and training, and 
who treat slave-patients, with that of free doctors, who have a proper 
medical education, and treat free patients. The former are brisk with their 
charges, prescribing treatment without having listened to the patients’ 
accounts of their illnesses and giving no explanation for the treatments they 
prescribe. The free doctors, by contrast, learn what they can about the 
patient’s condition by talking to the patient and his family. They try to agree 
a course of treatment with the patient and explain why the treatment is 
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appropriate. They behave almost like a philosopher with their patients 
(857d). S. turns the Platonic analogy on its head, by having the slave doctors 
(who are analogous to non-Stoic philosophers) treating free patients (their 
masters) and being very attentive to their wishes, rather as the free doctors 
are to the free patients in Plato. Stoic philosophers, we are to infer, behave 
to their charges in the brisk manner of Plato’s slave doctors (qua optimum et 
celerrimum est), and he approves of this approach. On this passage, see 
Baraz (2016: 165).  
Plato’s analogy of the philosopher with a doctor and philosophy as 
therapy was a favourite trope with Hellenistic philosophers, not just Stoics 
(see Nussbaum 2009: 13-47), but S.’s use of it points up a particular aspect 
of Epicurean practice. In his characterisation of non-Stoic philosophers as 
pandering to the patient S. alludes to the Epicurean practice of moral 
education of the student, as described by Philodemus of Gadara in his Περì 
παρρησίας (‘On Frank Criticism’). In this form of moral therapy, the student 
informs the teacher about his moral progress and the teacher in his turn 
offers candid advice and criticism. The actual Epicurean approach is much 
more nuanced than S. implies, involving a subtle adaptation of the moral 
criticism to the character of the student. It is true that less confident and 
more timid students will be given gentler criticism, whereas the stronger-
minded students will be exposed to more direct and forthright, even 
aggressive, criticism. Perhaps this is S.’s point: that some students will be 
given a relatively easy time. For more on Epicurean frank criticism, see the 
edition and commentary on Philodemus’ Περì παρρησίας by Konstan et al. 
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(1998) and Tsouna (2007: ch. 4). Gigante (2000: 40) thinks that S. may have 
known the Περì παρρησίας. He thinks that Tranq. 1.1-3, where Serenus 
confesses his lack of moral progress to S., reflects the openness that was 
expected between teacher and student amongst Epicureans.  
The phrase molliter et blande (‘softly and gently’) has a counterpart 
at Ira 2.21.6, where S. says that irascibility is principally a product of a soft 
and gentle education: nihil enim magis facit iracundos quam educatio mollis 
et blanda. In both passages, S.’s position is that soft teaching weakens the 
character of the student. The supposed association of softness with 
Epicurean teachings is further enunciated at 15.4 (mollia ac desidiosa 
praecipere), although S. (with reservations) exempts Epicurus from this 
charge. See Commentary ad 15.4. 
 
1.1: ut supra fortunam emineat: ‘so that he may rise above his lot’. 
According to Viansino (1968), the expression ‘supra . . . eminere’ is Livian 
and Ovidian (p. 118, with examples). Here fortuna has the sense of the 
circumstances in which one finds oneself, whether favourable or adverse. 
This fits into the wider portrayal of the sapiens as unaffected by external 
circumstances. They are indifferentia, of no importance to the sage, except 
inasmuch as they may function as a test of his virtue.  
 
1.2: ‘At ardua per quae uocamur et confragosa sunt’: interjection by an 
imagined interlocutor (here Serenus) of a type common in S. Frequent 
examples in this treatise, e.g. 3.1, 4.1, etc. 
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This style of sentence in which a pronoun (ea or illa) corresponding 
to quae is omitted, is common in both Senecas: et ipse iram fassus est . . . 
sed irae causam non dixit, quam Fuscus [= non eam dixit, quam Fuscus] 
(Sen. rhet. Contr. 1.7.15); quaerere, num cometae condicionis sint, cuius 
superiora [= eiusdem condicionis . . . cuius] (Sen. phil. NQ 7.2.1). ‘At illa 
loca, per quae uocamur, ardua et confragosa sunt’ would be a more formal, 
Ciceronian version of the sentence. However, S.’s word order, involving the 
rhetorical figure of coniunctio, emphasises ardua (the task Serenus faces 
will be difficult). The use of neuter plural adjectives as substantives, which 
already occurred in poetry (e.g. dubia at Plaut. Epid. 544; mollia at Manilius 
5.153), was to become increasingly common, and ‘very productive’ in Late 
Latin (H—S II.1.2, §90, p. 154). 
According to Grimal (p. 34), confragosus (hard, difficult, uneven) is 
‘aimé de Sénêque’. He cites Ep. 84. 13 (Confragosa in fastigium dignitatis 
via est); as here, confragosus is used in the context of a difficult route to be 
traversed to achieve a worthwhile end. The word does not seem to be 
restricted to a particular register or genre (see TLL IV and OLD). It is found 
first, with the general meaning ‘dangerous’ or ‘difficult’, in Plautus (Cist. 
614, Men. 591). Its use in the context of difficult terrain (‘rough’, ‘uneven’, 
‘broken’) goes back to Varro (Rust. 1.18.4: [ager] confragosus et arduis 
clivis). Most relevant for the passage of CS under discussion here is Livy, 
who uses it of mountainous terrain specifically. So, at 21.32.9, he describes 
how Hannibal pitched his camp in the most extensive valley possible inter 
confragosa omnia praeruptaque (‘amidst all the broken and steep places’); 
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at 28.2.1 he speaks of confragosa loca. In this connection it is very 
instructive to compare Ep. 51, in which S. develops the imagery of the hard, 
high mountainous regions being associated with the life of virtue and the 
low-lying, soft plains with vice and degeneracy. Hannibal is presented as an 
exemplum of a man whose virtue is lost when he leaves the mountains (the 
Alps) and the rigours of the military life for the decadence of low-lying 
Campania. The moral is summed up at Ep. 51.10: Et fortior miles ex 
confragoso venit: segnis est urbanus et verna. Again, the connection with 
Livy is close. At 39.1 (but without using confragosus), Livy contrasts the 
comfort (amoenitas) and opulence of Asia, which produced softness 
(mollitia) in its inhabitants, with the rugged terrain of Thrace and Liguria, 
which produced hardy warriors who could inflict defeats on Roman armies. 
 
1.2: plano . . . fastigium: S. modifies the earlier sentiment. The difficulty of 
the path to virtue is an error in the mind of the novice, analogous to an 
optical illusion, whereby places seen at a distance seem more difficult to 
traverse than they actually are. Viansino (1968: 119) cites Ep. 113.3, Ben. 
7.1.5, and NQ 1.39 1.3.10 as parallels. 
 
1.2: plano aditur excelsum?: the interrogative num is omitted, according to 
Grimal (p. 47) to indicate impatience, to Minissale (p. 53) to be ironic. 
Neither of these explanations seems to make sense in this context. The 
omission of the interrogative may just be a colloquialism, conversational 
style).  
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1.3-4.3: narratio. This starts with a recollection of Serenus’ previous 
indignation at the treatment of Cato by a mob of political opponents. S. 
extols Cato as superior to the heroes of myth and the last defender of 
the Republic (1.3-2.3). This part of the narratio is rounded off with the 
first statement of the propositio. Then Serenus’ misgivings about Stoic 
claims are set out in direct speech (3.1-3.2), followed by S.’s responses 
(3.3-4.3). 
 
1.3: Nuper . . . pertulisset: the occasion for the treatise. Serenus has 
complained that Cato, the prime Roman example of a Stoic sapiens, was 
subjected to contumeliae by the Roman mob (multitudo), something which 
never happened to the worst of Caesar’s and Pompey’s henchmen. It is to 
allay Serenus’ worries (pro ipso quidem Catone te securum esse iussi, 2.1) 
that S. discourses on the invulnerability of the sapiens to iniuria or 
contumelia. 
 
1.3: ‘Pompeios et Caesares . . . Vatinios: ‘the likes of Pompey and Caesar 
. . . the likes of Vatinius’. For other examples of this use of the plural of a 
proper name in S., see the examples cited in Viansino (1968: 119. It is not 
confined to S.: see Powell ad Cic. Sen. V.13 (p. 129) for parallels from 
Cicero and others. As Powell notes: ‘This use of the plural of proper names 
is quite common, and does not seem to have the colloquial flavour of the 
English plural (“we can’t all be Einsteins”)’. Publius Vatinius, the object of 
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Cicero’s vituperation in the In Vatinium (although the two men were later 
reconciled), was an ally of Caesar and used by him as a political enforcer. 
He is mentioned again at 2.1, together with Clodius. Vatinius features later 
at 17.3 where S. commends his method of parrying insults aimed at his 
physical appearance.  
 
1.3: dissuasuro legem: ‘about to oppose a law’. It is not clear precisely 
which law is meant here. It may be Pompey’s lex agraria of 59 bc, which 
aimed at providing his veterans with portions of ager publicus in Italy. 
Caesar, Pompey’s fellow-triumvir and consul for 59 BC, drove this law 
through in the teeth of senatorial opposition, led by Caesar’s co-consul 
Bibulus and Cato the Younger. However, in the account of Plutarch (Cato 
minor 31-33) it is Bibulus, not Cato, who is maltreated by the mob and 
pelted with ordure. If this is the incident referred to, the forefronting of Cato 
rather than Bibulus may go back to the favourable account of his career in 
Cicero’s Laudes Catonis (Cic. Top. 94 with Reinhardt ad loc.). Likewise, 
the forefronting of Bibulus in Plutarch may be due to Caesar’s hostile 
Anticato (45 BC; Cic. Top. 94). Another possibility for the incident may be 
the Lex de provinciis consularibus of 56 BC (ibid., 43), when Cato was 
ejected from the rostra. See Millar (1998: 126, 131, 170) (he does not 
mention S.).  
 
1.3: a rostris ad arcum Fabianum: the arch of Fabius was a triumphal 
arch dedicated to the victory of Q. Fabius Maximus over the Allobrogi in 
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121 BC. Here for the first time it is referred to as arcus Fabianus, having 
previously been referred to as fornix Fabianus. See L. Chioff, in LTUR 
II.264-6. 
 
1.3: contumelias: iniuriae are not mentioned here. This could pose 
problems of interpretation, given that the propositio includes both iniuria 
and contumelia. If the anecdote of Cato, which provides the occasion for the 
subject of CS, contains only instances of contumelia, then we might doubt, 
as does Liebersohn (2005), that CS is really not about iniuria but about 
contumelia. For an assessment of Liebersohn’s arguments, see Introduction, 
§ III. 
 
2.1: P. Clodius: another late Republican politician who, like Vatinius, was 
considered by many (and certainly by Cicero) as an unscrupulous and 
immoral operator. S. expatiates on his vileness in Ep. 97. 4-7: when put on 
trial he bribed the jurors by offering women (some of them senators’ wives) 
and youths (cf. Cicero, Ad Atticum 1. 16. 5). S.’s unfavourable portrayal of 
both Clodius and Vatinius here seems influenced by Cicero, who was not 
well disposed to either man.  
 
2.1: nullam enim sapientem nec iniuriam accipere nec contumeliam 
posse: the first mention in the main text of the paradox propositio that 
probably formed the actual title of CS (see Introduction, § II). The main 
verb governing this propositio is not given, but must be understood. 
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Possibilities are respondi from the beginning of the section or some word 
like dixi.  
 
2.1: caeca cupiditate correpti: for similar alliteration of caecus (and other 
words formed with caec-) with cupiditas cf. Lucr. 3.59 (caeca cupido); 
Cicero: caecum cupiditate et avaritia fuisse (Quinct. 83.10); ne ipsos caecos 
redderet cupiditas et avaritia et audacia (Rosc. Am. 101.8-9); o caecam 
cupiditatem (Sull. 91.3); cupiditate esse caecatum (De Domo sua 60.8-9); 
cupiditas tam caeca (Pis. 58.1); obcaecati cupiditate (Fin. 1.33.4); S.: Pol. 
9.5 (caeca cupiditas), Proiv. 6.1 (caecam . . . auaritiam), Ep. 15.9 (caeca 
cupiditas), Ep. 16.9 (caecam cupiditatem) Cf. Ep. 119.8 (caecitas mentium). 
Not cited in Wölfflin (1931: 225-281 ‘Zur Alliteration: A. Über die 
allitierende Verbindungen der lateinischen Sprache’) but see him for other 
examples. Greed (cupiditas) is stressed in this section of CS: cum inmensa 
potentiae cupiditate (2.2, ll. 24-25).  
 
2.1-3: Catonem . . . potest: Cato is a surer exemplar (certius exemplar) of a 
sapiens than Ulysses or Hercules, because he did not contend with beasts or 
monsters, but had the unique task of holding back the fall of the Roman 
Republic, a task greater than the Labours of Hercules, the ordeals of Ulysses 
and the burden of Atlas, which were in any case fictions believed by 
credulous ancients. According to Tatian, Address to the Greeks, 3.2, Zeno 
viewed ‘Hercules and a few others’, in addition to Socrates, as sages. As S. 
says, the Stoics viewed these heroes as sages, because they were inuictos 
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laboribus et contemptores uoluptatis et uictores omnium terrorum. S.’s 
reasons for putting Cato above Hercules and Ulysses (Cato non cum feris 
manus contulit, quas consectari uenatoris agrestisque est, nec monstra igne 
ac ferro persecutus est) is very similar to the Epicurean/euhemerist 
argument holding up Hercules as an exemplar of virtue proposed by 
Lucretius (5.22-54), a passage discussed in detail by Galinsky (1972: 130-
1). For Lucretius, the truly virtuous man is he who banishes troubles from 
his mind, rather than killing beasts. S.’s position here contrasts strongly with 
his praise of Hercules at Ben. 1.13-14, where he is compared favourably 
with Alexander for performing his labours for the benefit of mankind, rather 
than for personal glory. Like Hercules, Ulysses (Odysseus) did kill monsters 
during his return home from Troy. However, it is his more passive 
endurance of hardship and humiliations which is prominent in his story. 
(See Stanford (1963: 118-45) for a full examination of the Hellenistic and 
Roman (including Stoic) tradition around Ulysses.) So Cicero (Off. 1.113): 
Quam multa passus est Ulixes in illo errore diuturno, cum et mulieribus, si 
Circe et Calypso mulieres appellandae sunt, inserviret et in omni sermone 
omnibus affabilem [et iocundum] esse se vellet! Domi vero etiam 
contumelias servorum ancillarumque pertulit, ut ad id aliquando, quod 
cupiebat, veniret. And indeed, S. does highlight Ulysses’ moral strength in 
resisting the temptation of the Sirens’ song at Ep. 123.12. However, what is 
interesting in the Cicero passage just quoted is its last sentence, which I 
have put in bold. Ulysses showed self-control in refusing to be provoked by 
the insults directed at him by the slaves in his own house. Given that half of 
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CS is devoted to an examination of insult, it is surprising that S. does not 
make use of this aspect of the Ulysses legend. Indeed, the behaviour of 
Chaerea, who is not provoked by Caligula’s insults, in order to get his own 
back on him later, is very similar to that of Ulysses as presented by Cicero. 
What S. is doing in CS, by presenting Cato as the exemplar of a sage, is to 
give the discussion a specifically Roman as well as Stoic colour. Likewise, 
Chaerea replaces Ulysses as the exemplum of a man who withstands insults 
and keeps his cool in the face of provocation. 
This replacement of ancient legendary figures with real and recent 
Roman as exempla is seen in the (implicit) comparison of Cato with Atlas 
(nec in ea tempora incidit quibus credi posset caelum umeris unius inniti: 
excussa iam antiqua credulitate . . . diuidi). S. attributes the story of Atlas to 
ancient credulity (on which cf. Cic. Rep. 2.18; Verr. 2.3.78.132), contrasting 
such tales with the real-life (if metaphorical) image of Cato sustaining the 
Republic, fighting to save it against the threat posed by the triumvirs and 
their followers.  
The tenor of the passage is a little reminiscent of Horace, Odes 3. 3. 
1-8: 
 
Iustum et tenacem propositi virum 
non civium ardor prava iubentium 
non vultus instantis tyranni 
mente quatit [. . .] 
si fractus illabitur orbis, 
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impavidum ferient ruinae. 
 
The theme of the collapsing Republic is also found at Horace, Epode 
16.1-2: Altera iam teritur bellis civilibus aetas, | suis et ipsa Roma viribus 
ruit. The man of virtue sticks to his plan in the face of the mad demands of 
the citizenry (cf. the ordeal undergone by Cato at the hands of the multitudo) 
or the threatening visage of the tyrant (cf. later in the treatise Chaerea 
standing firm against Caligula’s insults).  
The verb sidere is rarely found before the Augustan age (OLD 1-4; 
pre-Augustan: prose, Nep. Cha. 4.2; verse, Lucilius 176 Marx). Combined 
with pessum, it has the sense ‘to be destroyed or ruined’ (lit.: ‘to sink to the 
bottom’, of a ship; see OLD pessum b), almost a passive of pessum dare (‘to 
send to the bottom’, (fig.) ‘to destroy or ruin’, on which see OLD pessum c). 
Pessum occurs in prose only after the Augustan age, although it is found in 
verse as early as Plautus (see TLL X.1, fasc. XII). The register seems to be 
epic, in keeping with the momentousness of the fall of the Republic: cf. 
Lucr. 6.589-90 (multae per mare pessum │ subsedere suis pariter cum 
civibus urbes), Luc. 3.674-5 (sidentia │ corpora caesa tenent spoliantque 
cadauera ferro).  
 
2.2: multiformi malo: multiformis, ‘taking many forms’, only appears 
once, in Cicero Ac. 1.26, before S. (TLL VIII). In S., also at Ep. 120.22, 
referring to the varied characters of non-sages. For the adjective used of bad 
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or evil, as at CS, cf. Apul. Met. 10.34 (multiforme scelus; Loeb: ‘manifold 
crimes’). 
 
2.2: neque enim Cato post libertatem uixit nec libertas post Catonem: 
memorable chiasmic sententia.  
 
2.3: Huic tu putas iniuriam fieri potuisse a populo quod aut praeturam 
illi detraxit aut togam, quod sacrum illud caput purgamentis oris 
adspersit?: having referred to the mob’s treatment of Cato previously as 
contumelia, but not iniuria (1.3), S. now refers to it as iniuria, but not 
contumelia.  
 
2.3: Tutus est sapiens nec ulla adfici aut iniuria aut contumelia potest: 
here the propositio is repeated (with variations), but to it is added a mention 
of the safety of the sage. The safety of the sage (which also implies his 
freedom from anxiety) is developed later at 4.3 and 13.5.  
 
3.1-3.2: Serenus’ attack on the claim that the sage cannot suffer injury or 
insult has two prongs: (1) They claim to be different from non-Stoics, but 
they just use different words to cloak their similarity to them. (2) If the 
Stoics are really no different from others, why should Serenus accept their 
claim that the Stoic sage, unlike non-sages, cannot suffer injury or insult? 
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3.1-3.2: S. ‘quotes’ a possible objection that he thinks Serenus is about to 
make (paras adclamare, 2.1).  
 
3.1: incensum et efferuescentem: Serenus is angry, which is not the act of 
a sage, who should show tranquillitas inter lacessentia (4.3). It is ironic that 
Serenus, given his name, is angry. The sage is always serenus. Serenus is 
therefore both acting out of character with his name and falling far short of 
the moral ideal to which he should aspire. 
 
3.1: praeceptis uestris: praecepta (Gk. παραινεσεῖς) are instructions or 
rules guiding the behaviour of individuals in particular situations. As such, 
they are to be contrasted with decreta (Gk. δόγματα), which are the broad 
doctrines or principles of Stoicism. See Ep. 94 for a discussion of decreta 
and praecepta. The use of uestris shows: (a) that Serenus is addressing the 
Stoics in general, not just S.; (b) that he has not fully accepted Stoicism – 
otherwise he would use nostri, as S. does when referring to the Stoics 
(among whom he counts himself), e.g. VB 3.2 (‘nostram [sc. opinionem] 
accipe’), Ep. 65 (‘Stoici nostri’). 
 
3.1: Deinde . . . ministeria: this long first part of the sentence is structured 
on the basis of three sub-sentences introduced by a concessive cum-clause: 
cum . . . negastis . . ., non negatis . . .; cum . . . negastis . . ., non negatis . . .; 
cum . . . negastis . . ., idem non itis infitias . . .. The final non itis infitias 
provides variatio after five instances of negatis. For concessive cum + 
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indicative (not the more normal subjunctive), cf. Phaedrus 4.23(24).4: qui, 
magna cum minaris, extrices nihil!; Pliny, NH 11.227: cum tamen . . 
.perhibentur; Vitruvius 8.3.2: Hi autem, cum sunt frigidi, ideo uidentur 
fervere.  
 
3.1: ingentia locuti: poetic. See Ovid, Met. 13.340: ingentia magni uerba 
uiri. Also of actions: ausosque ingentia Gracchos (Luc. 6.796).  
 
3.1: cum pauperem negastis esse sapientem: Serenus alludes to the Stoic 
paradox that only the sage is rich (cf. Cic. Par. 6: Solum sapientem esse 
diuitem). Serenus’s response non negatis solere illi et seruum et textum et 
cibum esse) misses the point.  
 
3.1: cum sapientem negastis insanire: here Serenus alludes to the Stoic 
paradox that the sage alone is sane; or, as Cicero expresses it in the title to 
his fourth paradox, that every foolish man is mad (Omnem stultum insanire). 
Again, Serenus’ response (non negatis et alienari et parum sana uerba 
emittere et quidquid uis morbi cogit audere) misses the point.  
 
3.1: cum sapientem negastis seruum esse: finally, Serenus alludes to the 
paradox that only the sage is free and every foolish man is a slave (Cic. Par. 
5: Solum sapientem esse liberum, et omnem stultum seruum). As with the 
two paradoxes previously alludes to, Serenus’ reply (idem non itis infitias et 
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ueniturum et imperata facturum et domino suo seruilia praestaturum 
ministeria) misses the point.  
 
3.1: itis infitias: ire infitias = negare, instead of the more usual infitiari 
(which is found in Cicero: see OLD, infitior 1-2), does not occur in prose 
before Nepos (Ep. 10.4) and Livy (e.g. 9.9.4), although it occurs in Plautus 
and Terence (TLL VII.1, infitiae 1). Not used elsewhere in S. See Minissale 
(p. 70) for fuller discussion and many Livian parallels. It was used in legal 
language, as Gaius (Inst. 4.172) quotes a praetorian ruling: non calumniae 
causa infitias ire. The date of this particular ruling is not known, apart from 
its being no later than Gaius’ death (? C. AD 179). 
 
3.1: alienari et parum sana uerba emittere: Viansino (1968: 123) thinks 
that this passage relates to drunkenness (‘ubriacchezza’), Zeno having 
claimed that the sage was incapable of drunkenness (see Ep. 83.9). 
However, the words here make no specific references to drunkenness, and I 
see no reason not to take the words at face value, i.e. as referring to madness 
(drunken or otherwise). Since the sage was the only truly rational person, 
the Stoics claimed that all non-sages were mad (see SVF, pp. 164-8, nos. 
657-70; Cicero: omnes stultos insanire, Tusc. 4.24 [54]). 
 
3.2: nec iniuriam nec contumeliam accepturum esse sapientem: here 
Serenus repeats the propositio that was first enunciated at 2.1. It is 
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integrated into the rest of the sentence by the use of the future participle of 
accipere. This is the second repetition, S. having repeated it at 2.3.  
 
3.2: priuilegium: in classical usage, according to L–S, ‘a bill or law in 
favor of or against an individual’. Here it has the post-Augustan meaning of 
a ‘prerogative’ or ‘an ordinance in favour of an individual’ (e.g. Ben. 
3.11.1).  
 
3.2: patientia: the res uulgaris of being able to put up with hardship, e.g. 
Cic. Inv. 2.54.163: patientia famis et frigoris; De lege agraria 2.24.64: 
patientia paupertatis. S. uses uulgus, like turba, to denote non-Stoics, cf. VB 
2.2.  
 
3.2: si negas accepturum iniuriam: here, in a partial repetition of the 
propositio, Serenus omits contumelia. This is possibly because, as S. says at 
5.1, it is a minor iniuria, really a subcategory of iniuria.  
 
3.3: sacrum: cf. 2.3: sacrum illud caput (of Cato). The sage is ‘sacred’. 
Indeed, in ancient philosophy, reason, which the Stoic sage exemplifies par 
excellence, is divine, a quality which men share (albeit imperfectly) with the 
gods. Cf. 6.8: illa quae sapientem tuentur . . . dis aequa. Those who seek to 
harm him (like the populus in 2.3, who attacked Cato) are sacrilegi. The 
sage is sacred because he personifies the divine reason that pervades the 
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universe. Lucretius refers to Epicurus as a god: 5.8: deus ille fuit, deus; 5.19: 
quo magis hic merito nobis deus esse uidetur. Also, Ep. 74.  
  
3.3: inuulnerabile . . . exhibebo: inuulnerabilis is found elsewhere in S. at 
Ben. 5.5.1, Helv. 13.2, Ep. 9.2, in the latter two cases qualifying animus, but 
in de Beneficiis qualifying hostis. Grimal (p. 42) declares it to be a 
’Métaphore militaire’, but only the Ben. passage really justifies that claim: 
presumably uulnera can be received outside warfare, for example in a 
robbery.  
 Here nota means ‘distiguishing mark’ (OLD 1).  
 
3.4: firmitas: near-synonym for constantia, also at 6.2 (tantum firmitatis in 
hominem . . . cadere). Besides providing variatio, firmitas also reinforces 
the metaphors of sturdy physical objects that have been employed to 
describe Stoic constantia (cf. 3.5: sapientis animus solidus est).  
 
3.4: pingue otium: proleptic adjective: ‘leisure that makes one fat’. Cf. Ep. 
73.10 (pingue otium) and NQ 2.19.2 (erant enim pinguia et differta ut ex 
longo otio corpora); cf. Ovid, Am. 2.19.25 (non-pejorative according to 
McKeown). See Viansino (1968: 124) for a very full listing of Greek 
parallels. 
 
3.4: desides populos: possibly orientals (cf. Pliny, Panegyricus 31.5 has 
desidem Aegyptum), although this is not specified. Another possibility could 
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be the Campanians, among whom Hannibal took a break from his military 
exploits and, according to S., went to seed (cf. Ep. 51.7: Si faceremus quod 
fecit Hannibal, [. . .] nemo non intempestivam desidiam, victori quoque, 
nedum vincenti, periculosam, merito reprehenderet).  
 
3.5: sapientem nulli esse iniuriae obnoxium; itaque non refert quam 
multa in illum coiciantur tela, cum sit nulli penetrabilis: Here, S. 
narrows down his attention to iniuria, which, as he explains later (5.4), can 
involve detrimentum corporis, for instance, as here, produced by spears.  
For the image, cf. S. De ira 3.5.8: quanto pulchrius uelut nulli (sc. animum) 
penetrabilem telo omnis iniurias contumeliasque respuere’; Ovid, Met. 
12.166: corpus nullo penetrabile telo. Perhaps a pun on penetrale, the 
innermost sanctum of a temple. 
 
3.5: Quomodo . . . adamas . . . conseruant: The sage’s virtue makes him 
invincible to fortune, just as adamant is invincible to fire and other forms of 
physical assault. Adamant was reputedly the hardest stone (diamond) and 
virtually indestructible, cf. Pliny NH 37.57 (cited by Austin, in his 
commentary on Aeneid 6.552, p. 181). There may be an echo of the 
adamantinoi logoi in Plato, Gorg. 509a, the ‘steel and adamantine 
arguments’ (tr. Irwin; see his note ad loc.) that ensure the stability of 
knowledge as opposed to mere opinion, which is not solidly grounded. The 
virtue of the Stoic sage is based on infallible reason too. (Cf. Commentary 
on 10.2, 17.1.) 
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 Although adamas is a Greek word, S. gives it in Roman script, not 
Greek. As Bickel (1906) argues, S. usually gives in Roman script foreign 
(principally Greek) words that have been assimilated into Latin, reserving 
Greek script for those words which had not been firmly established in Latin 
writing by his day, and which he considered he was introducing to a Latin 
readership. So, in the case of adamas, S. was using a word that had already 
appeared in Virgil (Aen. 6.552), Ovid (Met. 4.453) and Propertius (4.11.4), 
and so he gives it in Roman script. It is thought that it appears in Latin prose 
for the first time in this passage in CS (Albrecht (2014: 704)). 
 
3.5: inexpugnabilis: military metaphor, to be developed at greater length at 
6.8 (inexpugnabilia). The image of the soul of the sapiens as an 
impregnable fortress is found at Cicero, Paradoxa Stoicorum 4.27.  
 
4.1: 'Quid ergo? non erit aliquis qui sapienti facere temptet iniuriam?': 
the identity of the person speaking is not clear. Is it Serenus with another 
objection? Or the ‘imaginary objector’ so often found elsewhere in S.? I am 
inclined to say the latter, not least because of the brevity of the objection, 
which is characteristic of such objections by the imaginary interlocutor in 
contrast to Serenus’ lengthy speech. 
 
4.1: inferiorum: can be interpreted as neuter, following Viansino (1968) 
and Minissale (neither of whom gives reasons for their interpretation), but 
the context might also favour a masculine interpretation, as the first few 
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lines of the section concern the question of whether someone (‘aliquis’ – not 
something, ‘aliquid’) can harm the sapiens. This would fit better with the 
general discussion of CS, in which it is clear that injuries and insults are 
inflicted by humans on other humans. Cf. S. Ben. 14.19: Hunc . . . diuisum a 
contactu et a conspectu mortalium.  
 
4.1: potentes, et imperio editi et consensu seruientium ualidi: tricolon 
crescendo.  
 
4.1: neruo: synecdoche. Poetic. Cf. Valerius Flaccus 3.182: fallere neruo. 
May also refer to the sinews of an artillery piece: hunc aut tortilibus uibrata 
falarica neruis (Lucan 6.198).  
 
4.2: stolidus ille rex: Xerxes. Presumably not named because by then he 
was a standard rhetorical topos of the stupid, deluded tyrant. See Seneca 
rhetor, Suas. 2.18: terras armis obsidet, (Xerxes) coelum sagittis, maria 
vinculis. For parallels in S. and elsewhere see Klei (91), Viansino (1968: 
126; 1988: 392) and Minissale (p. 83). The second episode is recounted in 
Herodotus (7.35). Costa (p. 200) thinks that the first may be based on Hdt. 
5.105, where Darius is described as shooting an arrow into the air. The third 
episode, where Xerxes, angry at the destruction of his great bridge across 
the Hellespont in a storm, has the sea whipped with chains, is recounted at 
Hdt. 7.33-5. Possibly, there is an allusion here to Caligula’s building of a 
bridge across the Bay of Naples from Baiae to Puteoli, which, Suetonius 
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says, some people thought was an attempt on his part to emulate Xerxes 
(Suet. Gaius 19). Caligula figures prominently in the second half of CS 
(18.1-5) and this may be a hint at what is to come. Those who remembered 
Caligula’s exploits might think of him (even subconsciously) at the mention 
of Xerxes.  
 
4.2: Neptunum: personification, more vivid than mare, and giving the 
comparison between sea and sapiens more point, as chains are the sort of 
tortures that a sapiens might have to endure at the hands of a tyrant.  
 
4.2: his: one would expect iis, which is the emendation of Wesenberg (cited 
in Waltz’s edition), but is not cited in Reynolds’s apparatus criticus. his is 
the reading of A, while according to Viansino (1968) iis is the reading of 
F3.  
 
4.2: qui templa diruunt ac simulacra conflant nihil diuinitati nocetur: 
probably an allusion to Xerxes’ destruction and despoliation of the temple 
of Athena on the Acropolis at Athens, which would continue the analogy of 
the eastern king seeking to harm what is divine or connected with the gods. 
Despoiling temples of their statues and other valuable contents including 
money was one of the accusations laid against Verres by Cicero (Verr. 
5.184-7). For a discussion of sacrilege in the broader context of accusations 
of personal immorality in Ciceronian oratory, see Hammar (2013: 142-4).  
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4.2: proterue, petulanter, superbe: tricolon, not crescendo, but with the 
second element longer by one syllable than the first and third. The first two 
elements begin with ‘p’, leading is to expect the third element to begin with 
‘p’ likewise, but it begins with ‘s’, producing variatio.  
 
4.3: 'At satius erat neminem esse qui facere uellet': again, it is not clear 
whether we are intended to understand this objection as expressed by 
Serenus or by someone else. The second-person singular (optas) in S.’s 
response could equally be Serenus, or just one of the imaginary interlocutors 
who are addressed in the second person by S. (inquis).  
 
4.3: magnum argumentum . . . pollentis: argumentum is here probably 
just ‘evidence’ or ‘proof’ in the general (OLD 1), rather than ‘proof’ in the 
legal sense, as Minissale (p. 86, with examples) suggests.  
 
4.3: armis uirisque: possibly an echo of Virgil, Aen. 1.1: Arma uirumque. 
However, the collocation armis virisque is found in Sallust, BJ: [57] Id 
oppidum, in campo situm, magis opere quam natura munitum erat, nullius 
idoneae rei egens, armis virisque opulentum; [62] Igitur Iugurtha, ubi 
armis virisque et pecunia spoliatus est, cum ipse ad imperandum Tisidium 
vocaretur, rursus coepit flectere animum suum et ex mala conscientia digna 
timere. (I owe these references to Dr Fiachra Mac Góráin (personal 
communication).) So S. may be using an expression that pre-dates Virgil, 
without any intended Virgilian echo. However, given his fondness for 
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quoting from Virgil throughout his prose works, it is more likely that he is 
echoing Virgil. 
 
4.3: tuta securitas: having already commanded Serenus to be free from 
care (securum) because Cato, as a sage, does not accept injury or insult 
(2.1), and stated that the sage is safe (tutus) from injury and insult (2.3), S. 
now brings the two concepts of safety and freedom from care together here. 
He reinforces (and amplifies) the point by later, at 13.5, saying that freedom 
from care is the ‘characteristic good’ (proprium bonum) of the sage. The 
two are linked elsewhere in S., e.g. Phaedra 164 (scelus aliqua tutum, nulla 
securum tulit: see Coffey & Mayer ad loc.), Clem. 19.5, and Ep. 105.8 
(tutum aliqua res in mala conscientia praestat nulla securum) cf. Ep. 97.3.  
 
5.1-5.5: divisio and definition of iniuria 
 
5.1: Diuidamus . . . contumeliosa uerba: the divisio. S. makes a distinction 
between iniuria, which is natura grauior, because it involves harm to the 
one injured, and contumelia, which is (natura) leuior (except to the 
sensitive), because it offends the object of the insult. The definition of 
contumelia is expanded at the start of the second part of the treatise (10.1). 
For a fuller discussion of contumelia, see Introduction, §§ VII–VIII. 
The distinction is important for S.s’ argument, at least as far as as 
responding to and allaying Serenus’ indignation Cato’s rough treatment at 
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the hands of the mob is concerned. As Liebersohn (2005) argues, what Cato 
experiences is not full-blown injury but merely insult, the lesser injury.  
 
5.1: Tanta . . . uerba: Here S. explains why contumelia can be grauis 
delicatis. The dissolutio or uanitas of some men’s souls leads them to think 
that nihil acerbius, presumably than insult. S. amplifies this thought by the 
example of a slave who (a) prefers to be beaten with whips rather than with 
blows of the fist and (b) believes death and blows to be more tolerable than 
insulting words. (a) implies that blows of the fist are to be understood as 
being on the level of insults rather than injuries: they are cuffs that give no 
physical injury, and are just humiliating to receive, unlike the ‘proper’ 
punishment of a whipping. Flagellum (perhaps mock-affectionate here?) is 
the dimunitive of flagrum (L–S; OLD), which was, according to Lilja (1965: 
55), ‘a whip of knotted cords with spikes in them’. To be beaten with the 
flagrum was the severest form of whipping a slave could undergo (ibid.). 
Maybe they are delivered in conjunction with verbal insults. So, insult may 
be either verbal or physical. Thus the original ‘objective’ definition whereby 
iniuria is gravior than contumelia is undermined by the consideration that 
an individual subject may find that it is contumelia that is gravior.  
The thought that insult is worse than injury is found expressed in 
Nonius Marcellus (430, 10-15; p. 694 Lindsay): INIURIA A CONTUMELIA HOC 
DISTAT. Iniuria enim levior res est. He cites in support a line from the 
Periboea of Pacuvius (c. 220-130 BC): 
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pátior facile iniúriam, si est uácua a contumélia. (279 Ribbeck) 
 
Nonius also cites the Fallacia of the comic poet Caecilius Statius (c. 
230/220-168 BC): 
 
fácile aerumnam férre possunt, si índe abest iniúria; 
étiam iniuriám, nisi contra cónstat contuméliam. (47-48 Ribbeck; Manuwald 
(2003: 84) considers Caecilius to be citing Pacuvius) 
 
Although the quotations do not quite support Nonius’ assertion that injury is 
levior than insult (rather, they imply that insult exacerbates injury: cf. the 
English proverb ‘to add insult to injury’), it is clear is that the view that 
insult could be a worse thing to experience than injury was known to Roman 
theatre audiences of the second century BC. And S. may very well have 
known the plays in question. The Caecilius fragment might refer to the 
attitudes of slaves (so Guardì 1974: 129), but the lack of a context for the 
quotations precludes further discussion. S. could equally have observed such 
behaviour in slaves, without taking it from literature.  
The context in their respective plays and the speakers of each of 
these fragments are unknown; it may be that the sentiments they express are 
taken from Greek models. The Caecilius fragment might refer to the 
attitudes of slaves, but we cannot know.  
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5.1: colaphis: ‘blows of the fist’, ‘cuffs’ (Gk. κόλαφος). Viansino (1968: 
128) is incorrect when he says that it is only found in comic poets (‘usato 
solo dai comici’; apart from S., he presumably means), for Valerius 
Maximus also uses it (3.11.2). Instances in comedy include: Plaut. Capt. 88; 
Poen. 494; Ter. Andr. 199; Pompon. Atell. 178. According to Martin on 
Terence, Adelphoe 200, it is used mostly in Terence by people of low social 
standing, so by a pimp (leno) at Adelphoe 200 and 245. S. is therefore using 
it here to give a register appropriate to slaves. It is used again in CS at 14.3 
and is also found in S. in Ira 3.11.2, Ep. 13.5, Apoc. 15.  
 
5.2: non dolore tantum sed doloris opinione uexemur, more puerorum, 
quibus metum incutit umbra et personarum deformitas et deprauata 
facies: the thought goes back to Plato, Phaedo 77e. See Viansino (1968: 
128) for Greek references.  
 
5.2: personarum deformitas: probably masks with deformed faces, such as 
those used in the theatre – cf. De ira II, 11, 2; Ep. 24.13.  
 
5.2: deprauata facies: grimaces, probably not qualifying personarum, but 
referring to real faces, being distorted by their owners. Cf. Cic. De Or. 
2.252, De Fin. 5.35. 
 
5.2: nomina parum grata auribus: see Grimal, p. 48, for citation of names 
that sound bad to infants. 
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5.2: digitorum motus: perhaps shadow pictures.  
 
5.2: et alia quae impetu quodam erroris inprouidi refugiunt: For the 
association of young people with error and lack of foresight, cf. Cic. Tusc. 
5.62: is . . . se adulescens improvida aetate inretierat erratis. 
 
5.3: Iniuria, which is gravior than contumelia (5.1), he defines as having the 
following purpose (propositum): aliquem malo adficere (to inflict bad on 
someone). However, S. argues, this cannot be done to a sage, because 
malum is incompatible with sapientia (malo autem sapientia non relinquit 
locum). This is because one example of malum is turpitudo, which is the 
opposite of virtus. However, as virtus (S. has virtus honestumque, 5.3) is the 
defining quality of the sage, he cannot exhibit its contrary, turpitudo, 
without (which is the implication of the argument) ceasing to be a sage. S. 
presents the argument in the following syllogistic form: 
 
(1) (si) iniuria sine malo nulla est, malum nisi turpe nullum est,  
(2) turpe autem ad honestis occupatum pervenire non potest, 
(3) (therefore) iniuria ad sapientem non pervenit. 
 
Here, in premise 1, there is an equivocation between malum used in its 
ordinary sense as (1) a misfortune or hurt/harm (as in sine malo) and (2) the 
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limited, Stoic sense (in malum nisi turpe nullum est) of malum as lack of 
virtue, as what is base (turpe). 
The argument is restated using another syllogism: 
 
(1) Nam si iniuria alicuius mali patientia est,  
(2) sapiens autem nullius mali est patiens, 
(3) (therefore) nulla ad sapientem iniuria pertinet. 
 
This time, there is another equivocation, on patientia/patiens, as (1) 
endurance/undergoing something and (2) tolerance/tolerant of something. 
The slide takes place between premises 1 and premise 2, the first sense 
(together with the first sense of malum) being present in premise 1, and the 
second sense (together with the second sense of malum) present in premise 
2. 
 S. amplifies this by explaining precisely why the virtue of the sage 
does not allow him to suffer iniuria: Omnis iniuria deminutio eius in quem 
incurrit, nec potest quisquam iniuriam accipere sine aliquo detrimento vel 
dignitatis vel corporis vel rerum extra nos positarum. So iniuria involves 
loss, whether diminution of status, bodily damage, or loss of externals (e.g. 
property). However, the sage cannot suffer loss, because these things are 
fortuita (bestowed by fortuna) and are not essential to virtue. The sage 
already has everything: omnia in se reposuit, nihil fortunae credit. He is 
contentus virtute (5.4), which is the only thing he securely possesses; the 
rest are possessed at the whim of fortune (unius enim in possessione virtutis 
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est, ex qua depelli numquam potest; ceteris precario utitur, 5.4), and if 
‘lost’, they are not his loss, as they belong to another, fortune.  
 
5.3: unum enim illi malum est turpitudo: cf. Cic. Tusc. 2.29: Nihil est 
malum nisi quod turpe atque vitiosum est; DL 7.101: μόνον τὸ καλὸν 
ἀγαθόν. 
 
5.4: Omnis iniuria deminutio eius est in quem incurrit, nec potest 
quisquam iniuriam accipere sine aliquo detrimento uel dignitatis uel 
corporis uel rerum extra nos positarum: deminutio is a legal term, for 
instance in the phrase deminutio capitis (loss of legal personality). The loss 
of indifferent is thus likened to a diminution of legal status. As Grimal 
points out (p. 51), S. does not include dignitas (doxa) among the res extra 
nos positae as, according to Diogenes Laertius, Zeno did (D.L. VII.106).  
 
5.4: omnia in se reposuit, nihil fortunae credit, bona sua in solido habet 
contentus uirtute: the two outer cola contain financial imagery (reposuit, 
bona sua in solido habet), but the middle colon (nihil fortunae credit) has 
the general, not specifically financial sense of ‘he puts no trust in fortune’. 
However, Wölfflin’s emended to credidit. The perfect tense gives the more 
financial sense of ‘has entrusted nothing to fortune’, in the sense of laying 
down a deposit with fortune (cf. omnia in se reposuit). Wölfflin’s 
emendation therefore integrates the middle colon better with the financial 
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imagery of the other two elements of the tricolon, and for this reason I am 
inclined to accept it. ‘di’ could be a haplography. 
For the expression fortunae credere, cf. Ad Helviam 5.4 (Numquam 
ego fortunae credidi); Ep. 76.34 (stultis et fortunae credentibus). Also, DL 
6.105: τὸν σοφὸν . . . τύχῃ μηδὲν ἐπιτρέπειν. 
 
5.4: in solido: ‘in safety’, V. Aen. 11. 427. Sen. Ben. 3. 4. 2: praesentia 
bona nondum tota in solido sunt. Again, this continues the ‘imagery cluster’ 
of firmitas, adamant, citadels, rocks, etc.  
 
5.4: libera est, inmota, inconcussa: like the sage, who exemplifies it, 
virtue is unmoved and unshaken by fortune, in contrast to the non-sage.cf. 
Ep. 59.14: sapiens . . . inconcussus; De ira 3.25.3: Qui non irascitur, 
inconcussus iniuria perstitit. For similar vocabulary in S.’s depiction of the 
state of soul of the sage, who has attained perfected virtue and the summum 
bonum, see Ep. 71.27 (altera pars rationalis est, haec inconcussas 
opiniones habet . . . cum vero perfectum est, inmota illi stabilitas est). 
 
5.5: Itaque nihil perdet quod perire sensurus sit: abrupt change of 
subject from virtus to sapiens.  
 
5.5: precario: legal term, a precarium being a concession that can be 
revoked at the wish of the person making it; cf. Tranq. 11. 1: sapiens corpus 
suum, seque ipsum inter precaria numerat.  
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5.5: quia <salua> uirtute sua salua sunt: as far as I can tell from 
Reynolds’s and Viansino’s (1968) apparatus critici, the MSS read quia 
uirtute sua sunt, ‘because his possessions are/exist by (means of) virtue’, 
which gives poor sense, and Lipsius added salua between sua and sunt. 
Lipsius’s conjecture is generally accepted. The sense now is: ‘because his 
possessions are safe by (means of) virtue’. I think the sense given by 
Lipsius’s conjecture is good, that the sage’s actual possessions, those 
appertaining to his virtue, are intact. The point that Stilbo’s actual 
possessions, those appertaining to his virtue, are intact, is reinforced by his 
reply to Demetrius at 6.1: ‘. . . omnia mea mecum sunt’. It points ahead to 
Stilbo’s reply to Demetrius at 6.1: ‘. . . omnia mea mecum sunt’. However, 
Gertz and Madvig thought that uirtute needed salua to qualify it too. Gertz 
conjectured salua before uirtute, and this is accepted by Reynolds. Madvig 
inserted it after uirtute, citing (according to Reynolds’s apparatus) CS 16.2 
(sed nomen iniuriae, quod non potest recipi uirtute salua). The second salua 
does reinforce the inextricability of the sage’s virtue with the possessions 
that really matter to him: if his virtue is safe, so are they. Moreover, Getz’s 
word order gives a neat chiasmus, which Madvig’s does not (cf. the 
chiasmus at 2.2: Cato post libertatem uixit nec libertas post Catonem). 
Viansino (1968: 33), however, accepts Madvig’s word order. On balance, I 
think the OCT is preferable to Viansino’s (1968) text, principally for the 
chiasmus. However, some doubts must remain about Gertz’s and Madvig’s 
conjectures. If there had been only one salua in the text, as Lipsius thought, 
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it is easy to see how a careless scribe could have missed it out in haste or 
inadvertency. Indeed, the scribe of A did miss out a portion of the text (5.6-
7; see Reynolds’s preface, p. xv), which had to be supplemented from γ. 
However, if there were two salua, it seems less likely that both of them 
would have been omitted.  
 
5.6-6.7: the chria (exemplum) of Stilbo’s encounter with Demetrius 
Poliorcetes  
 
This anecdote is an example of a chria. The chria here would seem to be of 
the second type of chria as given by Quintilian 1.9.4: ‘another includes an 
answer (“being asked” or “when this was said to him, he answered”)’ (tr. 
Russell (Loeb); alterum quod est in respondendo: ‘interrogatus ille’, vel 
‘cum hoc ei dictum esset, respondit’). For more on chriae, see Russell 
(Loeb), vol. 1, pp. 211-12, nn. 6-9. What is notable in CS is the expansion 
by S. of the simple chria form (Ab hoc . . . ‘omnia mecum mea sunt.’) into a 
full-blown narrative topped off with a long speech.  
This anecdote of Stilbo has great similarity with that of Bias of 
Priene, one of the Seven Sages of Greece (see New Pauly, pp. 622-3) as 
related in Cic. Par. 1.8 and Valerius Maximus 7.2, exc. 3. Like Stilbo, 
Bias’s home city has been captured and sacked, and his fellow citizens are 
fleeing with what possessions they can carry with them. Asked by some 
unspecified individual, according to Cicero, why he was not doing the same, 
he replied: ‘I am indeed doing the same; for I am carrying all my goods with 
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me’ (cum esset admonitus a quodam, ut idem ipse faceret, 'Ego vero', inquit, 
'facio; nam omnia mecum porto mea'). Valerius’ version is roughly similar: 
'interrogatus quid ita nihil ex bonis suis secum ferret ‘ego vero' inquit 'bona 
mea mecum porto' (text Briscoe’s, as given in Loeb, with alterations by 
Shackleton Bailey). S.’s account of Stilbo is much more vivid than Cicero’s 
and Valerius’ of Bias. In addition to his reply in direct speech at 5.6, which 
recalls Bias’ direct speech in Cicero and Valerius, Stilbo is given a full-scale 
speech (6.3-71.1). Moreover, as Traina (1974: 14-15) points out, the initial 
direct-speech reply (‘nihil,’ inquit, ‘omnia mea mecum sunt’) at 5.6 is 
supplemented by two varied repetitions in Stilbo’s own long oration, one in 
indirect speech at 6.3 (nec quicquam suum nisi se putet) and the other in 
direct speech again at 6.5 (teneo, habeo quidquid mei habui). The anecdote 
occurs again in Ep. 9.18-19, illustrating the self-sufficiency of the sage. 
Again, there is the reply of Stilbo, in direct speech (‘omnia’ inquit ‘bona 
mea mecum sunt’, 9.18), word-similar to that of CS 5.6 except for the 
addition of bona to go with mea. Again, it is repeated with variations, with 
comments by S. in 9.19: ‘Nihil’ inquit ‘perdidi’: dubitare illum coegit an 
vicisset; ‘Omnia mea mecum sunt’; iustitia, virtus, prudentia, hoc ipsum, 
nihil bonum putare quod eripi possit. In both passages, the repetition of 
Stilbo’s reply hammers home the point that only virtue is securely possessed 
by the sage. In other repects, though, the passage in Ep. 18-19 is much less 
dramatic than that in CS, and more reminsicent of the matter-of-fact 
accounts of Bias of Priene in Cicero and Valerius Maximus. This is no 
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surprise, given the important structural role that the Stilbo episode plays in 
CS, as discussed above.  
The dramatic character of the episode in CS is increased in other 
ways too. For instance, as Döring (1972: 141) argues, S. raises the level of 
pathos by giving Stilbo daughters (plural) rather than the single daughter 
recorded by Diogenes Laertius (2.114), hence increasing his loss in all eyes 
except his own. Also, rather than being quizzed by an unnamed fellow 
citizen, as Bias is, Stilbo is brought into confrontation with the leader of the 
enemy, the man responsible for the destruction of Megara. Victor and 
vanquished face each other, and in S.’s view the true victor is not 
Demetrius, but the supposedly vanquished Stilbo. In this respect S.’s 
account is reminiscent of that between Alexander the Great and Diogenes 
(D.L. 6.38). In each case the king asks the philosopher a question, the reply 
to which indicates the philosopher’s indifference to worldly power and 
wealth. So Alexander asks Diogenes to ask for anything he wants. Diogenes 
asks Alexander to stand out of his light. Cf. Demetrius’ defiance before 
Nero in Epictetus 1.25.23: ἀπειλεῖς μοι θάνατον, σοὶ δ’ ἡ φύσις (‘You 
threaten me with death, but nature threatens you’). Here in CS, Demetrius 
asks Stilbo whether he is missing anything, to which Stilbo replies: nothing, 
he has everything with him. That is, he has virtue, which is all he needs. 
According to Diogenes Laertius (2.115), Demetrius took measures that 
Stilbo’s house be preserved and his plundered property restored to him, but 
that when Stilbo was asked to give a list what he had lost, he he ‘denied that 
he has lost anything which really belonged to him, for no one had taken 
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away his learning, while he still had his eloquence and knowledge’ (Loeb 
translation). Plutarch recounts this episode at Dem. 9.5-6. In Plutarch, the 
question Demetrius asks is whether anyone had robbed him of anything, so 
which he replies: ‘No one ..., for I saw nobody carrying away knowledge’ 
(Loeb translation).  
The sacking of cities was one of the means by which the Hellenistic 
rhetorical and ‘tragic’ historians, such as Duris of Samos, sought to arouse 
the emotions of their readers and audiences and hence make them engage 
sympathically with the actors in the events they were narrating. See Walsh 
(1961: ch. 2) for the influence of the ‘tragic historians’ on Livy. As Klei 
(103) remarks, the captarum urbium forma was a favourite subject in the 
rhetorical schools. On descriptions of the sacking of cities as touching the 
emotions, see Quint. Inst. 8.367-70. Cf. Keitel (2010: 337-52) for a 
discussion of narrative of the sacking of cities, specifically in Tacitus. 
 
5.6: Stilbon philosophus: for exhaustive testimonia for this Megarian 
philosopher, see Döring (1972: 46-61, 140-56). According to Diogenes 
Laertius, the Megarian Philippus (2.114; Döring fr. 165) and Heraclides 
Lembus (2.120; Döring fr. 167; FHG 170-1), Stilbo was a teacher of Zeno 
of Citium, the founder of the Stoa. This may account for the use of Stilbo as 
an exemplar of Stoic virtue. Through his connection with Zeno, he was 
considered one of the Stoics, as was Crates, who also allegedly taught Zeno 
(D.L. 7.2, Döring fr. 168; 7.24, Döring fr. 169). Indeed, the Megarian 
school, to which Stilbo belonged, was fond of logical puzzles, as were the 
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Stoics, who may have got it from them through Zeno’s being a pupil of 
Stilbo. Given that CS is concerned to prove a Stoic paradox and uses many 
syllogisms to do this in the first half, this could be a further reason why 
Stilbo might be suitable as an exemplum.  
 
5.7: se . . . indemnem esse testatus est: indemnis means ‘suffering no 
damage or loss’ (OLD), ‘secure from loss, incurring no loss’ (Berger 498). 
Interestingly in the light of the similarities between 5.6-61 and Ep. 9.18-19 
discussed above, it occurs at Ep. 9.19 (quanto hic mirabilior vir qui per 
ferrum et ruinas et ignes inlaesus et indemnis evasit!). In both passages, the 
term has a metaphorical sense, because in purely legal terms Stilbo has 
suffered property loss and damage in the sack of Megara. In respect of his 
true possession, his virtue, he has suffered no loss. 
Testari means ‘To affirm or declare solemnly (esp. before 
witnesses), testify to, etc.’ (OLD 2; cf. Berger 735), here used in a 
transferred sense (‘To give evidence of, demonstrate (something) by one’s 
action or condition’ (OLD 4)).  
 
5.7: habebat enim uera secum bona, in quae non est manus iniectio: 
bona means ‘(usu. pl.) Possessions, property, estate’ (OLD 8); ‘The whole a 
person’s property’ (Berger 374). The term manus iniectio refers to the 
procedure of laying a hand or hands on a person or object in order to claim 
ownership of him/or/it. See Berger 542 (‘Legis actio per manus 
iniectionem’); cf. Berger 577 (‘Manus iniectio (manum inicere)’). As 
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Stilbo’s true possessions (his virtue) cannot be taken from him and so lie 
outside legal procedure, manus iniectio will not apply to them. The term is 
not used in a transferred sense here, but S. makes it clear that the procedure 
cannot apply to Stilbo’s virtue. 
 
5.7: non iudicabat sua, sed aduenticia et nutum fortunae sequentia: (1) 
iudicare is used in a transferred, non-legal sense here, as elsewhere in CS 
(6.2, 9.1, 10.3, 13.3, 13.5, 14.4, 18.4). (2) aduenticius can mean ‘(of 
property) obtained otherwise than by direct inheritance from one’s parents, 
coming by an accident of inheritance; accruing accidentally or as a windfall’ 
(OLD 4). S.’s gloss, ‘following the approval of fortune’, is not strictly 
necessary for the argument, but rounds off the sentence better than the bare 
adventicia.  
 
5.7: nutum fortunae: personification, fortune nodding her appoval. The 
expression is only found here before Apuleius (Met. 4.12.3, 7.20.1, 10.24.2). 
Given the well-established cult of the goddess Fors Fortuna at Rome (see 
Fears 1981: 846ff.), such a personification would have seemed natural to 
S.’s readers.  
 
5.7: Ideo ut non propria dilexerat; omnium enim extrinsecus 
adfluentium lubrica et incerta possessio est: crucial to understanding this 
sentence is the distinction in Roman law between ownership (proprietas, 
dominium) and possession (possessio) as summed up by Ulpian: Nihil 
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commune habet proprietas cum possessione (Digest 41.2.12.1, p. 507 
Mommsen/Krueger/Watson); not 21.2.12.1, as in Berger 637). As du Plessis 
(2015: 176) explains: ‘Possession was regarded essentially as physical 
control of the sort that was protected by possessory interdicts, whereas 
ownership was the ultimate entitlement to property’. Here we have the 
adjective propria (referring to the quae dissipata et direpta ferebantur of the 
previous sentence) contrasting with the noun possessio. So Stilbo had not 
held dear what he had lost as his own property. The explanation S. gives is 
that of all things that ‘flow’ to (person or persons unspecified) from outside, 
there is only unstable and uncertain possession, not ownership. In terms of 
human law, Stilbo did have ownership, and not merely possession, of his 
house and many other things. But (and I think this is probably S.’s 
implication) in the broader scheme of nature, he had merely possession of 
his physical property, but secure ownership of his virtue. 
 
6.1: dives aliquis regnum orbae senectutis exercens: a rich old person 
who has no heirs can exercise considerable power over legacy hunters or 
relatives, who feel obliged to follow his or her every whim (cf. regnum) in 
the hope of receiving an inheritance. For the manipulative power exercised 
over legacy hunters, see also Marc. 19.2: in civitate nostra plus gratiae 
orbitas confert quam eripit, adeoque senectutem solitudo . . . ad potentiam 
ducit ut quidam odia filiorum simulent et liberos eiurent, orbitatem manu 
faciant; Breu. 7.7: quot illa anus efferendis heredibus lassa (the old woman 
outlives her legacy hunters) and Williams’s note ad loc. In these passages, 
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as Williams notes, S. is giving an interesting alternative slant on the theme 
of legacy-hunting, by emphasizing the attitude of the person whose wealth 
is coveted by the captator, rather than concentrating on the captator. For a 
full discussion of captation see Champlin (1991: 87-102); ibid., App. IV 
gives a list of passages. However, at 9.2 S. speaks of magno labore 
adfectata hereditas, which is more in line with the satirists’ concentration 
on the captator.  
 
6.1: egregiam artem quassandarum urbium professus: sarcastic. The 
participial phrase artem . . . professus parallels sapientiam . . . professi of 
1.1. S. is contrasting the sapientia of the philosophers at 1.1 with the mere 
ars of Demetrius Poliorcetes. This is the old distinction between σοφία and 
τέχνη found in Plato’s Gorgias. The use of quassandarum continues the 
moved/unmoved imagery.  
For parallels for egregius used sarcastically see Cic. Cael. 63: ‘in 
balneis delituerunt.’ testis egregios!; Seneca rhetor, Contr. 1.2.1: o 
egregium pudicitiae patrimonium: ‘militem occidi’. 
 
6.2: Inter micantis ubique gladios et militarem in rapina tumultum, 
inter flammas et sanguinem stragemque inpulsae ciuitatis, inter 
fragorem templorum super deos suos cadentium uni homini pax fuit: 
reminiscent of scenes of the sacking of cities, such as the account in Aeneid 
2 (cf. tumultus: Aen. 2.122, 2.485; flamma: 431, 478, 587, 632, 633, 757; 
cadentem patriam, 575-6; sanguis: 72, 367, 501-2, 530, 551, 582, 662, 667; 
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stat ferri acies mucrone corusco | stricta, 333-4; et in multo lapsantem 
sanguine nati | implicuitque comam laeua, dextraque coruscum | extulit ac 
lateri capulo tenus abdidit ensem, 551-3; iam flammae tulerint inimicus et 
hauserit ensis, 600), and many such in Livy (see Walsh 1961: 191-7). The 
scene depicted in CS 6.2 contains many of the stock aspects of descriptions 
of captured cities outlined by Quintilian 8.3.68-9.  
 
6.2: pax: for peace as a quality in the soul of the philosopher, cf. Cic. Tusc. 
5.48: semper in animo eius (sc. sapientis) esse placidissimam pacem; Lucr. 
3.23-4: neque ulla | res animi pacem delibat tempore in ullo. According to 
Plut. Dem. 9.5, Stilbo was ‘famous for his election of a life of tranquillity’ 
(δόξαν ἔχοντος ἀνδρὸς ᾑρημένου πως ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ καταβιῶναι). Stoicism and 
Epicureanism had peace of the soul as the ultimate aim. The other dialogus 
addressed to Serenus, De tranquillitate animi, is a discussion of how to 
attain and retain spiritual calm. Here, the use of pax rather than tranquillitas 
is particularly apposite as the scene is one of war and Stilbo is yet at peace. 
 
6.4: En adsum hoc uobis probaturus, [. . .] agitent: having started his 
speech by addressing Demetrius in the second person singular, Stilbo now 
addresses unnamed persons in the second person plural. (For a broader 
discussion of tu and uos addressees in S. in relation to questions of genre, 
see Introduction, § II.) Who these persons may be is uncertain. They may be 
the Macedonian army as a whole, or the people of Megara. It seems, though, 
as if S. is speaking through Stilbo, reaching out beyond the confrontation 
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between Stilbo and Demetrius, beyond also his immediate conversion with 
Serenus, to a broader public, perhaps an audience that is supposed to be 
observing the conversation, or the readership in general. In this regard, the 
future participle probaturus used in place of a final clause is interesting. Not 
only does it streamline the sentence, avoiding a more cumbersome purpose 
clause with ut, but it is also an expression of S.’s expressing his intention 
through the words of another, here Stilbo. For a discussion of this 
motivating use (‘Motivierender Gebrauch’) of the future participle, see 
Westman (1961: 92-8).  
For more on the use of future participles (not just as final clauses) in 
S., see Summers, p. lxvii; see also Williams, p. 31, for examples in De otio 
and BV. On future participles used in place of final clauses, see Woodcock 
(1959: 73, § 92). 
 
6.5: an peior publico, nescio: rhyme of ending and alliteration on initial p. 
 
6.5: teneo, habeo: repetition with asyndeton, for emphasis. Cf. 6.6 (mecum 
sunt, mecum erunt), 7.1 (exhibuimus, exhibebimus).  
 
6.6: Non est quod me uictum uictoremque te credas: uicit fortuna tua 
fortunam meam: a neat sentential formulation of the insignificance of 
Demetrius’ victory over Stilbo: all that has happened is that Demetrius’ 
fortuna has defeated Stilbo’s fortuna. The point is emphasised by the 
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repetitions me uictum uictoremque te (a chiasmus) and fortuna tua fortunam 
meam.  
 
6.6: Caduca illa . . . nescio: caduca illa picks up the two fortunae of the 
previous sentence. However, the stress is rather more on Stilbo’s fortuna, as 
illa (‘those’, possibly ‘the latter’) seems to express. Also, illa marks a shift 
in attention from Stilbo’s fortuna overall to the individual, but unspecified 
things (expressed by the plural illa) that comprise his fortuna. They are 
fleeting and transitory (caduca, OLD 9). Caducus also has a legal sense, 
referring to property that ‘is not, or cannot be, taken up by the heir or 
legatee and consequently falls to the treasury’ (OLD 10). The specific legal 
sense seems not to be in play here, although S. clearly intends some allusion 
to property as he adds after caduca, almost by way of a (loose) gloss, et 
dominum mutantia: the ownership of these things changes.  
 
6.6: quod ad res meas pertinet, mecum sunt, mecum erunt: res meas 
(my things, my (true) property) denotes Stilbo’s virtue, not his fortuna; 
meas needs stressing when translated into English (my things), and is 
reinforced by the subsequent repetition of mecum, which further emphasises 
the inseparability of Stilbo from his true possessions (his virtue). The 
polyptoton sunt . . ., erunt is not merely there for variatio, but the present 
tense, followed by the future, shows that what Stilbo has now will be his in 
the future as well (and, we may assume, for as long as he lives). 
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6.8-7.1: lessons to be drawn from the Stilbo exemplum.  
 
6.8: una manu: synecdoche, the hand being that of Scipio Aemilianus. His 
fame as the destroyer of Carthage and the taker of Numantia presumably 
justified this allusive mention. Cf. Ira 3.11.7, where he is mentioned as the 
taker of both Carthage and Numantia; also Cic. Mur. 58: Bis consul fuerat 
P. Africanus et duos terrores huius imperi, Carthaginem Numantiamque, 
deleverat cum accusavit L. Cottam.  
 
7.1: hunc sapientem nostrum nusquam inueniri: a common criticism 
against the Stoics, that their sage is an unattainable ideal, and hence that 
their conception of virtue is unrealistic. See Viansino (1968: 137), for a 
copious listing of examples, among them Cic. Div. 2.28.61: (sapientes) qui 
omnino nusquam reperiuntur; Cic. Laelius 18: sed eam sapientiam 
interpretantur, quam adhuc mortalis nemo est consecutus. Indeed, Stoics 
themselves admitted that sages were rarely found (see the passages cited in 
Brouwer 2014: 164).  
 
7.1: exhibuimus, exhibebimus: asyndeton, common in S., e.g. Ep. 33.1 
(ubi aliqua eminent, notabilia sunt); BV 17.5 (operose assequuntur quae 
uolunt, anxii tenent quae assecuti sunt). See Summers, pp. xcii–xciii; 
Williams, p. 231. It is also a polyptoton, the tense being different in the 
repetition. The shift from perfect to future serves to emphasise the 
continuity of S.’s instruction of Serenus: he has shown him already the Stoic 
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picture of the sage, and he will continue to do so. For polyptoton elsewhere 
in CS, cf. 6.6 (mecum sunt, mecum erunt; and note ad loc.). 
 
7.1: raro forsitan magnisque aetatium interuallis unum; neque enim 
magna et excedentia solitum ac uulgarem modum crebro gignuntur: cf. 
S. Ep. 42.1: nam ille [=vir bonus] tamquam phoenix semel anno 
quingentesimo nascitur. Nec est mirum ex intervallo magna generari: 
mediocria et in turbam nascentia saepe fortuna producit, eximia vero ipsa 
raritate commendat. This image was relayed by the second-century AD 
Aristotelian philosopher Alexander of Aphrodisias (199.16-17). The view 
that the sage is an extremely rare occurrence was held by the early Stoics 
(e.g. Chrysippus, apud Diogenianus apud Eusebius of Caesarea, 
Preparation for the Gospel 6.8.14). 
 
7.1: uulgarem modum: uulgus is often used by S. to describe the non-Stoic 
majority, e.g. VB 2.2. Cf. Hor. Od. 3.1.1: Odi profanum vulgus et arceo. 
Also, turba.  
 
7.1: Ceterum hic ipse M. Cato, a cuius mentione haec disputatio 
processit, uereor ne supra nostrum exemplar sit: picking up the 
hyperbolic and lengthy praise of Cato at 1.3-2.2, S. claims that Cato 
surpasses in virtue even the almost unattainable standard that the Stoic sage 
sets, but gives no reason why this should be so. Here nostrum means ‘our 
[i.e. Stoic]’. 
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Klei (111), however, disagrees with this interpetation of the passage. 
He thinks that it is Stilbo who is referred to by nostrum exemplar. He thinks 
that S. would not, even for rhetorical effect, have Cato rise above ‘the pure 
ideal’ (‘het zuivere ideaal’) of the Stoic sage, which by definition cannot be 
surpassed. Certainly, given the near-impossibility of becoming a Stoic sage, 
let alone surpassing it, it does seem a gross exaggeration to speak of Cato, 
no matter how distinguished he was, in these lofty terms. Nevertheless, pace 
Klei, the words of this passage do point in that direction. At the beginning 
of 7.1, S. has: Non est quod dicas, ita ut soles, hunc nostrum sapientem 
nusquam inueniri. This clearly concerns the Stoic sage, not Stilbo. And 
what follows, in which the rarity of occurrence of the sage is discussed, also 
clearly concerns the Stoic sage. Since the end of Stilbo’s direct speech at 
6.7, there has been mention of Alexander the Great, Scipio Aemilianus, and 
now the Stoic sage. In other words, two sections have passed since the end 
of the Stilbo digression; if he was meant here by nostrum exemplar, surely 
S. would have made this clearer, probably by introducing the name again. 
As I said at the beginning of this note, the sentence in the lemma continues 
the hyperbolic manner of referring to Cato, who held up the tottering 
Republic like Atlas holding up the world. Moreover, S. does not seem to be 
seeking to make a strong distinction between Stilbo and the Stoic sage. 
Stilbo serves here quite adequately as an example of the sage (Stoic or not) 
who is unconcerned by the misfortune he has suffered. And his stated 
indifference to the loss of his property is in keeping with Stoic doctrine, as 
we have seen. Therefore, I think Klei is wrong. 
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More recently, Yelena Baraz (2015: 169-70) has taken nostrum 
exemplar to refer to Stilbo. She gives no reason for this reading, which I 
have argued above is wrong. That said, she finds it problematic that Cato is 
given priority over Stilbo as this undermines ‘their very position as 
exemplaria sapientis, a position crucial to Seneca’s task in this text’ (ibid. 
170). Also problematic, for Baraz (ibid. n. 27), is CS 2.1, where Cato is 
elevated above Ulysses and Hercules as a ‘surer’ exemplar of the sage, 
although, as she says, the ranking is justified by S.’s subsequent discussion 
(2.2). While she is right to find this hierarchising of sages troublesome (can 
anyone who has attained moral perfection be ‘more perfect’ than another in 
the same position? – my question, not Baraz’s), and does feed into the 
general problem (pounced on by Stoicism’s opponents) of the reality and 
feasibility of the sage, S. does elevate Cato above other moral exemplars in 
CS.  
The reason for this, I think, can only be rhetorical, despite Klei’s and 
Baraz’s reservations. [‘While this instance of ranking may be easier to 
justify as rhetorical, the recurrence of this procedure in the comparison of 
Stilbo and Cato shows its consequences once it becomes a structuring model 
in Seneca’s thought and presentation’ (Baraz 2016: 170 n. 27).] From CS 
1.3 it is clear that Serenus, who is not yet committed to Stoicism, is an 
admirer of Cato and is outraged by his rough handling by the mob. Given 
that Cato was a Stoic, S. sees a way to exploit Serenus’ admiration for Cato 
in order to move him into the Stoic camp. S., whose own admiration for 
Cato is clear from other works, puts him on a pedestal, way above the other 
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(non-Roman) moral exemplars, by this rhetorical exaggeration playing on 
Serenus’ emotions and thus making him more susceptible to the Stoic 
message S. is trying to impart.  
 
7.2: bonis inter se pax est, mali tam bonis perniciosi quam inter se: the 
association of the sage with peace, introduced at 6.2, is developed further 
here. The idea that good men and sages are friends with each other is a very 
common one in Stoicism; see Viansino (1968: 138) and Banateanu (2001: 
155-81) for references. The thought seems to be that the sage has no desire 
to harm anyone, and qua sage cannot be harmed even if the attempt is made 
to harm him; so between sages peace reigns; the inner peace of the sage is 
matched by his peaceful intentions in his dealings with others, sages and 
non-sages alike. By contrast the non-sages (the bad), who have no inner 
peace, are disposed to do harm both to sages and to each other.  
The thought expressed here is akin to that found at Diogenes 
Laertius 7.124, according to whom the Stoics say that friendship exists only 
among the virtuous (spoudaioi) because of their similarity to each other; the 
bad (phauloi), by contrast have no friends. This is because, according to 
Diogenes, the Stoics view friendship as common use (koinōnia) of the 
‘things to do with life’ (ta kata ton bion), treating their friends as they would 
treat themselves, as valuable for their own sakes.There may be an allusion 
here to the Old Stoic account of the cosmic city, as expounded by Zeno of 
Citium in his Republic (D.L. 7.33 = SVF 1.122). According to Diogenes 
Laertius (loc. cit.), Zeno held that only sages can be citizens, friends, 
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household members and free men, and that even their parents, who are not 
sages, are enemies. There is dispute over what the cosmic city was supposed 
to be. Some interpretations take the city to be an ideal city, rather like 
Plato’s ideal city, which is incapable of realisation. Vogt (2008), by 
contrast, considers the cosmic city to be the world as it is, but that only 
certain people (the sages) could be citizens of it, just as in Greek cities of 
the time the citizen body was restricted to adult free males. That did not 
mean that others (slaves, women, children and resident aliens) did not live 
in it. From this, Zeno would seem to have envisaged an ideal city consisting 
solely of sages.  
 
7.2-8.1: logical proofs of the impossibility of the sage accepting injury. 
 
After a short section on the objection that the sage is an unattainable ideal, 
S. argues that the sage cannot be harmed, because what harms must be 
stronger than what is harmed; and as wickedness (nequitia) is not stronger 
than virtue, the sage cannot be harmed (the term bonus is synonymous with 
sapiens (cf. later in this section, Illud enim iam non es admonendus, 
neminem bonum esse nisi sapientem):  
 
(1) Denique ualidius debet esse quod laedit eo quod laeditur; 
(2) non est autem fortior nequitia uirtute; 
(3) non potest ergo laedi sapiens. (7.2) 
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Here there is an equivocation on ‘stronger’ reflected in the slide from 
ualidius in premise 1 to fortior in premise 2. Although ualidus sometimes 
has connotations strength of character or purpose (see OLD 8a), it usually 
refers to physical strength and power (including good health). Fortis, by 
contrast, in addition to meaning physically strong, often has a more moral 
sense of brave and resolute etc. There has therefore been a shift from a non-
moral to a moral sense. This is not surprising, given the essentially morally 
neutral content of premise 1 and the clearly moral content of premise 2. 
However, the use of a different word in premise 2 does impair the logical 
validity of the syllogism. 
Moreover, good men (i.e. sages) do not wish to harm one another, 
only wicked men wish to harm good men. However, if what is stronger 
cannot be harmed by what is weaker, and the wicked man is weaker than the 
good man, and the good man cannot fear injury unless from his inferiors, 
then the sage cannot be injured: 
 
(1) Quodsi laedi nisi infirmior non potest, 
(2) malus autem bono infirmior est, 
(3) nec iniuria bonis nisi a dispari uerenda est, 
(4) iniuria in sapientem uirum non cadit. (7.2) 
 
Here, the underlying assumption is that good is ‘stronger’ than bad. Perhaps 
there is some influence from Greek κρείσσων, which can mean both 
‘stronger’ (cf. Plato, Rep. 338c) and ‘better’. See the discussions of Plato, 
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Gorgias 488c—d on whether ‘stronger’, ‘superior’ and ‘better’ are 
coterminous (Dodds (pp. 284-5 of his commentary) and of Gorgias 488cd 
by Irwin (pp. 184-5 of his commentary)). If 7.2 contains an echo of this sort 
of discussion in Plato (and possibly in earlier Stoic philosophers), then 
infirmior in premise 2 has, besides its basic meaning of ‘weaker’, also a 
connotation of ‘morally inferior’.  
At this point, S. counters the imagined objection that if Socrates was 
unjustly condemned, he accepted an injury (7.3). There is a distinction, S. 
maintains, between doing an injury and accepting that one has been done, 
that is, between seeking to harm someone and actually harming them. He 
illustrates the point by several short examples, for instance that poison may 
be administered, but be harmless because the intended victim has eaten, so 
neutralising the poison (7.4). This is a matter of logic: A can occur without 
B occurring; but B cannot occur without A occurring. Thus, I can move my 
feet (A) without running (B); but I cannot run (B) without moving my feet 
(A). Likewise, in order for me to accept an injury, someone must have done 
an injury; but if someone has done me an injury, I do not have to accept it. 
(7.6.) Here again is the equivocation on two meanings of accipere: (a) 
receive (nolens volens), (2) accept willingly, take on board. 
A syllogism picks up the imagined objection about Socrates being 
unjustly condemned (8.1): 
 
(1) Praeterea iustitia nihil iniustum pati potest, quia non coeunt 
contraria; 
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(2) iniuria autem non potest fieri nisi iniuste; 
(3) ergo sapienti iniuria non potest fieri. 
 
Here there may be an equivocation on two possible meanings of coeunt: (1) 
to come together to form a whole (OLD 7), (2) to come together so as to 
affect each other (e.g. join battle, or have sexual intercourse). 
So, in addition to the logical distinction between an injury being 
made and an injury being accepted, there is the further logical argument that 
injury, which is an injustice, cannot be done to the sage, who is just.  
 
7.3: 'Si iniuste' inquit 'Socrates damnatus est, iniuriam accepit.': here, 
an imaginary objection in the third person (inquit).  
 
7.3: Hoc loco . . . perdiderim: S., to counter the objection that Socrates 
accepted an injury by being unjustly condemned, S. needs to establish that 
an injury may be intended but the intended victim may not accept it. The 
example he gives, of an inept thief burgling an item from a man’s country 
house and putting it in his town house, is not entirely convincing. The owner 
has lost the item for as long as it is in transit between his villa and his town 
house; the loss is temporary, but there is still a loss.  
 
7.4: Potest . . . perfecta sunt: S. first asserts that someone can be harmful 
without actually doing harm. There is a play on different meanings of 
nocens here. First, it is simply the present participle of nocere: harming (i.e. 
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actually doing harm). Secondly, however, nocens can mean ‘injurious’ or 
‘noxious’ (OLD 1, i.e. in the sense of predisposed to cause harm), or even 
‘stained with crime, guilty’ (OLD 2). I think S.’s argument depends on the 
meaning ‘guilty’ being understood. After giving examples to illustrate the 
point, he sums up his position with the following words: Omnia scelera 
etiam ante effectum operis, quantum culpae satis est, perfecta sunt – the 
intention motivating a wicked act, not only the act itself, determines guilt. 
Cf. S. Ben. 5.14.2: sic latro est etiam antequam manus inquinat; Cic. Fin. 
3.32: Nam ut peccatum est patriam prodere, parentes violare, fana 
depeculari, quae sunt in effectu, sic timere, sic maerere, sic in libidine esse 
peccatum est etiam sine effectu. Minissale (p. 117) also cites Seneca rhetor, 
Contr. 4.7: scelera quoque quamuis citra exitum subsederint, puniuntur.  
 
7.4: Si quis cum uxore sua tamquam cum aliena concumbat, adulter 
erit, quamuis illa adultera non sit: The sense of tamquam here is probably 
that in OLD 4c (‘as if, as though [. . .] without finite vb.’). Ker translates 
tamquam cum aliena as ‘thinking she is another man’s wife’. A parallel in 
S. (given in OLD loc. cit.) is Ben. 1.7.1: qui dedit tamquam non recepturus 
(‘who gave it in the belief that he would not receive it back’). Ker’s 
translation implies that the husband actually believes that his wife is another 
man’s wife. Another interpretation could be that the husband thinks of 
another man’s wife whom he covets while he has sex with his own wife, 
knowing her to be his own wife. In other words, he can only achieve sexual 
union with his own wife if he thinks of another man’s wife while doing so. 
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Either interpretation would fit with the view of completed crimes presented 
in the previous note: it is enough for him to think of adultery to have 
committed it.  
 
7.6: Ex hac sorte . . . accepisse me: Ex hac sorte is interesting. Both 
Grimal (p. 63) and Minissale (p. 118) says that it is equivalent to ex hoc 
modo, probably understanding the phrase in the sense ‘in this manner’ (cf. 
OLD ‘modus’ 11e). Ker, however, translates it ‘in this category’ (cf. OLD 
‘sors’ 9), as it occurs in S. Epp. 36.4 (non dubie primae sortis), 52.3 
(secundae sortis ingenium), 117.8 (concedo ista alia esse, sed non sortis 
alterius). I think Ker is correct.  
 
8.1: Praeterea: introduces a new, additional aspect of the argument.  
 
8.1: quia non coeunt contraria: cf. S. Ben. 5.12.5: mala bonaque 
dissentiunt nec in unum coeunt. This logical principle is not confined to 
Stoics, cf. Epicurus 2.1.2: ta d’enantia oudamōs sunuparchei (cited in 
Viansino 1968: 140).  
Here there may be two possible interpretations of coeunt: (1) to 
come together to form a whole (OLD 7), (2) to come together so as to affect 
each other (e.g. join battle, or have sexual intercourse). 
 
8.1: loco muneris: loco + genitive is common in S. See Viansino (1968: 
140) for copious examples.  
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8.2-9.3: general examples of the everyday misfortunes, including death, 
which do not affect the sage.  
 
8.3: Qui rationi innixus: the standard view of the sage (shared by 
Platonists and Stoics), that his virtue is based on reason. Armisen-Marchetti 
(1989) thinks it may be a metaphor based on the image of a man leaning on 
a walking stick.  
 
8.3: locorum commutationes: ‘changes of location’, but probably meaning 
‘exile’, cf. S. Helv. 6.1: hanc commutationem loci sequuntur incommoda. 
 
8.3: nedum ut . . . maereat: nedum with ut + subjunctive, ‘still less (is it 
true that)’ (OLD 1), is Livian (e.g. 3.14.6) and post-Augustan, according to 
Williams (p. 158) ad Breu. 7.4 (nedum ut isti sciant). 
 
9.1: motus animorum inconditi: by contrast the animus of the sage is bene 
fundatus (6.4: at nulla machinamenta posse reperiri quae bene fundatum 
animum agitent).  
 
9.1: nos: the scope of nos here is probably‘we Stoics’, as often in S., or 
possibly humanity as a whole. See the next note. 
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9.1: omne autem fortuitum circa nos saeuit et in uilia: this is a 
problematic passage, because of the final seven letters, which read inuitia in 
A, and iniuria in γ. A’s reading is meaningless. The reading of γ gives a 
recognisable word. If we were to accept it, the passage could be translated: 
‘but everything that is sent by fortune and injury rages around us’. Although 
iniuria is appropriate to the subject matter of CS, iniuria is not found with 
saeuire before Quintus Serenus Sammonicus (d. 212), Liber Medicinalis 
24.448 (cum saeuit penitus haerens iniuria lumbis). One solution is 
Madvig’s in uilia, which is accepted by Reynolds. The verb saeuit is to be 
understood as governing in as well as circa. The passage should then be 
translated as: ‘but everything that is sent by fortune rages around us and 
against worthless things’. Madvig cites in support of uilia, in connection 
with fortuita, Tranq. 11.4: Huic [sc. who doesn’t know how to die well] 
itaque primum rei pretium detrahendum est et spiritus inter uilia 
numerandus; Helv. 8.3: id, inquam, actum est ut in alienum arbitrium nisi 
uilissima quaeque non caderent; Ep. 66.35: Ratio ergo arbitra est bonorum 
et malorum; aliena et externa pro uilibus. These parallels suggest that he 
takes the uilia to be indifferents, and that he interprets nos as humanity in 
general, rather than Stoics in particular. I am not entirely convinced by 
Madvig’s emendation.  
Another approach is suggested by Viansino (1988: 94). He writes 
‘<infra>’. If this emendation accepted, the sense would be: ‘but everything 
that is sent by fortune rages around us and beneath us’. That is, everything 
that fortune sends surrounds us almost completely. This certainly fits with 
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the imagery of CS, in which the sage’s soul is compared to a city with walls 
so high that no-one can scale them.  
Viansino (1968) cites in his apparatus (without giving the Latin) in 
support the following passages from S.: Ira 3.6.1; Pol. 16.1; Ben. 5.4.4; Ben. 
7.3.2; Med. 520. (In his commentary (p. 409) he also cites Prov. 1.3, but I 
cannot see the relevance of this passage to the present discussion. Also, his 
reference to Thy. 351 doesn’t make sense – he must be using a different 
edition from Zwierlein’s OCT. Perhaps he means (using the OCT’s 
lineation), l. 365-8: Qui tuto positus loco | infra se uidit Omnia | occurritque 
suo libens | fato nec queritur mori.) 
I think the passages cited by Viansino provide strong corroboration 
for reading infra. They all capture the image of the superiority, the physical 
elevation above possible torments, that is associated with the sage in 
particular, but also with those, like Antonius and Medea, who rise above 
adversity. 
Powell (personal communication) suggests inuitos. It is certainly 
easy to see how this could have been corrupted into inuitia. It gives the 
following sense: ‘but everything that is sent by fortune rages around us even 
against our will’. However, the sense does seem rather bland, if not a truism. 
Everyone, Stoic sage and non-sage alike, has to confront the ‘slings and 
arrows of outrageous fortune’. There seems no need to stress this. 
I can think of another possible reading. A’s inuitia may be a 
corruption of inuidia. This will give the following sense: ‘but everything 
that is sent by fortune rages around us and envy too’. Attestation for the 
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combination of fortuna/fortuitum with inuidia in S. is admittedly sparse, but 
cf. Marc. 5.6: Nulla re maior inuidia fortunae fit quam aequo animo. On 
this reading, in addition to omne fortuitum in general, the malice of others is 
considered. This is quite apposite given that iniuria is inflicted by somebody 
on someone else. Here we should consider the malice of the mob who are 
attacking Cato at CS 1.3 and also the fact that everything sacrum will also 
find some sacrilegus who will wish to harm it (CS 3.3). These two examples 
concern the sage, but non-sages are equally liable to be the object of envy or 
malice. Cf. Kaster (2005: 88 and n. 15) on inuidia uirtutis. 
However, I think there is yet another possibility: that the text is 
incomplete, and that originally something followed after inuitia. As we have 
seen in the discussion on <salua> uirtute in 5.5, A did miss out a couple of 
lines of text. In that case, the missing portion was supplied by γ. This might 
have happened here, only in this case γ failed to include the missing text 
too. The reading of γ, iniuria, could then have been the subject of the 
missing verb. 
 
9.2: quaeque alia inter togatos latrocinia sunt: S. is talking here of the 
kinds of crimes that are equivalent among (supposedly) respectable Roman 
citizens to banditry or brigandage (the principal sense of latrocinium: OLD 
1; secondary sense ‘forcible seizure, plundering, pillage; lawless action, 
coercion’: OLD 2). These may be ‘white-collar’ crimes like embezzlement 
of public funds and fraud, or perhaps legacy-hunting.  
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9.2: quaestuosae domus gratia erepta: the situation to be imagined is a 
patron’s withdrawal of favour from a client. The adjective quaestuosus can 
mean both ‘wealthy’ and ‘lucrative’/’profitable’ (Cato Agr. 6 of a field; Cic. 
Phil. 2.35, of an officina). So the patron’s domus (his household) is wealthy, 
but it is also lucrative to the client.  
 
9.2: qui nescit nec in spem nec in metum uiuere: (1) hope and fear are the 
two characteristic passions relating to the future. (2) Double negative with 
nescio: not found elsewhere in S. Although he is fond of double negations to 
add emphasis (see Traina (1987: 29-30)), these tend to be combinations of a 
negative pronoun or adverb followed by non (e.g. nemo non, Breu. 14.5 
(with intervening word), 20.5; numquam non, Breu. 2.1; nullum non, Breu. 
6.4, 7.9; nihil non, Breu.15.4: see Williams ad locc.; nullius nec hominis nec 
dei timor, Ep. 17.6; nullius . . . nec . . . nec, Tranq. 1.7). The use of nescio 
followed by nec ... nec is unusual. See Stolz-Schmalz, 5
th
 edition, 1926, p. 
832 (cited by Klei ad loc., p. 123). It is similar to the double negatives found 
at Petronius 58.5 (nec sursum nec deorsum non cresco, nisi dominum tuum 
in rutae folium non conieci) where a verb is also involved.  
Whether S. is using colloquial style where he uses double negatives 
can be disputed. Hofmann (1951: § 92) adduces several examples of double 
negatives, including one in Cicero (Verr. 2.60 [he incorrectly has ‘3’ not 
‘2’]: debebet . . . nummum nullum nemini), as instances of colloquialisms. 
Setaioli (2000: 36-7) certainly thinks that such pleonastic negations with an 
infinitive following a negative verb may be evidence of the influence of 
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colloquial speech. The Cicero example is disputed as an instance of 
colloquialism as two commentators on Petronius 42.7 (neminem nihil boni 
facere oportet) – Smith, p. 102 and Schmeling, p. 167) – cite it as a 
refutation of the view that Petronius is exhibiting semo plebeius there. The 
other Cicero passage cited by Smith and Schmeling as evidence that a 
double negative might not be colloquial is QF 3.4. 1 [24.1 Shackleton 
Bailey]: nullam in nullo nostrum dignitatem. 
 
9.3: Adice . . . temptat: state of soul of the sage.  
 
9.3: inmota mente: a phrase found at V. Aen. 4.449: mens immota manet, 
lacrimae volvuntur inanes. See Austin ad loc. Austin cites Augustine, CV 
9.4, who takes the phrase to be typical of the Stoic sage’s imperturbability 
of soul. Williams (ad loc.) takes it as ‘the Stoic attitude (not unfeeling but 
resolute)’, citing Prov. 2.2 and Ep. 9.3, which are reminiscent of CS 16.2. 
For a discussion of the moral philosophical implications of inmota mente, 
see Introduction, § VI.  
 
9.3: uir erroribus ereptus: the sage cannot err, because he has knowledge.  
 
9.3: altae quietis: perhaps a play on different meanings of altus: deep 
(peace) and high (i.e. exalted or godlike? – cf. CS 6.8: excelsa, 
inexpugnabilia, dis aequa). Cf. Breu. 19.2: alta rerum quies (of the life of 
virtue). Ep. 71. Again, as with inmota mente, there may be an echo (whether 
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conscious or not) of poetic diction, e.g. Aen. 6.522: pressitque iacentem | 
dulcis et alta quies placidaeque simillima morti; Ov. Met. 7.185-7 (OCT): 
homines uolucresque ferasque soluerat alta quies; nullo cum murmure 
saepes | [sopitae similis, nullo cum murmure serpens;] | inmotaeque silent 
frondes, silet umidus aer; Luc. BC 1.249-50: pax alta per omnes | et 
tranquilla quies populos. Note the close association of alta quies and 
inmotus (inmotae . . . frondes) in Ovid, which is also found in CS 9.3. 
Unlike Vergil’s and Ovid’s alta quies, however, S.’s altae quietis does not 
scan.  
 
9.3: ipsa illi iniuria usui sit: cf. Prov. 2.9 for the view that adversity 
generally (and not just iniuria) tests, but in a beneficial way, the sage’s 
virtue. 
 
9.4-9.5: rounding off of the first part of the divisio.  
 
9.4: Faueamus, obsecro uos, huic proposito aequisque et animis et 
auribus adsimus: A combination of the first-person plural jussive 
subjunctive (faueamus and adsimus) with a parenthetic address (for 
parenthesis in S., see Bourgery, p. 335) in the second-person plural (obsecro 
vos), either to non-Stoics (cf. petulantiae uestrae . . . saluis uitiis uestris) or 
to the plural readership (whether Stoic or non-Stoic). The subject of the 
first-person plural faueamus is probably the inclusive ‘we’, i.e. ‘you and 
me’; otherwise, the combination of first-person plural verb followed by a 
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second-person plural address is awkward. With the exception of 3.1, where 
Serenus is imagined to be addressing the Stoics, uos and uester are used in 
this treatise of non-Stoics, or at least the plural readership, Stoic or not (uos: 
9.4, 15.2, 15.4, 16.3, 19.4; uester: 9.4 (x 2), 15.2, 15.4, 19.4). The first-
person plural presumably refers to everyone (including of course S.) who is 
not a sage. 
Grimal (p. 70) thinks that the language here is ‘religieux’, citing VB 
26.7 (favete linguis, also found in Hor. Carm. 3.1.2). Faueamus governs 
huic proposito, and so on this interpretation, we should have to translate ‘let 
us be silent in the presence of this proposition’ (Basore in the Loeb 
translation, p. 77), with linguis understood. At Ep. 52.10 we find favere 
without linguis but meaning fauere linguis: tacete, fauete et praebet uos 
curationi philosophi tamquam medici. Moreover, the religious character of 
the language here seems to be reinforced by obsecro and adsimus; for the 
latter cf. Tib. 2.1.1: quisquis adest, fauet. The language of the passage is 
very close to that of Terence, Andria, prol. 24: fauete, adeste aequo animo 
et rem cognoscite, and Hecyra 28: aequo animo attendite. However, favere 
may not be being used here in a religious sense, but rather in the sense of 
‘let us favour this proposition’. The phrase fauere proposito, which has no 
inherently religious connotation, is found at Ovid, Fasti 1.468 (ipsa mone, 
quae nomen habes a carmine ductum, | propositoque faue, ne tuus erret 
honor!); Pliny Pan. 95.3 (uos modo fauete huic proposito). It can be 
interpreted as looking forward to aequis later in the sentence, which may 
mean ‘sympathetic’. It can be argued that obsecro vos is religious language 
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(but so weakened that it doesn’t carry much weight), which reinforces 
Grimal’s view. But obsecrare is used frequently of imploring, without any 
religious connotation, for instance in an appeal to an audience or panel of 
judges in the peroratio of a speech, as at Cic. Mur. 86: oro atque obsecro, 
iudices, ut ne . . . obruatis; S. Ben. 3.38.3: certate, obsecro vos. Moreover, 
there is some dispute as to the correct interpretation of the line of the Andria 
prologue cited in the previous paragraph, Shipp (p. 121) thinking that favete 
is not religious but legal language, as in Quintilian 4.1.73: iudices . . . ut 
faveant rogamus. Such an interpretation would certainly fit with the 
frequent use of legal language in this treatise. It seems, then, that favere and 
obsecrare can be both hieratic and legal in register, and that S. may be 
exploiting both levels of meaning here. 
aequisque et animis et auribus is probably a zeugma, with aequis 
governing both animis and auribus, with a different meaning each time. 
aequis animis seems to be a plural variant on the common Latin phrase 
aequo animo (‘with a calm soul’, ‘level-headedly’). But one might ask why 
the audience should keep their heads in the presence of the propositum. Is it 
likely to enrage them? It might, given that S. mentions petulantiae uestrae . 
. . caecae temeritatis in the next sentence; it certainly would support the 
interpretation of faueamus as ‘let us be silent’: if you are keeping quiet, you 
are (probably) calm of soul. Support for this interpretation may be found at 
2.8.3: aequo placidoque animo. Alternatively, and surely correctly, one 
could interpret aequisque animis as ‘with impartial minds’, i.e. the non-
sages are to give the propositum a fair hearing. However, this latter 
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interpretation of aequis animis runs into trouble when we come to the 
interpretation of auribus. This word is redundant unless it is taken with 
aequis: if one attends (adesse), whether in the sense of listening or in the 
sense merely of being present, one will have one’s ears with one. So, we 
must take auribus with aequis, and aequis auribus (and variants of it) is 
indeed a very common phrase, meaning ‘with sympathetic ears’ or 
‘impartial ears’, i.e. giving someone a fair hearing. [For example, Cic. Fam. 
7.33.2: meis aequissimis utuntur auribus; Sen. rhet. Contr. 7.1.4: aequos 
praebete aures. For exhaustive examples of aequis auribus, see TLL 
I.1037.] But what is it to give an impartial hearing if not to be fair-minded? 
If we take aequis animis to be ‘with fair minds’, then we have S. has 
repeating himself: ‘with fair minds and fair ears’. We can smooth over the 
difficulty and preserve the zeugma by translating ‘with impartial minds and 
sympathetic ears’, but the difficulty remains. I think it would be preferable 
to interpret aequis animis as ‘with calm souls’.  
 
9.4: saluis uitiis uestris haec sapienti libertas quaeritur: the thought 
seems to be that the moral flaws of others provide the opportunity for the 
sage to attain freedom through virtue. They are a foil to the sage. In saluis 
uitiis there is possibly an ironic allusion to the Stoic term salua virtute. 
There may also be a parody of legal terminology relating to property or 
legal rights, e.g. quibus casibus saluam manere tutelam patrono (Gaius, 
Inst. 1.181).  
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9.5: Sic in certaminibus sacris . . . consecuti sunt: the comparison of the 
sage with an athlete may go back to Panaetius, cited in Latin translation by 
Gellius (AN 13.28, cited by Grimal (p. 42) in his discussion of CS 3.3.). 
However, it is the vir prudens (man of practical wisdom), not the sapiens, 
who is described by Panaetius. S.’s boxing imagery here does not reflect 
approval of athletics as a means to attaining virtue. He is generally sceptical 
(e.g. Epp. 15 and 80) about the value of athletics in training the soul, while 
admitting (in Ep. 15) that some forms of light physical execise are not 
incompatible with philosophy (see Koenig 2005: 137-40 on Epp. 15 and 
80).  
 
9.5: in certaminibus sacris: these may be the ἱεροὶ ἀγῶνες (Olympic, 
Pythian, Nemean, Isthmian) of Greece. Minissale (p. 136) considers that 
there may be an allusion to Roman quinquennial games established by 
Augustus at Naples (Suet. Aug. 98) and Nero at Rome (Suet. Nero 12). 
However, it may be that a reference to sacred games in general, both Greek 
and Roman, is intended.  
 
10.1-11.2: introduction of the second part of the divisio, which includes 
a definition of contumelia and an explanation of the moral psychology 
underlying it. 
 
10.1: here begins the second part of the treatise, which considers 
contumelia. Picking up on the preliminary distinction made between iniuria 
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and contumelia at 5.1, S. defines contumelia as a lesser iniuria that cannot 
be redressed by law, because there is no law against it (Est minor iniuria . . . 
putauerunt, 10.1). Whether a contumelia has been made is a subjective 
matter, and depends on the state of soul of the person allegedly insulted. The 
affectus (passion, emotion) of offence at words or deeds is caused by the 
humilitas animi contrahentis se (‘the humility of a soul which lessens 
itself’). This picks up 5.1: Prior illa natura grauior est, haec leuior et 
tantum delicatis grauis, qua non laeduntur homines sed offenduntur. The 
phrase humilitas animi contrahentis se explains why delicati should be so: 
they have an inferior soul. The sentiment is similar to that at Helv. 13.6.  
 
10.1: Quoniam priorem partem percucurrimus, ad alteram transeamus, 
qua quibusdam propriis, plerisque uero communibus, contumeliam 
refutabimus. 
 
It is by no means obvious what the quaedam propria and pleraque 
communia are, more specifically, what it is it to which they are propria or 
communia. Leaving aside for the moment the interpretation of quibusdam 
and plerisque, there are two possibilities for the referents of propriis and 
communibus, both of which have been suggested in the literature. One 
possibility is that quaedam propria are arguments (argumenta understood in 
the Latin?) that are distinctive to the Stoics, but not to other schools, and 
that the communia are arguments that Stoics and others both use. The 
problem with this interpretation is that there is very little evidence of any 
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argument deployed by S. that is not distinctively Stoic. At 15.4, S. does cite 
with approval (Quam paene emisit uiri uocem!) Epicurus’ saying ‘raro 
sapienti fortuna interuenit', only to make clear the distinction between the 
purport of Epicurus’ remark and the true Stoic position. Again, at 16.3, S. 
does admit that the differences between Stoics and Epicurus are slight (Non 
est quod putes magnum quo dissidemus). Moreover, utraque exempla 
(‘exempla from each side [i.e. Stoic and Epicurean]’ urge contempt of 
injuries and insults, which can be tolerated/endured by a person who is not a 
sage, viz. a consipiens. Nevertheless, they do disagree; as with much moral 
philosophy, the ends are the same, but the explanations and approaches to 
the ends adopted by different philosophers are not the same.  
Another interpretation is offered by Basore in his Loeb translation: 
‘Having touched upon the first part of the discussion, let us now pass to the 
second, in which by arguments – some of them our own, most of them, 
however, common to our school – we shall disprove the possibility of insult’ 
(p. 77). Here, propria is taken to refer to arguments devised by S. himself, 
while communia refers to arguments held by all Stoics. [It is also attributed 
by Viansino (1988: 412) to Charpentier (‘prove trovate da Seneca’ and 
‘prove tradizionali’). I take it that Basore’s ‘our own’ refers to S., who is in 
any case using the ‘royal we’ in this sentence (refutabimus).] While this is 
an interesting interpretation, it is not easy to identify the propria. From his 
other works, particularly some of the Epistles, it is clear that S. had a mind 
of his own and did not just accept the Stoic tradition uncritically. However, 
in the Epistles he does make it clear when he is departing from tradition or 
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disagreeing with a predecessor. In CS, by contrast, there is no such open 
disagreement with tradition, if indeed there is any disagreement. The tenor 
of CS does seem fairly traditional in Stoic terms, which makes this 
interpretation hard to prove. I therefore think we should consider other 
interpretations of this passage. 
Friedrich (1902), according to Viansino (1988: 412), takes propria 
to refer to arguments that concern the sage specifically (‘riguardanti il 
saggio’), while communia are arguments that are applicable to all people 
(‘riferabili a tutti’). Certainly the focus is on the sage in the immediate 
discussion following 10.1, in particular his magnanimitas (11.1). And then 
S. shifts his attention in this second part of CS away from the sage 
specifically to the consipiens, the ‘middle case’, as it were, between the 
near-unattainable ideal of the sage and the beginner’s state in which Serenus 
finds himself at present. The consipiens is an ideal to which most ordinary 
people can aspire with some expectation of attaining it; hence he is 
communis. The sage does crop up again in the discussion at 15.1-5, but then 
it moves away from him specifically. I think this interpretation has more to 
commend it than later commentators have given it credit for. Klei (1950: 
128) and Abel (1967: 144) accept without comment Albertini’s (1923: 75-6) 
objection, which reads as follows: ‘les ch. 10-14 corresponderaient aux 
propria, les ch. 16 (§ 4), 17 et 18 aux communia; les 15 et 16, 1-3, seraient 
mixtes et serviraient de junction. Mais il faut une exégèse compliquée et 
pénible pour que les deux adjectifs à être ainsi chargés de sens.’  
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In place of this ‘exégèse compliquée et pénible’ Albertini offers an 
interpretation based on nineteenth-century works by Rabbow and Bouillet. 
It is that propria refers to arguments applicable to contumelia alone, while 
communia refers to arguments that are applicable to both contumelia and 
iniuria. On this interpretation, he argues, only contumelia is under 
discussion in chapters 10-14, while iniuria reappears in chapters 15 and 16, 
and then again in chapter 19. In my view, Albertini’s suggestion is just as 
‘complicated’ as Friedrich’s. Indeed, whatever the interpretation of propria 
and communia adopted, there will be a shift between the two in the second 
half of the treatise; that is unavoidable, from S.’s very words.  
I shall discuss two further interpretations. Viansino (1988: 411-12), 
without specifying the scholar (perhaps it is himself) suggests that propria 
may refer to ‘consigli pratici’ and communia to ‘consigli di carattere 
generale’, equivalent to the distinction between praecepta, which are 
specialia, and decreta, which are generalia that S. offers in Ep. 94.31: Quid 
enim interest inter decreta philosophiae et praecepta nisi quod illa 
generalia praecepta sunt, haec specialia? Utraque res praecipit, sed altera 
in totum, particulatim altera. He also cites in support Clement of 
Alexandria’s Protrepticus 11.113, glossing: ‘consigli su punti particolari; 
consigli validi per insieme della vita’. I do not find this interpretation 
convincing. First, it requires us to interpret the entire discussion of 10-19 as 
concerning contumelia, which it patently does not, as iniuria figures in it 
too. Second, I am not sure that propria and communia are synonyms of 
specialia and generalia, as this interpretation requires. Probably, communia 
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could be interpreted in the sense of generalia (i.e. decreta) that concern 
insult generally, in all its manifestations. But I think Viansino’s 
interpretation becomes more difficult when we consider propria. Surely, on 
the subject of contumelia, there could be decreta that prescribe a general 
attitude to insult and praecepta that prescribe a particular form of behaviour 
in response to a particular insult. But they will both be propria, in that they 
concern the subject of contumelia.  
The final interpretation I shall discuss is that favoured by Grimal 
(1949: 252, cited in Abel 1967: 145), who cites the distinction made by 
Aristotle (Rhet. 1.1.1355b24-29) and found later in Cicero’s De oratore 
2.315, between idia/propria (arguments intended for specialists, here Stoics) 
and koina/communia (those intended for laymen). This is a variation on the 
first interpretation I considered, with the laymen standing instead of the 
other philosophical schools: communia now means ‘common to all people’, 
whereas earlier it meant ‘common to all schools’. Certainly, the consipiens 
is something that it is possible for non-sages to become, whereas sagehood 
is a rare accomplishment indeed. To that extent, the insult-part of CS opens 
up the discussion to lay people and their potentialities, if properly guided; 
Stoics, even budding ones like Serenus (if he really is a Stoic at the stage, 
rather than a sceptical Epicurean), can also benefit, of course.  
After reviewing these interpretations of propria and communia, I 
think that the most likely to be correct are Friedrich’s and Albertini’s, but I 
think that neither is conclusive. Clearly, there is a mixture of arguments in 
the second part of CS. Certainly, the title(s) of the work notwithstanding, 
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there is a move away from the exclusive concentration on the sage and his 
vulnerability to the possibilities for self-improvement of the non-sage, who 
can make a start on the path to virtue by learning to handle insults in a Stoic 
way. There is also a mixture of discussion on contumelia and iniuria (not 
surprising perhaps as the one is a subset of the other).  
 
10.2: dictum factum: asyndeton. However, A
3γ
 reads factumque; and –que 
or –ue may easily have been omitted. 
 
10.2: inhonorificum: according to Grimal (p. 73) a ‘néologisme, peût-être 
creation de Sen.’. Minissale (p. 138) cites ἄτιμος as its Greek model. 
 
10.2: 'ille me hodie non admisit, cum alios admitteret', et 'sermonem 
meum aut superbe auersatus est aut palam risit', et 'non in medio me 
lecto sed in imo conlocauit': examples of supposedly insulting behaviour, 
recounted in direct speech from the point of view of the offended party. For 
supposed cause for offence provided by seating and other arrangements at 
dinner parties, see De ira 3.37.  
 
10.2: alia huius notae: ‘other things of this stamp/character’. Cf. Clem. 
2.2.2 for the same expression and Braund ad loc. 
 
10.2: nausiantis animi: a soul suffering from nausea (sometimes spelled 
nausia: Ep. 16.3), according to OLD the verb being used in its transferred 
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sense, so: ‘a soul feeling disgust/loathing’. In its literal sense, nausea means 
sickness or vomiting, e.g. Ep. 16.3, Tranq. 1.17. Here the familiar metaphor 
of the sick soul of the non-sage reappears.  
As with adamas (3.5) and struthocamelus (17.2), this is a Greek 
word that had been assimilated into Latin by S.’s day (it is found e.g. in 
Plautus (Amph. 329: nausio) and Cicero (Att. 5.21.3: nausians; Fam. 7.26.2: 
nausiantem): for other examples, see TLL under nauseo), and which he 
therefore reproduces in Roman script. See Bickel (1906) and cf. 
Commentary on 3.5 and 17.1. 
 
10.3: ingenia natura infirma et muliebria: picks up the theme of female 
infirmity introduced at 1.1, and picked up again at 14.1, though with some 
concession to possibility of improvement by education: imprudens animal 
est et, nisi scientia accessit ac multa eruditio, ferum, cupiditatium 
inontinens. See Viansino (1968: 145) for copious references for Senecan 
‘misoginia’; also Minissale, pp. 139-40. A recent discussion is Wilox 
(2006), which argues that, although in general muliebritas is pejorative, 
women can show virtue by the way they mourn. 
 
10.3: uitio interpretantis: reiterates the view that insult is a matter of 
incorrect interpretation of others’ deeds and words. It thus builds on the idea 
that it is possible to choose not to accept a contumelia even if one is meant, 
just as it is possible to see an insult where none is intended. cf. De ira 
3.11.1: quaedam interpretatio eo perducit ut uideantur iniuriae (on taking 
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maligni sermones to be iniuriae). Again, it is a question of knowledge, 
which the sage possesses and the non-sage does not. The sage knows his 
worth and will not pay attention to words and deeds that seem to diminish 
him, even if they were not intended as such; he interprets correctly, the non-
sage does not. 
 
10.4: Alia sunt . . . haec non nego sentire sapientem: a reiteration of the 
point that the sage does not accept injuries, but here with emphasis on the 
fact that he does actually feel the hurt. He demonstrates his virtue by not 
minding the pain and not accepting that any injury is done to him. This 
consideration might have been better placed earlier, where the lengthy 
expatiation on the invulnerability of the sage to harm gives the impression 
that he does not even feel pain, let alone accept it as injury (Graver 2007: 
86-108). Ep. 99.18: he doesn’t criticize the wise man who weeps at the 
funeral of a loved one, for these tears are involuntary. For variations on this 
theme, see Ep. 85.29: Iste vero dolet (sensum enim hominis nulla exuit 
virtus), sed non timet: invictus ex alto dolores suos spectat. At Ep. 9.3, S. 
contrasts the sentience of the Stoic sage with the insentience of the 
Epicurean, thereby showing the Stoic’s superiority inasmuch as he has to 
overcome pain whereas the Epicurean does not: Hoc inter nos et illos 
interest: noster sapiens vincit quidem incommodum omne sed sentit, illorum 
ne sentit quidem. 
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11.1: pulcherrimam uirtutem omnium [animi], magnanimitatem: The 
word magnanimitas, which seems to have been coined by Cicero (Off. 
1.152), presumably by analogy with words like aequanimitas, which itself 
already occurs in Terence (Phormio 34), is a translation of the Greek word 
μεγαλοψυχία, which is used by Aristotle (NE IV.3) to denote the virtuous 
man’s sense of self-worth, by which he correctly recognises his moral 
superiority and expects that the less virtuous will pay him due honour 
(including external goods such as political offices and wealth). See Grimal 
77-8 for a full discussion of this concept; also Viansino (1968: 146-7) and 
Minissale 144-5.  
In S. the term, and its sonorous synonym magnitudo animi (cf. 6.2; 
9.4), still denotes the correct judgment of self-worth on the part of the 
virtuous person, but the Stoic sage holds external goods to be adiaphora 
(indifferentia), of no intrinsic moral value. The differences (and similarities) 
between Aristotle and S. can be seen in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics 
97
a
15-26 (adduced by Braund in her note on magnanimitas in Clem. 1.5.3), 
in which megalopsuchia is defined as either ‘not to put up with an 
[physical?] insult (hubrizomenoi)’ (exemplified by Alcibiades, Achilles and 
Ajax) or ‘indifference to good or bad fortune’ (exemplified by Lysander and 
Socrates). [I am using Braund’s translation of the Greek here, with aspects 
of the first queried and the second slightly modified.] In the Stoic view, 
these two Aristotelian aspects of megalopsuchia are incompatible, because 
the man who is immune to the vicissitudes of fortune (the sage) will not 
even see that an insult has been directed at him, as S. argues in CS. It is 
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through his ‘greatness of soul’ that the sage surpasses all non-sages. The 
thought is well expressed at Ep. 74.13: perit magnanimitas, quae non potest 
eminere nisi omnia velut minuta contempsit quae pro maximis vulgus optat.  
The sage’s correct judgement of the unimportance of the things 
which ordinary people hold dear originates from his superior, godlike 
rationality, by which he understands the true nature of the universe and 
man’s place in it. Compare De ira 3.5.7-8, where S. says that greatness of 
soul is ‘the most beautiful virtue of all’, with which compare Ep. 115.3: ex 
istis [sc. virtutibus] magnanimitas eminentissima. [Cf. also Fragment 78 
Voterro (29 Haase), a quotation by Lactantius, Divinae institutiones 5.13.20, 
p. 443, 5-8 Brandt: Recte igitur Seneca incongruentiam hominibus obiectans 
ait: ‘Summa virtus illis videtur magnus animus, et idem eum qui contemnit 
mortem pro furioso habent: quod est utique summa perversitatis.’] In giving 
this high position to magnanimitas, S. may be following a strand of Stoic 
tradition that goes back to Panaetius. According to Cicero in Partitiones 
Oratoriae 77, which Pohlenz (cited in Knoche (1935: 53) and Gauthier 
(1951: 159)), thought based on Panaetius, greatness of soul comprises the 
whole category of practical virtues: Quae autem haec [sc. practical virtues] 
uno genere complectitur, magnitudo animi dicitur: cuius est liberalitas in 
usu pecuniae, simulque altitudo animi in capiendis incommodis et maxime 
iniuriis, et omne quod est eius generis, grave, sedatum [non turbulentum]. 
[The division between theoretical and practical virtues set out in Part. 76 
(Est igitur vis virtutis duplex: aut enim scientia cernitur aut actione) is due 
to Panaetius, according to Diogenes Laertius 7.92.] The other practical 
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virtues are: temperantia (Gk. sōphrosunē, temperance), prudentia (Gk. 
phronēsis, practical wisdom), and fortitudo (Gk. andreia, courage in facing 
future evils)/patientia (Gk. karteria: endurance of present evils). See the 
detailed discussion in Gauthier (1951: 157-64).  
In S.’s thinking greatness of soul is connected with goodness of soul, 
e.g. De ira 1.20.6, where S. disagrees with Livy’s judgement of someone 
that he is a uir ingenii magni magis quam boni.  
It is interesting to compare here Pliny’s Panegyricus of the emperor 
Trajan, which draws a much fuller connection between the magnitudo 
(animi) of the emperor and height. For instance, at Pan. 56 he says: Accidit 
quidem, ut corpora quamlibet ardua et excelsa, procerioribus admota, 
decrescant; item, ut altissimae civium dignitates collatione fastigii tui quasi 
deprimantur, quantoque propius ad magnitudinem tuam adscenderint, 
tantum etiam a sua descendisse videantur. Illos tamen tu [...] adeo in edito 
collocasti, ut tantum super ceteros, quantum infra te cernerentur. Si unius 
tertium consulatum eundem in annum, in quem tuum, contulisses: ingentis 
animi specimen haberetur. Ut enim felicitatis est, quantum velis, posse: sic 
magnitudinis, velle, quantum possis. And at Pan. 94.3 in his closing prayer 
to Jupiter calling upon him to protect the emperor in the future, he thanks 
the king of the gods for his past protection of Trajan: Neque enim sine 
auxilio tuo, cum altissima quaeque quaterentur, hic, qui omnibus excelsior, 
inconcussus stetit. Here, like the sage the emperor is not only higher than 
the rest of men, but also is unshaken, like the city walls of the sage’s soul in 
CS. As for S. the Stoic sage is close to godhood, so also is the emperor 
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Trajan for Pliny. Given the similarity between S.’s language in CS and 
Pliny’s language in his Panegyricus, there is some justification for thinking 
that Pliny may have been influenced by S.’s language in CS here. Griffin 
(2000: 543-5) thinks that he may have used S.’s De clementia when 
composing the Panegyricus. Pliny studied philosophy as a young man, and 
he knew and admired the Stoic philosopher Euphrates of Tyre (Plin. Ep. 
1.10), who, according to Fronto (Ad Verum 4), had been a pupil of 
Musonius Rufus. [For a full discussion of Euphrates, see Frede (1997).] 
Although Pliny admits (perhaps with excessive modesty) in Ep. 1.10 that his 
philosophical understanding was slight, and indeed only mentions S. once in 
his extant writings (in Ep. 5.3.15, where his name appears in a list of famous 
men who wrote light verse as a diversion), CS 11.1 suggests that his 
acquaintance with S.’s works may have been deeper. 
 
11.2: Contumelia a contemptu dicta est, quia nemo nisi quem 
contempsit tali iniuria notat; nemo autem maiorem melioremque 
contemnit, etiam si facit aliquid quod contemnentes solent: the 
etymology on which S. bases his analysis of the nature of contumelia – the 
derivation from contemneo – is generally considered to be a false one: see 
E–M 140 and W–H 267-8, who prefer a derivation from tumeo, to swell 
(with self-importance and overweening arrogance?). Interestingly, this 
etymology, although it is not S.’s, is also relevant to his view of contemptus, 
which he describes as istum adfectum inflatum at 11.1. Also, as W–H note, 
this etymology links the word with contumax/contumacia (see note below).  
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11.2: tali iniuria notat: here S. refers to contumelia as an iniuria, which 
may give support to Grimal’s interpretation of minor iniuria at 10.1 as ‘a 
lesser injury’ (with iniuria in the nominative) rather than ‘lesser than injury’ 
(with iniuria in the ablative), which Ker has in his translation. Interesting is 
S.’s use of notare here. Although it basically means to mark with an insult 
here, there may be an underlying allusion to the censor’s putting a mark 
against the name of an infamosus citizen, and hence stigmatizing him (see 
OLD 3a, 3c). It hints at the likely intention of insult in many cases, viz. to 
diminish someone’s social standing (see Introduction, § VII). Of course, the 
sage is not bothered by this. 
 
11.2: Nam et pueri os parentium feriunt et crines matris turbauit 
lacerauitque infans et sputo adspersit aut nudauit in conspectu suorum 
tegenda et uerbis obscenioribus non pepercit: these examples of the 
typical behaviour of unsocialised children are similar to the behaviour of 
adults who commit iniuriae or contumeliae. On the socialisation of children, 
S. recommended a firm but not overly restrictive approach (see Ira 2.21.1-
6).  
 
11.2: uerbis obscenioribus: ‘obscenities’ (tr. Ker). Often an augural term 
(OLD obscenus
1 
1), referring to inauspicious omens, obscaenus has the 
extended senses of ‘impure’, ‘indecent’, ‘filthy’, ‘lewd’ (OLD obscenus1 2-
4).  
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11.3: mancipiorum nostrorum urbanitas in dominos contumeliosa: 
mancipium is here a synonym for servus, as at S. rhet. Suas. 7.6: Lepidus . . . 
utriusque collegae . . . mancipium; S. Ben. 3.28.4: adulterarum commune 
mancipium. In connection with the ‘insulting wittiness’ Grimal (79) cites S. 
Ep. 50.2, where S. discusses Harpaste, his wife’s fatua (‘clown’, in 
Gummere’s Loeb translation). However, there is no evidence that Harpaste 
insulted her mistress. For the licence allowed to slaves, particularly for 
purposes of entertainment, see Petronius, Satyricon 64.11ff., where 
Trimalchio encourages his deliciae, the slave boy Croesus, to mount him as 
if he were a horse and beat his shoulder-blades with the flat of his hand. 
Here audacia . . . coepit a domino, and the play does resemble that between 
parents and children (cf. the indignities meted out to their parents by 
children at 11.1), as when a father allows his child to ride him like a horse. 
For the contrast between the modestia expected of free boys and the licentia 
allowed to slave boys born in the household, cf. Prov. 1.6 (cogita filiorum 
nos modestia delectari, uernularum licentia, illos disciplina tristiori 
contineri, horum ali audaciam). On this contrast, see the discussion in 
Mencacci (2010). 
 
11.3: seruulo: the diminutive is probably colloquial language (see 
Minissale 149), appropriate in the context of slaves. Cf. the use of colaphus 
at CS 5.2 and 14.3. 
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11.3: ioculare conuicium: ‘insulting talk’, ‘mockery’ (OLD conuicium 2). 
Not intended to be taken seriously, as the adjective indicates. Conuicium can 
have a legal sense, as Berger (1953: 416) explains: ‘A verbal offence against 
a person’s honor. It is considered an iniuria when committed by loud 
shouting in public (vociferatio).’  
 
12-13: explanations of the sage’s total indifference to attempts to insult 
him. 
 
12.2: talorum nucumue et aeris minuti: knucklebones (tali) of animals 
were used for gaming. Cf. Martial 14.14.1: Cum steterit nullus vultu tibi 
talus eodem; Quint. Inst. 6.1.47: qui pueris in epilogum productis talos iecit 
in medium. Presumably nuts were also used as counters in games. For the 
importance of nuts to children, cf. S. Ira 1.12.4: non pietas illam iram sed 
infirmitas mouet, sicut pueris, qui tam parentibus amissis flebunt quam 
nucibus. For the pairing of tali and nuces, cf. Hor. Serm. 2.3.170-1: 
postquam te talos, Aule, nucesque | ferre sinu laxo, donare et ludere vidi . . . 
aeris minuti refers to small change (‘little copper coins’ in Ker’s 
translation). The phrase aes minutum occurs rarely (TLL I.1075, aes III.1): 
here in CS for the first time, and then in Juv. 6.546 (aere minuto); also the 
Gospel of Luke, Vulg. 21.2: aera minuta duo (λεπτὰ δύο in the Greek).  
Note also the asymmetric correspondence . . . ue et . . . (on which see 
H–S, vol. 2, p. 522, § 285 fα). Also found at Hor. Serm. 2.6.75-6 (quidue [. . 
.] et quae [. . .]), Tac. Agr. 33.4 (montesue et flumina).  
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For the wrong priorities of children, cf. S. Ep. 115.8: simillimi pueris, 
quibus omne ludicrum in pretio est; parentibus quippe nec minus fratribus 
praeferunt parvo aere empta monilia. 
 
12.2: orbium: so Reynolds, following a suggestion of Ageno  (1922: 25). 
Orbes were round tables whose tops were made from the section of a tree, 
usually the citron tree (OLD 2f). They were often put on legs of ivory: 
Lucan 10.145; Martial 2.43.9; 14.139(138). For the use of orbes in 
banquets, cf. also Martial 9.59.7; Juv. 1.137. (For further passages see 
Ageno (1922: 26). The only two passages of S. he adduces – Ben. 7.9 and 
Tranq. 1.7 – do not contain the word orbis, but only mensa, although the 
tables in question are wooden.) Reynolds cites in his apparatus Helv. 11.6, 
presumably meaning these words: lapides aurum argentum et magni 
leuatique mensarum orbes. Although this passage is not cited by Ageno, it 
offers some corroboration for his reading, with its juxtaposition of gold and 
silver and round tables. Lana (ad loc., p. 197 n. 5), in support of orbium, 
cites Dio Cassius (61.10.3), who says that S. possessed 500 round tables of 
citrus wood with ivory legs, all identical, on which he served banquets. If 
true (Dio was hostile to S.), this still does not mean he wrote orbium and not 
urbium here, unless he was being self-critical. Like Klei, I see no need to 
alter the text in this fashion, and disagree with Reynolds’s text at this point.  
 
12.2: quod illi inter ipsos magistratus gerunt et praetextam fascesque ac 
tribunal imitantur, hi eadem in campo foroque et in curia serio ludunt: 
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for boys imitating adult political life cf. Plut. Cato min. 2.5: as a boy Cato 
the Younger and his friends played at ‘actions at law, accusations, and the 
conducting of the condemned persons to prison’ (Loeb translation). Such 
games helped in the socialisation of children. See Harlow & Laurence 
(2002: 49) on children reflecting in their games the roles they were to play 
in adult life. The oxymoron serio ludunt brings out the trivial nature of 
much adult activity, from the sage’s viewpoint, but the seriousness with 
which it is pursued.  
 
12.2: illi in litoribus harenae congestu simulacra domuum excitant: the 
use of children making sandcastles as a comparison for adult human activity 
goes back as far as Homer (Il. 15.361ff., Hector pulling down the Achaean 
wall as easily as a child kicks and pulls down a sandcastle he has just built; 
cited by Klei 139). Harenae congestu(s) is paralleled in Lucr. 6.724 (also 
cited by Klei 139); cf. also Hor. Serm. 2.3.247: building little houses 
(Aedificare casas) is a childish pastime. For a discussion of Roman 
children’s games, see Harlow & Laurence (2002: 46-51). An interesting 
philosophical use is by Heraclitus (D–K 52), who compares Zeus creating 
the world to a child building a sandcastle. However, S.’s intention is quite 
otherwise here, for he likens non-sages, who unlike the sage are certainly 
not similis deo, to children playing in the sand.  
 
12.2: in lapidibus ac parietibus et tectis moliendis occupati tutelae 
corporum inuenta in periculum uerterunt: a common theme in S. and 
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others (see Viansino (1968: 149) for references), the sentiment is that the 
construction of elaborate but structurally unsound buildings perverts the 
purpose of buildings, which is to provide shelter and protection. For copious 
references to the collapse of buildings, which was a common problem in 
Rome, see Klei 139-40; Viansino (1968: 149); also Carcopino (1991: 43-4). 
The word tutela here means ‘protection’ (OLD 2). However, given the 
context in which it appears, in a passage that compares children making 
sandcastles with adult builders whose constructions are also often flimsy, 
there may be some resonance of the legal meaning the word, i.e. 
‘guardianship’, ‘tutelage’ (OLD 1), whereby a widowed mother exercised 
guardianship over her children through a tutor. On tutela as guardianship, 
see Gardner (1991: 146-54).  
 
12.3 contumelias sapiens ut iocos accipit: just as the master is not 
troubled, indeed is pleased by, the mock-insults of his witty slave boys, so 
the Stoic sage takes the insults of adult non-sages as jokes. 
 
12.3: et aliquando illos tamquam pueros malo poenaque admonet 
[adficit], non quia accepit iniuriam, sed quia fecerunt, et ut desinant 
facere; sic enim et pecora uerbere domantur: the sage’s consideration of 
adult non-sages as children extends to occasional corporal punishment as a 
deterrence against insults. S. is not specific here whether the men the sage 
occasionally beats as a punishment and deterrence for insolence are slaves 
or free, or of either category. If they are free men, then this would be a great 
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dishonour and indignity, inasmuch as they would be being treated not only 
as children but as slaves. On the unacceptibility of beating as a punishment 
for free men, by contrast with its acceptability when used to correct slaves 
and children, see Saller (1991: 15 1-65). On the need to beat children as a 
punishment S. is in agreement with Chrysippus (SVF III 736, as cited by 
Quintilian (1.3.14), who disapproves of beating children).  
The Codex Ambrosianus (A) has admonet adficit, while the γ group 
has admonet et adficit. Fickert reads admonet [et adficit], while Reynolds 
has admonet [adficit]. Given the frequency of asyndeton in CS (e.g. 6.5 
teneo, habeo; 7.1 exhibuimus, exhibebimus), I see no reason not to accept 
A’s reading, and to add a comma between them, as does Klei, in order to 
bring the style into line with that at 6.5 and 7.1.  
 
12.3: pecora: usually used of herds of farm animals (e.g. sheep and cattle), 
but in poetic usage extended to other animals (e.g. horses). sessorem 
(‘rider’) implies that the animals are horses, and therefore that the usage is 
poetic here. The analogy of non-sages and non-Stoics with animals is very 
common in S. See e.g. VB 1.3 (ne pecorum ritu sequamur antecedentium 
gregem), Ep. 90.4.  
 
12.3: contumaciam: contumax is used of unruly animals by S. at De ira 
2.26.5, 3.34.1 (uerba contumeliosa, motus corporum parum honorificos, 
contumacia iumenta et pigra mancipia), and Clem. 1.16.4.  
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Besides its main sense of ‘obstinacy’ or ‘stubbornness’, the word has 
a legal sense, viz. ‘wilful disobedience to a judicial order’ (OLD 2). Berger 
(1953: 415): ‘Non-obedience to an order of a magistrate in general, to a 
judicial magistrate or a judge in particular, the refusal to answer or another 
form of contempt of court. A specific form of contumacia is non-appearance 
in court in spite of a summons or hiding to avoid a summons.’ It also has a 
military sense of disobedience of a superior’s order (ibid.), although as 
many commanders (e.g. praetors) also had legal functions, there may be 
little difference between the two usages. Examples: si in contumacia 
perseverassent (CIL 10.7852.12); contumaciam ligatoris arbiter punire 
poterit (Javolenus, Dig. 4.8.39); Neque enim sufficit eum poenae restitui, 
quam contumacia elusit (Trajan to Pliny: Plin. Ep. 10.57.2; see Sherwin-
White 639 ad loc., citing Dig. 48.19.5). I think it is unlikely that the legal 
sense is the prime meaning in CS 12.3, but there may be a hint of it. Non-
sages disregard the laws of God and nature, just as contumaces disregard the 
summons of the magistrate.  
 
12.3: Ergo et illud solutum scies quod nobis opponitur: 'quare, si non 
accepit iniuriam sapiens nec contumeliam, punit eos qui fecerunt?': 
another objection by an imaginary interlocutor.  
 
13.1: Quis enim phrenetico medicus irascitur? Quis febricitantis et a 
frigida prohibiti maledicta in malam partem accipit?: S. compares the 
sage to a doctor and those who insult him to insane or feverish patients. Cf. 
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S. Ira 1.15.1 quis enim cui medetur irascitur? This continues the medical 
theme, which was introduced at 1.1. The doctor is not angry at the madman 
because he cannot be reasoned with, nor is he troubled by the feverish 
patient’s abuse because he recognises that the patient is sick and not fully 
responsible for his or her actions, rather as the children at 11.2 are not fully 
responsible for their actions. Also, the feverish patient might not understand 
the reason for being denied cold water when he is hot and is angry at being 
refused what he thinks is a reasonable request.  
 The word phreneticus, a Latinization of the Greek medical term 
φρενητικός, was already well established in Latin usage by S.’s day, having 
been used by Cicero (Div. 1.81) and Celsus (2.4.8). For this reason, he does 
not use Greek script: see Bickel (1906). Cf. the other Greek borrowing in 
CS: adamas (3.5), nausians (10.1) and struthocamelus (17.1) and 
Commentary ad locc.Viansino (1968: 151) gives copious examples. 
Likewise with febricitantis: the medical term febricitare was a relatively 
new coinage, introduced, according to Viansino (1968: 151), by Celsus: see 
Celsus 2.1.15 (insania febricitantium) and TLL VI.1.406-7; cf. S. Ben. 
4.39.3 (non (surgam) si febricitauero). The phrase a frigida [sc. aqua] 
prohibiti (cf. S. Ben. 2.14.2: frigidam aegris negamus) refers to the kind of 
treatment given to feverish patients. For instance, Celsus (3.15.1-3), in his 
discussion of the treatment of quartan fever, recommends that patients 
should only drink hot water in the seven days after the remission of the 
paroxysm. Other aspects the language of this passage, although not 
specifically medical, do take on a medical hue from the context. So, 
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reliquias et effusa, which Ker translates as: ‘excrement and urine’. Although 
reliquiae often means ‘remains’/’scraps of food’ (Ep. 77.8), here, given the 
medical context, I agree with Ker that it should be taken to mean 
‘excrement’ (or ‘stools’). Likewise effusa should be taken as denoting urine 
rather than bodily discharges in general (see OLD effundō 3b); cf. Celsus 
7.7.1b: vesica . . . effundit . . . umorem.  
 
13.2: adfectum: normally in S., adfectus refers to a passion, something that 
a sage does not experience. For instance, at 11.1 istum adfectum inflatum 
refers to contemptus, the cause of the urge to insult. Here, however, it 
cannot have that meaning; otherwise S. would be saying that the sage has a 
passion. To get round this dilemma I think we should follow Minissale (p. 
157) in taking adfectum here to mean ‘disposition of the mind’ rather than 
‘passion’, but not for the reasons she gives. Minissale cites in support of her 
interpretation Quint. Inst. 6.2.8 (which she cites incorrectly as 6.2.7), which 
says that there are two types of affectus, the one corresponding to the Greek 
word πάθος, which the Romans call affectus, the other corresponding to the 
Greek word ἦθος, which the Romans call mores (for want of a better word). 
The passage Minissale cites does not really help us in interpreting CS 13.2, 
because mores is not a credible interpretation of adfectum in CS 13.2. 
Moreover, in the following section, Inst. 6.2.9, Quintilian expands the 
discussion by arguing that πάθος describes the violent emotions, which are 
momentary, while ἦθος describes the gentle emotions, which are 
continuous. The sage of course cannot experience emotions (‘passions’); see 
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Introduction, § VI. I think it is much more like that S. intended adfectus to 
have the meaning ‘disposition’ (of the soul), as it does at Cic. Tusc. 5.47 
(adfectus autem animi in bono laudabilis). Here, oddly, S. abandons strict 
Stoic terminology and uses a stoicised word in a non-Stoic way.  
 
13.2: obscena: private parts, both sexual and excretory (OLD obscena
1
 3). 
 
13.2: togati purpuratique: Roman citizens and courtiers of eastern 
potentates (see OLD purpurātus 2). See Livy 31.35.1 and Briscoe ad loc., 
who notes that it does not necessarily mean that the people so designated are 
actually wore purple. The mention of purpurati looks ahead to the eastern 
potentates (the King of the Medes and Attalus of Asia) in 13.3.  
 
13.2: ualentes colorati: Reynolds, following Viansino (1968): dubitanter. 
All MSS have ualentes coloratos. The MSS give the sense: ‘The sage 
knows that all these who walk proudly clad in toga and the purple, are 
strong and with healthy colour, but not quite healthy . . .’. According to the 
MSS, ualentes coloratos is thus part of the sage’s judgement of the togati 
purpuratique. If we follow Viansino (1968), ualentes colorati are additional 
attributes of the togati purpuratique, whatever the sage may think of them. 
Much depends on our interpretation of the meaning of coloratus. It is a 
medical term (‘of good colour’), as at Celsus 2.2: si plenior aliquis et 
speciosior et coloratior factus est; and less technically it can mean ‘tanned’ 
(S. Ep. 86.8: colorantur), which in an outdoor culture such as the Roman 
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had connotations of health too (cf. VB 7.3: Virtutem in templo conuenies, in 
foro in curia, pro muris stantem, puluerulentam coloratam, callosas manus 
habentem). The problem with the MSS reading is that it seems to contradict 
male sanos. The sage seems to think that the men are strong and healthy-
looking, but not healthy. If this is what S. is saying, we might expect sed 
before male sanos (although asyndeton is common in S.: see Summers, pp. 
xcii, 198-8). Viansino’s (1968) emendation restricts the sage’s judgement of 
the men to male sanos; the corruption presumably arose by assimilating 
colorati to sanos. Like Reynolds, I have reservations about Viansino’s 
(1968) ualentes colorati. 
 
13.2: male sanos esse: ‘not quite healthy’. For this usage of male as a 
quasi-negation (‘not properly’ or (with an adjective of health) ‘ill’) see OLD 
6 (cf. Mayer ad Hor. Ep. 1.3.31; Bömer ad Ov. Met. 3.474 and Fast. 1.559). 
People who appear healthy are not really so in respect of their mental health, 
unless they are Stoic sages. The expression is also found at Tranq. 11.1: Ad 
inperfectos et mediocres et male sanos hic meus sermo pertinet, non ad 
sapientem. It is common in Ovid: Met. 3.474, 4.521, 9.600; AA 3.7.13; Am. 
3.7.77. It is also found at Hor. Ep. 1.19, V. Aen. 4.8, Sen. rhet. Con. 2.1.4.8; 
Quintus Curtius 6.7.15.1.  
 
13.3: rex Medorum: recurrence of the theme of the irrational Asiatic 
monarch (cf. 4.2), this time emphasising his pride. Gertz emending to 
‘<Xerxes> rex’ (Reynolds comments ‘forte recte’), which would reinforce 
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the link with section 4, where stolidus ille rex is almost certainly Xerxes 
(see my commentary ad loc.). However, given the lack of explicit naming at 
section 4 and also the allusiveness in the mention of Scipio Aemilianus at 
6.8, I think there is no need to follow Gertz. Besides, a general reference to 
the behaviour of Great Kings of Persia may be intended, without Xerxes 
specifically being intended. Cf. Cambyses’ cruel treatment of Praexaspes as 
related at Ira 14.1-2. 
 
13.3: Attalusue Asiae: probably Attalus III Philometor Euergetes (d. 133 
BC), the last king of the wealthy kingdom of Pergamum, which he 
bequeathed to Rome in his will. According to Justin—Trogus (36.4), when 
he ascended the throne he had some friends and relatives killed on the 
fictitious charge that they had murdered his mother and wife by sorcery; 
behaviour typical of an oriental despot.  
 
13.3: salutantem silentio ac uultu adroganti transierit: Silence and 
unapproachability – undemocratic qualities – were considered 
characteristics of many oriental peoples, in contrast to the talkativeness and 
affability of Greeks and Romans. Trogus (in the epitome of Justin), for 
example, notes the natural taciturnity of the Parthians and their preference 
for deeds over words (natura taciti, ad faciendum quam dicendum 
promptiores; proinde secunda adversaque silentio tegunt; 41.3). They 
certainly found the Greek-style approachability and affability (prompti 
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aditus, obvia comitas; Tac. Ann. 2.2) of their new king Vonones (a Roman 
candidate to the throne sponsored by Augustus) uncongenial.  
 
13.4: ad Castoris: ad aedem [or: templum] Castoris. The temple of Castor 
stood in the south-eastern corner of the Forum Romanum. Part of it was 
clearly set aside for shops (see also Plin. NH 10.121). See I. Nielsen, in 
LTUR I.242-5.  
 
13.4: humanitatem inhumanitatemque: ‘courtesy or [sic] discourtesy’ 
(Ker). The sage is indifferent to both civility and incivility.  
 
13.4: 'habes sub te Parthos et Medos et Bactrianos, sed quos metu 
contines, sed propter quos remittere arcum tibi non contigit, sed hostes 
taeterrimos, sed uenales, sed nouum aucupantes dominum.': here the 
sage addresses someone directly. This is reminiscent of Stilbo’s speech (6.3-
7), when he addresses Demetrius Poliorcetes. There may be an allusion to 
recent Parthian history here. Bactria, a far-eastern part of the Parthian 
empire, featured in the fight for the Parthian throne between the sons of 
Artabanus III, after his death in AD 38: Vardanes, to whom he had 
bequeathed his kingdom, and Gotarzes, who disputed this. According to 
Tacitus (Ann. 11.8), Gotarzes forced Vardanes to withdraw and pitch his 
camp Bactrianos apud campos (date uncertain, possibly c. AD 47). See 
Koestermann ad loc. and Bivar (1983: 75). 
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The Bactrians are only mentioned once elsewhere by S., at NQ 
5.18.10 (Bactris), in the context of Alexander the Great’s campaigns. The 
long form Bactrianos makes a tricolon crescendo after Parthos et Medos.  
 
13.4: nouum aucupantes dominium: certainly an allusion to the frequent 
palace revolutions in Parthia, as Grimal and Minissale ad loc. point out. 
However, I see no justification to assume, as they seem to, that events under 
Nero and the Parthian campaigns of Corbulo are alluded to. Klei ad loc. (on 
‘sed quos metu contines’) is non-committal about which (if any) particular 
events in Parthian history are alluded to. 
 
13.5: Nam . . . securus; securitas autem proprium bonum sapientis est: 
see note on 4.3 (tuta securitas).  
 
14.1: Tanta quosdam dementia tenet ut sibi contumeliam fieri putent 
posse a muliere: the withholding of a muliere to the end of the sentence 
adds point. The sentiment seems almost complete without the last two 
words, which set the argument on a new path. There is an element of 
surprise, as nothing hitherto has prepared the reader for this discussion of 
women.  
 
14.1: Quid refert quam <beatam> habeant, quot lecticarios habentem, 
quam oneratas aures, quam laxam sellam?: The MSS have: Quid refert 
quam habeant, quot lecticarios habentem, quam oneratas aures, quam 
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laxam sellam? There is a problem with quam habeant. The subject is 
presumably the quidam who think they can be insulted even by a woman. 
The MSS reading gives the sense: ‘What does it matter which woman they 
may have, how many litter-bearers they may have, how burdened ears, how 
capacious a travelling chair?’ The close repetition of habere, first as subject, 
then as participle qualifying the object, and in each case with the same 
meaning, is awkward and gives poor sense. Possible solutions up to now 
have involved: (1) changing quam, (2) changing habeant, or (3) changing 
habentem.  
Adopting strategy (1), Reynolds suggested adding <beatam> after 
quam, so giving the sense ‘how fortunate they may consider a woman’. This 
certainly solves the difficulty posed by having habere repeated with the 
same meaning, and the sense produced is not bad. However, there is no 
warrant for beatam in the MSS, except inasmuch as a woman with all the 
things listed might seem beata to the popular mind. Karsten, whom 
Reynolds cites in his apparatus, likewise thought that something had fallen 
out after quam, and suggested the lengthy diuitem nobilem formosam, 
whose three elements presumably mirror the three objects of habentem. 
However, the MSS provide even les justification for this conjecture than 
they do for MSS, in other words less than no justification. 
Approaches that adopt strategy (2) include Viansino’s (1968) change 
of habeant to adeant. The sense given is: ‘What does it matter which 
woman they approach, having how many litter-bearers, how burdened ears, 
how capacious a travelling chair?’. This certainly deals with the habeant . . . 
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habentem problem and gives good sense. Given that offence is usually 
caused through interpersonal contact, it seems logical to stress the physical 
approach to someone that adeant implies. It also has the merit of sticking 
much more closely to the MSS than do Reynolds and Karsten.  
As for strategy (3), Shackleton Bailey’s beata . . . habente is 
included in Reynolds’s apparatus. I cannot comment too much on this at the 
moment, because it is not clear to me from the apparatus just how of the 
MSS Shackleton Bailey intends changing and how much retaining.  
I would like to suggest another possible analysis of the problem. 
With the exception of Viansino (1968), most of the commentators assume 
that the problem lies in the omission of material between quam and habeant. 
Viansino (1968: 151), rightly I think, identifies the repetition of habere as 
the problem. However, another solution would be to excise habentem and 
change quam, perhaps to quae, so: Quid refert quae habeant, quot 
lecticarios, quam oneratas aures, quam laxam sellam? (‘What does it 
matter what things they may have, how many litter-bearers, how burdened 
their ears, how capacious a travelling chair?’). The subject of habeant now 
becomes mulieres. The corruption could have arisen through quam instead 
of quae being rationalised by adding habentem after lecticarios. An 
alternative, albeit more high-handed, solution would be to change habentem 
to habeant and excise quam habeant altogether, so: Quid refert quot 
lecticarios habeant, quam oneratas aures, quam laxam sellam? (‘What does 
it matter how many litter-bearers they may have, how burdened their ears, 
how capacious a travelling chair?’).  
220 
 
220 
 
 
14.1: lecticarios . . . laxam sellam: litter-bearers were a common feature of 
the households of the wealthy. Cf. Col.i.pr. 12: e turba pedisequorum 
lecticariorumque; Cic. Rosc. 134: coquos, pistores, lecticarios; Petr. Sat. 
96.4.  
Regarding the number of lecticarii (quot lecticarios), these could be 
as many as eight: see Suet. Gaius (43) on Caligula’s octaphoron. Eight 
bearers mean that the litter would be about three times the size of a normal 
four-bearer litter. The adverbs segniter delicateque, which imply that such a 
form of transport was a mark of effeminacy. The sella or sella gestatoria 
was a travelling chair carried by slaves by means of poles, like a modern 
sedan chair. According to Suet. Otho 6.3, it was favoured by women: Tunc 
abditus propere muliebri sella in castra contendit ac deficientibus lecticariis 
. . . Note that the bearers of a sella are also called lecticarii here. Lecticae 
and sellae were the only modes of transport allowed in Rome in daytime 
after Julius Caesar’s edict, and Claudius extended it to the rest of Italy: 
uiatores ne per Italie oppida nisi aut pedibus aut sella aut lectica transirent, 
monuit edicto (Suet. Claud. 25.2). Cf. also Martial 10.10.7: lecticam 
sellamue sequar? (spoken by a pauper in search of a patronus). Laxam 
probably refers to the roominess of the sella, and by extension to the high 
status of the occupant. 
 
14.1: quam oneratas aures: cf. BV 17.2: quare uxor tua locupletis domus 
censum auribus gerit? Helv. 16.3: non gemmae te, non margaritae 
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flexerunt; Ben. 9.4: uideo uniones non singulos singulis auribus 
comparatos; iam enim exercitatae aures oneri ferundo sunt; iunguntur inter 
se et alii binis superponuntur. Nec satis muliebris insania uiros superiecerat 
nisi bina ac terna patrimonia auribus singulis pependissent.  
 
14.1: aeque inprudens animal est et, nisi scientia accessit ac multa 
eruditio, ferum, cupiditatium incontinens: for S.’s views on women, see 
Motto 235; also note on 10.3 above. On virtuous female exceptions, 
including S.s own mother Helvia, see Edwards (2007: 189-91). Although 
disparaging here, as evidenced by the qualifying adjective imprudens, the 
word animal did not always have this sense. Inprudens could apply to men 
as well. For instance, in Ep. 113, S. discusses at length whether virtues were 
animalia. Moreover, at Clem. 3.2, S. echoes Aristotle’s description of the 
human being as a politikon zōon: hominem sociale animal. inprudens 
(‘without practical reason’, ‘without foresight’) is used by S. elsewhere to 
denote non-sages generally, not women specifically; CS 19.1. So, at Ira 
2.32.2: M. Catonem ignorans in balineo quidam percussit inprudens; quis 
enim illi sciens faceret iniuriam? At Breu. 1.1.5 we have imprudens vulgus.  
According to Klei (151), scientia denotes philosophical knowledge 
(‘wijsherige kennis’). The view that women could be suitable for a 
philosophical education was put forward by Plato (Rep. 451c–457c, 540c). 
This favourable view of women’s potential was advocated by Musonius 
Rufus. See, for a full discussion of the education of women in Rome, 
Hemelrijk (1999: ch. 3).  
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14.1: Quidam se a cinerario inpulsos moleste ferunt et contumeliam 
uocant ostiari difficultatem, nomenculatoris superbiam, cubiculari 
supercilium: more members of the households so the rich. The cinerarius is 
the hairdresser or hair-curler (using tongs heated by ashes); cf. Varro LL 
5.129: qui ea (sc. calamistra) ministrabat, a cinere cinerarius est 
appellatus; Cat. 61.131: nunc tuum cinerarius | tondet os; Lucilius 249: 
quem neque Lucanis oriundi montibus tauri | ducere protelo validis 
cervicibus possent, | zonatim circum impluuium cinerarius | cludebat.  
The ostiarius is the doorman or porter who decides who shall enter 
the house. The obstructiveness of ostiarii was clearly a commonplace, so 
that Pliny can praise Trajan for being ready to grant audience: Plin. Pan. 
79.6: nulla in audiendo difficultas. This use of difficultas to denote 
awkwardness of character is quite rare, apart from here and in the Pliny 
quoted above, being only found in Cic. Mur. 19, where it is closely 
associated with arrogance (adrogantiam pertulit, difficultatem exsorbuit) in 
a list of tribulations that Servius had to endure at the hands of his legal 
clients.  
The nomenculator/nomenclator was the announcer of the names of 
clients and guests; for their oddities cf. S. Breu. 14.4-5; S. Ep. 19.11; Ep. 
27.5; Plin. Ep. 2.14.6.  
 
14.2: 'Quid ergo? sapiens non accedet ad fores quas durus ianitor 
obsidet?' Another objection by the imaginary interlocutor. In durus ianitor, 
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there may be an allusion to the topos of the paraklausithyron, found in love 
poetry, where the lover is denied access to his beloved’s house by the 
locked door. Durus is applied to a ianitor in Ovid Am. 1.6.62 (o foribus 
durior ipse tuis), a transference of its normal usage to describe the door 
(Opelt 1965: 52). When it is used of a person, it is usually applied by one of 
the lovers to the other as a reproach for his or her unfeelingness (Opelt 
1965: 30). In this case, the durus ianitor takes the place of the door as the 
thing barring the client from his object of desire, viz. an audience with his 
patron. Cf. the characterisation of the obstinate ostiarius at S. Herc. Fur. 
164-6: ille superbos aditus regum │ durasque fores expers somni │ colit.  
For durus applied to people see OLD 4-5. For another instance of a 
transferred epithet in the context of the difficulty of access to the house of a 
patron, cf. Hor . Epod. 2.7-8: et superba ciuium │ potentiorum limina. As 
Watson ad loc. (p. 91) notes: ‘the limina are superba by transference, on 
account both of the arrogant treatment often meted out to the clientes by the 
various slave-functionaries who governed admission to their master, and the 
despiteful way in which the powerful patroni whose houses the limina 
fronted might receive the salutatio of the cliens’. The difference in respect 
of the transference the Horace and the passage in CS is that in Horace the 
adjective normally applied to the doorkeeper is transferred to the doorway 
of the house, whereas in S. the adjective normally applied to the door is 
transferred to the doorkeeper.  
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14.2: obsidet: military imagery. Compare Ira 3.37, where the limen is 
obsessum by the turba litigatorum.  
 
14.2: Ille uero, [. . .] tamquam canem acrem obiecto cibo leniet[. . .] 
dari: cf. S. Ira 3.37.2. Grimal 86 thinks there may be an allusion to 
Cerberus at Virg. Aen. 6.419ff.: cui uates horrere uidens iam colla colubris | 
melle soporatam et medicatis frugibus offam | obicit. I see no reason to 
suppose this here. It could be any guard dog. Rather, the comparison of a 
doorkeeper with a guard dog is in harmony with S.’s likening of non-sages 
to animals elsewhere in CS (e.g. 12.3). 
 Grasping ostiarii and other slave-functionaries, and the need to bribe 
them in order to gain access to a patron or other favours, seem to have been 
usual features of the salutatio: Hor. Serm. 1.9.57, Juv. 3.183-9, Columella, 
praef. 9 (mercenarii salutatoris), Amm. Marc. 14.6.15: et nomenclatores, 
assueti haec et talia venditare, mercede accepta, lucris quosdam et prandiis 
inserunt subditicios ignobiles te obscuros).  
 
14.2: et, ut uincat, par fuit: possibly gladiatorial imagery ; cf. Ira 3.34.5: 
nisi paria non pugnant ; Motto 91. For more gladiatorial imagery in CS, see 
16.2.  
 
14.3: 'At sapiens colapho percussus quid faciet?' Quod Cato . . . 
ignouisset: the language of the imaginary objector recalls S.’s assertion at 
5.1 that some slaves prefer being whipped to being cuffed (colaphis caedi) 
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and prefer blows to insults. S. probably also intends the reader to think back 
to the mob’s assaults on Cato in 1-2. He may be implying that being cuffed 
is the sort of treatment inflicted on a slave by a master and would thus be 
very demeaning to a free man, particularly if delivered by another free man 
(and a lower-class one at that). It is interesting to compare the anecdote 
about Cato given at Ira 2.32.2: M. Catonem ignorans in balineo quidam 
percussit inprudens; quis enim illi sciens faceret iniuriam? Postea satis 
facienti Cato,'non memini' inquit 'me percussum.' Melius putauit non 
agnoscere quam uindicare. Cato’s response of forgiving the iniuria is the 
same in both cases. He denies it has been done (CS: factam negauit ~ Ira: 
'non memini' inquit 'me percussum’) and forgives it. However, the cause of 
the iniuria is different in each case. In CS, we are to assume that the cuff is 
deliberate, intended to humiliate. In De ira, by contrast, the blow is 
accidental, a case of some fool unintentionally knocking against in Cato in a 
bath house. (This is stressed by the adjectives ignorans and inprudens 
framing the words describing the action, and by the comment that no one 
one knowingly (sciens) would seek to harm Cato.) Moreover, in De ira the 
man apologised (satis facienti).  
 The anecdote looks ahead to the indignity deliberately visited upon 
Socrates by his wife Xanthippe at 18.6. 
 
14.4: Non respicit quid homines turpe iudicent aut miserum, non it qua 
populus, sed ut sidera contrarium mundo iter intendunt, ita hic 
aduersus opinionem omnium uadit: cf. S. Marc. 18.3: Videbis quinque 
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sidera diuersas agentia uias et in contrarium praecipiti mundo nitentia. The 
stars (both planets and fixed stars) were considered divine by the Stoics, as 
indeed was the entire universe: Cic. ND 2.39 (Atque mundi divinitate 
perspecta tribuenda est sideribus eadem divinitas), 3.40 (singulas enim 
stellas numeras deos). The comparison of the sage with divine heavenly 
bodies is in keeping with the general portrayal of the sage in CS as near-
divine, as at 6.8 where the munimenta girding the sage’s bona (his virtue) 
are said to be dis aequa, and as at 8.2 where he is said to be closest to the 
gods and like a god, except for his mortality. This view goes back to Plato 
(ND 1.30) and Aristotle (ND 1.33). Probably here S. is referring to the five 
planets, as he is in the Ad Marciam passage cited. The words in contrarium 
mundo iter intendunt allude to the theory that the spheres containing the 
planets (and also sun, moon, and earth) moved in the opposite direction to 
the sphere containing the fixed stars which enclosed the other spheres and 
was the limit of the mundus. See Cic. Rep. 6.21 (Somnium Scipionis): cui 
subiecti sunt septem (sc. globi) qui versantur retro, contrario motu atque 
caelum. For a simplified modern account of this system, see North (1994: 
66-92); for a technical account, see Neugebauer (1975: vol. 2, pp. 677-85), 
and for a collection of translated sources, see Irby-Massie and Keyser 
(2002: 47-81). 
 
15.1: Desinite itaque dicere: 'non accipiet [...] possunt?' [. . .] uobiscum 
commune habentem: for the first time since 9.4, S. addresses unnamed 
plural persons. The address to a plural interlocutor continues for the whole 
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of 15.1-2, but then in 15.3 S. shifts back to addressing a singular interlocutor 
(Serenus, we may assume). 
 
15.1: si obscenorum uocibus inprobis per forum agetur: here obscenus is 
a noun, referring to foul-mouthed people (OLD obscenus
2
). The use of the 
adjective as a masculine noun occurs first in Seneca rhetor, Contr. 4, praef. 
10, where it has the meaning ‘obscene’ (tr. Winterbottom (Loeb)) rather 
than ‘foul-mouthed’; cf. S. Ben. 2.21.1: Vivam cum obsceno? (‘Shall I live 
with a lewd fellow?’ (tr. Basore (Loeb)). As the verbal abuse is taking place 
in the Forum, S. may intend a back-reference to the verbal and physical 
indignities inflicted on Cato by the populus in CS 2.  
 
15.1: si in conuiuio regis recumbere infra mensam: cf. 10.2: ‘non in 
medio me lecto sed in imo conlocauit’. By rex S. may be referring to some 
hypothetical or tyrant king such as an like Dionysius (I or II) of Syracuse, 
who toyed with his dinner guests, most notably Damocles; or perhaps we 
are to understand an oriental despot (cf. the previous references to Xerxes or 
the rex Medorum). Another possibility, which I think is more likely given 
the context of placement at dinner tables, is that the rex in question is a 
grandee who is throwing a dinner party for his clients. The word rex is used 
of a rich patron in comedy (Plaut. Stich. 455; Ter. Phorm. 338), and in 
Horace (Epist. 1.17.3) and Juvenal (1.136, 5.14). OLD (‘rex’ 8) takes this to 
be meaning. 
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15.2: at illum in aliis mundi finibus sua uirtus conlocauit, nihil 
uobiscum commune habentem: recapitulates the point (that the sage is set 
apart from ordinary mortals): cf. 6.8-7.1; 8.2: sapiens autem uicinus 
proximusque dis consistit, excepta mortalitate similis deo; also cf. Ep. 
59.16: talis est sapientis animus qualis mundus super lunam: semper illic 
serenum est.  
 
15.3: Quaere [. . .] uincitur: here, after two subsections of a plural 
addressee, the addressee is again in the singular.  
 
15.3: illud tolerabile sapienti, illud intolerabile: for the juxtaposition of a 
word with its privative, cf. 13.4: humanitatem inhumanitatemque. Again, 
the point is emphasised with anaphora, this time of illud: cf. note on 15.5 
below.  
 
15.3: uincit nos fortuna, nisi tota uincitur: for the Stoics virtue is an ‘all-
or-nothing’ matter; there are no degrees of virtue. Cf. Helv. 13.3: Non 
singula uitia ratio sed pariter omnia prosternit: in uniuersum simul uincitur. 
For the polyptoton of uincere, cf. Ep. 73.3: Adice nunc quod nemo eorum 
qui in re publica versantur quot vincat, sed a quibus vincatur, aspicit.  
 
15.4: Ne putes istam Stoicam esse duritiam, Epicurus, quem uos 
patronum inertiae uestrae adsumitis putatisque mollia ac desidiosa 
praecipere et ad uoluptates ducentia, 'raro' inquit 'sapienti fortuna 
229 
 
229 
 
interuenit.' Quam paene emisit uiri uocem! Vis tu fortius loqui et illam 
ex toto summouere?: a rapid change of number of interlocutor, (1) from 
second-person singular (putes – itself a switch from the plural of 15.3), (2) 
to second-person plural (uos [...] uestrae adsumitis putatisque), (3) to third-
person singular interlocutor (inquit), and finally (4) back to singular second-
person addressee (Vis tu). The singular second-person addressee is 
presumably Serenus. The plural addressees are certainly Epicureans in 
general (Epicurus, quem uos patronum inertiae uestrae adsumitis 
putatisque). What is striking is the abrupt transition from singular to plural 
second-person addressee in the same sentence, with the name Epicurus 
forming the pivot.  
 
15.4: Ne putes istam Stoicam esse duritiam: Serenus, one may assume 
from the second-person singular, is the addressee, but istam needs comment. 
It could either refer to something Serenus has said before (‘that which you 
mentioned’, OLD 2) or be neutral with respect to the second person (‘this’, 
OLD 4). For the former sense, there is the difficulty that only S. has 
previously used duritia and related words (at 3.5, 5.5, 6.3, 10.4 (x 2)). 
Serenus, in his speech at CS 3, has only spoken of the patientia of the sage 
(3.2). For this reason, I think it is preferable to interpret istam as plain ‘this’, 
as does Ker in his translation (‘this hardness’). 
 
‘raro’ . . . interuenit’ . . . uocem!: S. quotes Epicurus (sent. 16, p. 74 
Usener) directly, as an authority (see Trillitzsch (1962: 73-8) on appeals to 
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authority). Having done this to support his earlier claim that Epicurus, and 
not just the Stoics, shows duritia, S. undermines him in the next sentence by 
saying that he almost (paene) uttered a manly word. S. notes the similarity 
in thought between Epicurus and Stoics in respect of their views on fortuna, 
but is careful to assert the dictinction between the two schools. Again, the 
contrast running through CS between the supposed manliness of the Stoic 
philosophy and the femaleness of Epicurus’ philosophy is continued.  
 
15.5: Domus . . . est: the sage, who knows that wealth and show are 
indifferents, will live in a small, modest house and in general have a modest 
lifestyle, without vexatious doorkeepers. S. may be speaking metaphorically 
here, although there are examples of philosophers (e.g. Diogenes and Cynics 
generally, rather than Stoics; cf. the praise of Diogenes and primitive 
humans in Ep. 90) who eschewed wealth. For the unimportance of domestic 
wealth for Stoics see also Ep. 5.6 and Ep. 8.5. Of interest at CS 15.5 is the 
double meaning that fortuna bears. Principally it denotes fortune in the 
sense of one’s lot, the circumstances in which one finds oneself at a given 
time (OLD 8). Secondarily, though, it denotes wealth and property (OLD 
12). Again, there is the personification of fortuna: see the note on nutum 
fortunae (5.7).  
 
15.5: sine cultu, sine strepitu, sine apparatu: tricolon crescendo (2 
syllables, 3 syllables, 4 syllables) with anaphora (repetition of sine) and 
asyndeton. The anaphora emphasises the point that the sage’s house lacks 
231 
 
231 
 
all these appurtenances of luxuria. The lack of clamour (sine strepitu) 
contrasts the simple house of the sage with the busy house of the rich man 
that is besieged by clients. There may be a back-allusion to the tranquillity 
of the soul of the sage that has already been mentioned (altae quietis et 
placidae: 9.3): this house has peace and quiet, unlike that of the rich man.  
 
16.1-16.2: Quodsi Epicurus . . . non patitur: an amplification of the 
distinction between the Stoics and other schools of philosophy which was 
first adumbrated in 1.1, and which was continued at 15.4.  
 
16.1: hoc naturae repugnare: the Stoics claimed that they lived secundum 
naturam, so one line of attack from a philosophical opponent would be to 
show that they in fact lived contra naturam.  
 
16.2: gladiatores: gladiatorial imagery abounds in S. See Edwards (2007), 
passim. The use of gladiatorial imagery may go back to Cicero, cf. Cic. Opt. 
Gen. Or. 17.  
 
16.2: stat in gradu: in gradu stare is a technical, military term, meaning ‘to 
hold one’s ground’, ‘keep one’s position’; see Livy 6.12.8: obnisos vos 
(velim) stabili gradu impetum hostium excipere; Livy 8.38.11: in suo 
quisque gradu obnixi . . . pugnabant; Ov. Met. 9.43: in gradu stetimus certi 
non cedere (and see Bömer ad loc.). A variant on the image is to be found at 
S. Pol. 6.2: omnes scient, quomodo te in isto tuo gesseris vulnere, utrumne 
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statim percussus arma summiseris an in gradu steteris. Here, though, it is 
standing one’s ground that is the laudable and courageous response to being 
wounded; the cowardly response is immediate surrender of one’s arms. The 
context is clearly military, rather than gladiatorial.  
 
16.2: non sensum doloris detrahimus: an important point. The sage does 
feel pain, as everyone else does, but unlike everyone else, he does not 
accept that pain constitutes an injury. His invulnerability consists in his 
attitude to the sensation of pain, not his inability to feel pain. This is a 
recapitulation of the point made at 10.4: haec non nego sentire sapientem. 
Gellius provides a story illustrating the point at NA 12.5.  
 
16.3: consipiente: Rubenius suggested consipiente to replace the MSS’ 
conspiciente, which is meaningless in the context. The rare word consipere 
(most of its attestations are for Late Latin; see TLL 4.463) is attested, 
shakily, at S. NQ 6.29.2: non est facile inter magna mala consipere 
(according to the Loeb text, MSS ABV read concipere, ET desipere, but 
Hine’s apparatus includes no information on this word or variants); Ira 
3.13.4: contra [nos] potens malum et apud nos gratiosum, dum consipimus, 
dum nostri sumus, aduocemus (ω: conspicimus; Gronovius: consipimus); 
Gell. 6(7).3.12: ne . . . de statu mentis suae deturbati non satis consiperent. 
Given the rarity of consipere, it is highly likely that it was corrupted, and 
Rubenius’ emendation has generally been accepted by modern editors. It 
seems that the word is not attested before S., although some editors, 
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following Lipsius, have read it instead of the MSS’ concipere at Livy 
5.42.3. However, Ogilvie ad loc. rejects Lipsius’ conjecture and gives 
arguments in favour of keeping the MS reading. 
The use of consipere, which is related to sapere (hence to sapiens: 
see E–M 594, W–H II.477), is in keeping with S.’s liking for argumentation 
based on etymology, as seen in his remarks at 11.2: Contumelia a contemptu 
dicta est.  
 
16.4: In capitis mei leuitatem iocatus est et in oculorum ualetudinem et 
in crurum gracilitatem et in staturam: mei suggests that S. is referring to 
his own physical defects, although they are common enough in many men. 
For baldness, cf. CS 18.1: tanta capitis destituti et †emendacitatis† capillis 
adspersi deformitas (of Caligula); Suet. Cal. 27.1, 50.1. For weakness of the 
eyes, Viansino (1968: 161) provides many references in S.  
Although S. refers to Caligula’s exilitatem crurum later (18.1), there 
is probably no comparison between him and S. intended here by crurum 
gracilitatem. S. hardly likens himself to Caligula in other places (who would 
want to be thought like him?) and there was no love lost between them. All 
the physical defects S. lists were (and are) common to many men, and so S. 
probably is not thinking of Caligula here. Rather, compare the passage at the 
beginning of Ep. 66, where S. discusses his friend and condiscipulus 
Claranus, whose physical deficiencies and general modest lifestyle belie his 
moral qualities.  
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16.4: Coram . . . irascimur: the sentiment is that an insult, if delivered in 
company, is more damaging than the same words solely to the object of the 
insult. This is presumably because of the subjective nature of insult and also 
its social nature, inasmuch as the object of the insult will feel 
embarrassment at a public humiliation. Cf. 10.3: quorum pars maior constat 
uitio interpretantis. See Introduction, § VII. 
 
16.4: Coram . . . coram: more anaphora. See other examples discussed 
above. 
 
17.1: Chrysippus . . . dixerat: this sentence constitutes SVF II.11. We do 
not know in which work of Chrysippus the anecdote is related, or the 
context of the anecdote. For a list of some suggestions for a possible 
provenance, see Setaioli (2000: 326 n. 10). marinus ueruex seems to be a 
translation of the Greek insult θαλάσσιον πρόβατον (‘marine sheep’). 
Demetrius, On Style 172 explains the insult as τὸν μῶρον τὸν ἐν τῇ 
θαλάσσῃ, ‘the idiot in the sea’, possibly an incompetent sailor. However, I 
think that the insult could also imply that the person so described is a freak 
of nature, a monstrum, there being no such thing as a sheep in the sea. Klei 
(169), however, thinks it may be a translation of κριòς θαλάσσιον 
ἐκτετμημένον, lit.’ marine wether’. 
Both πρόβατον and ueruex on their own are also insults, meaning 
‘blockhead’, ‘dullard’, etc.; for the former see Ar. Nub. 1203, for the latter, 
Plaut. Merc. 567, Cas. 535; Petr. Sat. 57.1, Juv. 10.50. Dickey (2002: 176) 
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lists it as a ‘low-register’ insult, citing the Plaut. Merc. 567 and Petr. Sat. 
57.1 passages (Dickey 2002: 363). She does not, however, discuss or 
mention the CS 17.1 passage. The Latin ueruex is less neutral than the 
Greek πρόβατον, inasmuch as it has connotations of uselessness, impotence, 
ineffectuality, and lack of virility; whereas the Greek merely seems to 
suggest stupidity and lack of independent motivation. Opelt (1965: 86 n. 22) 
cites Marmorale, who thinks that ueruex may mean ‘eunuch’ (‘castrone’), 
presumably based on the alternative meaning of ‘wether’ for ueruex; if this 
is correct, then the insult may have been an imputation of effeminacy.  
In any case, S.’s translation seems to add more to the original Greek than 
merely marinus ovis would have done; the insult is on two levels, an insult 
within an insult, as it were. See the note on struthocamelum depilatum 
below for a discussion of noun + adjective insults. 
Janssens (1974: 76) takes marinus ueruex to be a direct reference to 
the fish called in Greek a probaton thalassion, which was known for its 
cunning in luring prey to its lair (Oppian, Hal. 1.145ff.; paraphrased by 
Aelian, Anim. 9.38). It is not possible to identify with any certainty which 
fish Oppian refers to, but Mair (Loeb edition of Oppian, pp. 218-19 n. d) 
suggests it might be a member of the cod family (Gadidae).The adjective 
(marinus) in S. is thus, for Janssens, not part of the insult, indicating 
something odd or incompatible with a uervex, and hence something odd or 
freaky about the insultee; rather, it is to indicate this particular fish, as 
opposed to a land animal. On this interpetration, the insult involves an 
accusation of deceitful or fraudulent character, like that of the fish, rather 
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than stupidity or effeminacy. Janssens thinks the insult was probably 
addressed to a politician (1974: 76), citing in support of his view the 
characterizations of Catiline by Sallust (Cat. 5.1-4 and 14.4-5), a bad and 
deceitful character (ingenio malo prauoque; Animus ... subdolus, uarius . . 
.simulator ac dissimulator) who easily ensnared upright and honest men 
(dolis haud difficulter capiebantur) with his wiles (Janssens 1974: 77). Cf. 
Robin (1983), who argues that the emperor Claudius is likened to a harbour 
seal (‘veau marin’) at Apoc. 5.3, which he thinks is an allusion to Claudius’ 
unintelligible speech, somnolence and corpulence (Robin 1983: 188). 
Setaioli (2000: 325-30), in contrast, sees the explanation of the insult 
in an anecdote related in the Vita Aesopi (24 Westermann). This anecdote is 
found in MS G of the Aesopica; the other MSS omit it. I have consulted the 
edition of Ben Edwin Perry, Aesopica (Urbana, IL, 1952), which uses 
Westermann’s text. Aesop is offered for sale as a slave together with two 
handsome young male companions. When the philosopher Xanthus asks 
what one of the boys know how to do, he replies ‘Everything’, whereupon 
Aesop bursts out laughing. When one of pupils of Xanthus asks why he is 
laughing, Aesop says: ‘Go away, marine sheep!’ When Xanthus asks the 
second companion of Aesop what he can do, and again he replies 
‘Everything’, again Aesop laughs. When a disciple of Xanthus again asks 
Aesop whey he is laughing, another disciple says to him: ‘if you want to be 
called a “marine goat” (thalassios tragos), ask him.’ Later, Xanthus himself 
asks Aesop what he knows how to do. Aesop replies ‘nothing at all’. When 
Xanthus asks him why, he replies: ‘these [lads?] announced to you that they 
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knew everything.’ The pupils of Xanthus say: ‘Well defended, for no man 
knows everything; this is why he laughed.’ There seems to be some play on 
the two meanings of ‘know’ as ‘know-how’, which the companions of 
Aesop had in mind when the answered Xanthus, and ‘know-that’ as 
(theoretical) knowledge, which Xanthus’ pupils were aware of (and surely 
Xanthus himself, although he presumably had the first meaning in mind 
when he asked his questions). In this passage, Setaioli thinks, the insults 
‘marine sheep’ and marine goat’ refer to the stupidity of the person who is 
the object of the insult. He cites in support of his argument Demetrius, Peri 
hermeneias, 172 (Setaioli 2000: 327, esp. n. 11), where Demetrius says 
relates a ‘conjecture’ (eikasia) that ‘thalassion probaton’ is used in banter 
(peri skōmmatōn) to refer to ‘ton mōron [en tēi thalassēi]’. Setaioli 
dismisses the view that probaton refers to a kind of fish, as found in the 
pages of Oppian and Aelian and accepted by Janssens (see above), which he 
however understands (should the insult be alluding to the fish) as a 
reference to its being sluggish (Aelian: nōthes; Oppian: nōthros), hence 
stupid (the word can also mean this: see LSJ) (Setaioli 2000: 328). On this 
‘old’ interpretation of the Vita Aesopi passage, then, the adjective merely 
indicates that the fish called the probaton is indicated by the insult, not the 
land sheep. On the interpretation favoured by Setaioli, the adjective is 
integral to the insult, it has ‘significato scoptico’ (‘mocking meaning’, 
ibid.): it links what is normally thought of as a land animal (and a stupid one 
at that) to the sea, emphasizing and intensifying the sense of its stupidity, 
and its ridiculousness (ibid. 329). The second insult uttered by Aesop 
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(‘marine goat’) Setaioli takes to be a variant on the canonical (in his view) 
‘marine sheep’. It intensifies the original insult: whoever asks this question 
of Aesop again is not only a marine sheep, but a marine goat (i.e. an even 
bigger fool). As the goat is a stronger and fiercer animal than the sheep, it 
represents a higher degree of folly (ibid.). In support of his interpretation of 
the integrality of the adjective to the insult, Setaioli cites Archilochus (fr. 74 
Diehl = 122 West, line 7), who tells of an upside-down world where 
‘quadrupedi’ (thēres in the Greek) and dolphins exchange dwelling-places – 
a trope reproduced (with variation) in Horace, AP 29-30: qui uariare cupit 
rem prodigialiter unam, | delphinem siluis appingit, fluctibus aprum. 
Setaioli (ibid. 329-30) thinks that the Horatian variation, which replaces 
‘wild beasts’ with the more concrete wild boar, an animal that is more agile 
and lively in its own element and yet correspondingly more inept and 
clumsy in an alien element, parallels the replacement of the sheep with the 
second pupil’s goat in Aesop. I am not convinced that a wild boar is 
necessarily more lively, and so on, than some of the other beasts covered by 
the category thēr (which could include the lion: see LSJ), and his argument 
is circular anyway. 
It seems, then, that interpretations of this passage fall into two main 
categories: that a particular sea creature (also called a ‘sheep’) is referred to, 
the adjective marinus being an indication that the creature is a sea creature, 
a ‘sea sheep’ (on the analogy of our ‘sea cow’, ‘sea cucumber’, etc.); the 
other that a land animal, a sheep, is referred to, and that the adjective 
intensifies the stupidity with which the animal is associated, giving the 
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impression that it is out of its element and hence doubly stupid and inept, 
and indeed freakish.  
In the absence of a context for this insult, it is hard to decide which 
of these two types of interpretation is correct. On balance, I incline to the 
second, not least because of the passages cited by Setaioli (Demetrius and 
Aesopica), which do indicate that ‘marine sheep’ (and variants thereof) was 
a familiar term of insult in Greek culture.  
 
17.1: In senatu flentem uidimus Fidum Cornelium, Nasonis Ouidi 
generum, cum illum Corbulo struthocamelum depilatum dixisset: 
uidimus suggests that the event related may be quite recent. We have no 
information on Fidus Cornelius apart from CS 17.1 (see Klei 1950: 169). 
The identity of the Corbulo referred to is uncertain. It could either be the 
famous general of Nero, who was famous also in Claudius’ reign, or it could 
be his father. Griffin (1992: 44 n. 4) thinks that the general’s father may be 
referred to, arguing that ‘Seneca rarely mentions the living’ (Corbulo the 
general outlived S.). From what we know of the father’s character, he was 
certainly not averse to getting involved in altercations and confrontations. 
Tac. Ann. 31.3 (cf. Koestermann I.479 and Woodman & Martin 280-1 ad 
loc.) relates how in AD 21 Domitius Corbulo, who had praetorian rank, was 
involved in an angry dispute for precedence with a young senator, L. Sulla. 
And at Ann. 31.5 (cf. Koestermann I.480 and Woodman & Martin 282-3 ad 
loc.), Tacitus relates how he complained about the poor state of the roads in 
Italy, and personally undertook the prosecution of those responsible, many 
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of whom were ruined financially. AD 21 is a long time before the likely date 
of composition of CS (post-41), however, and we cannot be sure that 
Corbulo père was still alive when Fidus Cornelius was insulted. Dio 
(59.53.3-4) relates that the Corbulo who complained about the roads in 
Tiberius’ reign was used by Caligula to attack the highway commissioners 
(both serving and former) in 39, and was made consul as a reward. Dio 
continues that later on, in the reign of Claudius, Corbulo was prosecuted and 
punished, and Claudius reimbursed the moneys taken from those who had 
been fined by Corbulo earlier. So, if Dio is correct, Corbulo père could well 
have been the man insulting Fidus Cornelius, and might well have been 
dead when S. wrote (as Griffin thinks probable). Syme (1979: 810), 
however, thinks it doubtful that the consul in 39 is Corbulo père. Clearly, no 
certainty is attainable on this matter.  
 For more on both Fidus Cornelius and Corbulo, and the implications 
of this passage for the dating of CS, see the Introduction, § I. 
 
17.1: struthocamelum depilatum: struthocamelus, a Greek word 
originally, was presumably assimilated into Latin by S.’s day, hence the 
Roman script (see Bickel (1906) and Commentary on 3.5 and 10.2). Also, 
the insult would (one assumes) have had less bite had an unfamiliar Greek 
term been used. Here, as with ueruex marinus, we have a noun with 
accompanying adjective. A bird that is depilatus has been plucked (cf. 
Apicius 6.3 (cited by Klei 1950: 169)). [Syme (1979: 820) has this 
translation, although he does not discuss the passage further.] But what does 
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it mean to call a man a ‘plucked ostrich’? To call someone an ostrich is an 
insult in itself (as calling someone a lion would not be). The ostrich was 
thought to be stupid for its habit of burying its head in the sand (see 
Diodorus 2.14 (who incidentally, disagrees with the view that it is a sign of 
stupidity) and Pliny the Elder, NH 10.1), a view of the bird that is proverbial 
today. So Corbulo may be referring to Fidus Cornelius’ alleged stupidity, or 
imputing stupidity to him. Or calling him an ostrich might be an allusion to 
Fidus’ (if he had these characteristics) strutting gait, or long and scrawny 
neck, a big body supported on long thin legs, for example, Janssen (1974: 
79) thinks that the insult may allude to the small head of the ostrich. Its 
name – meaning ‘sparrow-camel’ in Greek – may originate in the smallness 
of its head in comparison with the large size of its body. He cites the 
compound word strouthokephalos (‘sparrow-head’), found in Plutarch, De 
curiositate 520c to describe people with unusually small heads, who (with 
other freaks) were paraded in the marketplace for the amusement of the 
populace. He cites too Galen 19, p. 454 (Kühn), who cites strouthokephala 
as examples of terata marked by diminution and megalokephala as those 
marked by enlargement. And according to Claudian, Eutr. 2.315 (another 
passage cited by Janssens – see also the later discussion in this note), the 
ostrich had a ridendum . . . caput: a head worthy of ridicule.  
The adjective depilatum adds another level to the insult. Minissale 
(185) thinks the insult may indicate that Fidus had a long narrow neck and 
bald head. Certainly, ostriches’ necks and legs are bare except for a few 
sparse hairs. But as these are well-known characteristics of an ostrich, it 
242 
 
242 
 
would seem unnecessary to stress them by using the adjective ‘plucked’, 
which would actually imply that the ostrich’s body feathers had been 
removed. More likely, I think, there is an allusion to the practice of some 
men in Rome of shaving their bodies, a practice that was considered a sign 
of effeminacy (Corbeill 1992: 43-5), even homosexuality (Williams 2010: 
129-32). So, the insult may have been aimed at Fidus’ ostrich-like 
appearance and gait, or his stupidity (or both), allied to his effeminate habit 
of shaving his legs and other parts of his body. We cannot know for certain, 
because we have no other information on Fidus Cornelius except for the 
present passage of S., but it seems likely. Certainly insults, then as now, 
were aimed often at the victim’s physical appearance. So, an Athenian jester 
(gephuristēs) mocked Sulla’s blotchy face: ‘Sulla is a mulberry sprinkled 
o’er with meal’ (Plut. Sulla, 2.1; Loeb translation).  
In addition to the ostrich’s physical appearance and stupidity, 
Janssens (1974: 78-9) thinks that there may also be an allusion to its alleged 
cowardice. He cites another passage of Pliny (NH 10.73.142), in which the 
author opines that birds that are timid (fugaces) are ‘more prolific’ (Loeb 
translation of fecundiores) than brave ones (fortes). Among fertile birds he 
lists ostriches, hens and partridges. As an example of the alleged cowardice 
of the ostrich being used in a personal attack, Janssens (78) cites Claudian’s 
usage at In Eutropium 310-16. Here, Eutropius, who declines to resist the 
revolt of the Getae in Phrygia and shuts his mind to its seriousness, is 
compared to an ostrich, which flees from its hunters and then buries its head 
in the sand when they catch up with it, hoping they will not see it.  
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17.1: aduersus alia maledicta mores et uitam conuulnerantia frontis illi 
firmitas constitit, aduersus hoc tam absurdum lacrimae prociderunt: 
Nothing is known about Fidus apart from what is said by S. here, so we 
cannot know the content of the maledicta made against him. Perhaps they 
had some connection with his father-in-law’s alleged looseness of morals 
and exile.  
The reading uitam is Erasmus’ emendation of the MSS uitia (Klei 
170), and is accepted by most editors, including Reynolds, on the grounds 
that the immediately following convulnerantia influenced the scribes to 
expect a (second) neuter plural subject. Klei (ibid.) disagrees, citing in 
support Tranq. 15.5: sed satius est publicos mores et humana uitia placide 
accipere. The pairing mores et vitia might support the MSS vitia in CS, but 
otherwise the MSS give poor sense. S. would be saying either (1) ‘against 
other slanders and the vices that wounded his morals’ or (2) ‘against other 
slanders that wounded his morals and vices’, or (3) ‘against other slanders 
and the vices that wounded his morals’. The first sense implies a double 
attack on his mores, from others and from his own viciousness. This seems 
unlikely, and indeed contradictory, as he is maintaining a firm front against 
these things, and if he maintained a firm front against his uitia, he would 
presumably not have any uitia. The second sense is little better, with the 
slanders wounding not only his morals but also his vices. The third is more 
probable, and may be what Klei had in mind, for he cites in support Seneca 
rhetor Con. 2.1(9)6: extremis conuulneratum libidinibus. The text of Seneca 
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rhetor that Klei cites is presumably Bornecque’s edition (1902, rev. 1932), 
which is listed in his bibliography, and whose French translation he gives; 
the Latin, translated into English, reads: ‘corrupted to the marrow by the 
most shameful passions’. The other editions I have consulted (Bursian, 
1857; Kiessling, 1872; Müller, 1887) read conuulneratum libidinibus (i.e. 
no extremis), which Winterbottom (whose Loeb text is a corrected version 
of Müller’s (Winterbottom, p. xxvii), translates ‘crippled by lusts’. On this 
interpretation, Fidus is fighting double battle against the slanders of others 
and his own vices, which conspire to wound his morals. I am not convinced 
by the arguments to retain uitia, and I am happy to follow Reynolds. 
 
17.1: conuulnerantia: conuulnerare literally means to damage by cutting 
or perforate. S. here uses it figuratively, as he does in the metaphor at 
Tranq. 11.5: Eo magis conulneraberis et confodieris, quia nescis praebere 
iugulum; cf. Seneca rhetor, Contr. 2.1.6: conulneratum libidinibus (cited by 
Klei 170: see previous note).  
 
17.1: tanta animorum inbecillitas est, ubi ratio discessit: 
characteristically for S., a sententia sums up the point of the examples.  
 
17.2: Senectutem quidam inuiti audiunt: the A group of MSS read 
quidem. The reading quidam is almost certainly right; quidam could easily 
have been corrupted to quidem. 
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17.3: Vatinium . . . peruenerit?: picks up the allusion at 1.3 (infra 
Vatinios). The presentation of Vatinius here has some similarities with 
Tacitus’ description of another Vatinius, who became notorious in the later 
part of Nero’s reign: corpore detorto, facetiis scurrilibus (Tac. Ann. 15.34; 
cf. Dial. 8.3, 11.2; see also PIR III.389, no. 209). However, there is no 
evidence that S. intends an allusion to the Neronian Vatinius. If such an 
allusion were intended, that would point to a later date for CS than I 
consider likely, however (see Introduction, § I). Possibly the Neronian 
Vatinius adopted the name ‘Vatinius’ as an allusion to the Vatinius of 
Cicero’s day, given his own physical deformity and liking for playing the 
scurra. 
 
17.3: scurram fuisse: the word scurra denoted (a) ‘a fashionable city idler, 
a “man about town”’ (OLD) and, by extension, (b) an urban wit or jester, 
even a buffoon. (See L–S and OLD.) As Cynthia Damon (1997: 108-12, 
138-41, 202-6) shows, the scurra, although present in Plautine comedy as a 
gossip or wit, came to be identified from Horace onwards with the figure of 
the parasite. On the scurra, see also Beard (2014: esp. 152-5). 
For previous scholarship on the scurra, see Damon (1997: 109 n. 
11). Corbett’s (1986) monograph has been criticized for its poor 
methodology, most notably by Fowler (Greece & Rome 34 (1987): 90). 
However, Fowler’s remark that ‘I find it unthinkable that this kind of study 
should, be done without consulting the TLL’ is undermined by the fact that 
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TLL has at the time of writing (2016) only reached ‘P’ and so Corbett could 
not have consulted it for scurra (if that is what Fowler meant).  
 
17.3: uenustum: ‘attractive in appearance or manner, charming’ (OLD). 
Presumably, Vatinius’s character is intended here, rather than his 
appearance. 
 
17.3: dicacem: ‘having a ready tongue, given to making clever remarks at 
another’s expense’ (OLD). 
 
17.3: pedes suos . . . fauces concisas: according to Quintilian 6.3.77, 
Vatinius had a foot ailment (pedibus aeger); according to Plut. Cic. 9 and 
26, his neck was covered in swellings (possibly goitre). For Cicero’s 
comments on his appearance, likening him to a snake, see Vat. 2.4: Repente 
enim te tamquam serpens e latibulis oculis eminentibus, inflato collo, 
tumidis cervicibus intulisti . . . See Pocock for full discussion of the In 
Vatinium.  
 
17.3: in primis Ciceronis urbanitatem effugerat: S. may be referring here 
to the rapprochement between Cicero and Vatinius in 45 BC when Cicero 
agreed to act as an advocate for Vatinius. See their correspondence in Cic. 
Fam. 5.9 (255 Shackleton Bailey = SB), 5.10a.1-2 (259 SB), 5.10a.3 (256 
SB), 5.10b (258 SB), 5.11 (257 SB). Vatinius had certainly been the target 
of Cicero’s witty invective in the In Vatinium.  
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17.4: fructus . . . uindicet: these two words give a slightly legal tone to the 
passage, although it is unlikely they are being used in their strict legal 
senses here. Fructus can mean either, in a non-legal sense, the enjoyment or 
pleasurable possession of something (see OLD 1), or, in its legal sense, the 
right to enjoy the profits from something (OLD 1b). Here, there is a hint of 
the legal meaning, in that the insulter profits from the insult if it hits home, 
although the primary meaning of enjoyment without a specifically legal 
connection seems prevalent. The word uindicare can have the legal sense of 
laying legal claim to something as one’s own property that is in possession 
of another (uindico OLD 1) or claiming a slave free in an act of 
manumission (OLD uindico 3). However, it seems better to understand the 
word here in the sense of ‘avenge’, i.e. as a synonym of the non-legal ulcisci 
(OLD 5). This seems to be more in keeping with this part of CS, where we 
have ultionis (17.4), ulciscentium (18.3) and ultionem (18.5). 
 
18.1: C. Caesar, inter cetera uitia quibus abundabat contumeliosus: for 
detailed accounts of Caligula’s vicious character elsewhere in the Dialogi, 
see e.g. Breu. 18.5-6, Ira 1.20.8-9, 3.33.3-6, 3.18.3-19.5, Pol. 17.4-6, Tranq. 
9. 14.4-6. 
 
18.1.: mira libidine ferebatur omnis aliqua nota feriendi: here basically 
nota means ‘mark’ or ‘stain’, but again, as with notare at 11.2, there may be 
an underlying meaning of ‘black mark’, ‘stigma’.  
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18.1: tanta . . . pedum: for Caligula’s appearance is presented in bestial, 
grotesque terms. For saetis, and a discussion of the description of Caligula 
in Suet. Cal. 50, see the note by Minissale 192; also Grimal. 
 
18.1: †emendacitatis†: the reading of A1, which does not correspond to any 
known Latin word, any more than does emendicitis of A
3. The reading of ς 
is emendicatis (attested at Suet. Caes. 54 and Aug. 91), which gives the 
sense ‘obtained by begging’. Begging for hair is consonant with Caligula’s 
base nature. Indeed, we are told that Caligula used to have the backs of the 
heads of handsome long-haired men shaved, although we are not told what 
was done with the shorn hair: Pulchros et comatos, quotiens sibi 
occurrerent, occipitio raso deturpabat (Suet. Cal. 35).  
Of the emendations listed by Reynolds, Pincianus’s medicatis 
(‘doctored’, ‘besprinkled’, ‘dyed’) gives reasonably good sense. We are to 
imagine Caligula treating his remaining hairs with lotions, to prevent them 
falling out, or dying them, to preserve their colour. The problem is that all 
the MSS readings start emend-, their disagreements being concerned with 
what comes after these initial five letters. I think that any emendation should 
preserve emend-, and therefore we should not accept medicatis, whatever its 
other merits. 
Gertz’s emendicaticiis is a hapax. I do not think it is a good method 
to propose hapax legomena as emendations, although OLD include it 
without comment. I have followed OLD’s translation of ‘borrowed’ 
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(although they translate emendicare as ‘to obtain by begging’), rather than 
Basore’s ‘beggarly’, which is ambiguous: ‘beggarly’ in the sense of ‘sparse’ 
or ‘in need of replacement by begging’ (but see my earlier objections to 
’begged’)?  
A more promising approach might be to adopt a form of the verb 
emendare, which can mean to correct in a medical sense, i.e. to cure. See LS 
and in particular Pliny Maior 20, §129: Sextius adicit . . . alopecias 
emendari addito sinapi . . . porriginem et ulcera capitis cum adipe anserino 
(curing various afflictions, including baldness, dandruff and head sores); 34, 
§58: capillum et pubem emendatius fecisse (to dress hair faultlessly). We 
could imagine Caligula ‘correcting’ or ‘curing’ his baldness by applying 
false or replacement hairs. The question then would be which form of 
emendare? The unattested form emendaticiis would certainly fit, but again 
this would introduce a hapax.  
Another possibility would be to read emendationis, so giving the 
sense ‘hairs of correction’/’corrective hairs’, i.e. hair used to ‘correct’ 
baldness.  
Yet another possibility might be to posit an erroneous scribal 
addition of an initial ‘e’ to mendacitatis (‘hairs of falsehood’, ‘hairs that 
lie’). However, according to LS, mendacitas is ecclesiastical Latin, and we 
should not assume an earlier occurrence in S. 
However, all this is speculation, and I think no entirely satisfactory 
emendation has been proposed yet. As Gertz (68) says: ‘dubito, an verum 
nondum repertum sit; equidem scripturam vulgatam non intelligo’. 
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18.2: Asiaticum Valerium: for information on this man, see the note by 
Grimal (96) and Barrett, passim. Tacitus reverses the order of the names, 
e.g. Ann. 11.1. PIR
2
. 
 
18.3: Chaereae . . . auratus: the whole passage contrasts Chaerea, whose 
voice did not match his otherwise manly and soldierly bearing, with 
Caligula, whose effeminate dress gave him no cause to insult Chaerea 
because of his voice. 
 
18.3: sermo non pro manu erat: ‘his speech did not match his deeds’. 
Here manus means ‘action’, as opposed to words, as at Ira 1.4.3 (quaedam 
[sc. irae] saeuae manu uerbis parciores). 
 
18.3: armato mollitiam: the juxtaposition of the armato and mollitiam 
indicates the incongruity of softness with being a soldier, and thus the 
inappropriateness of Caligula’s insults. Softness (mollitia) was frequently 
used to describe people who were considered morally suspect. See Edwards 
(1993: ch. 2). 
 
18.3: haec ipse perlucidus, crepidatus, auratus: asyndetic tricolon, with 
the last element one syllable shorter than the preceding two, which with its 
three long syllables, as opposed to the mixture of short and long syllables of 
the preceding two adjectives, gives it emphasis and slows down the sentence 
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at the end, rounding it off decisively. The word perlucidus (usually 
‘transparent’), here means ‘wearing transparent clothes’ (OLD 1). Caligula, 
although clothed, wishes his body to be visible, as if he were naked. In this, 
he is like a dancer, a class of person, usually servile, who frequently 
performed half-naked. He is crepidatus, i.e. wearing crepidae, which OLD 
defines as: ‘A kind of footwear consisting of a thick sole attached by straps 
to the feet, characteristically worn by Greeks and usu. regarded as an 
affectation when worn by Romans’. Cf. Cic. Pis. 92: crepidatus veste servili 
navem conscendit; Suet. Dom. 4.4: Certamini praesedit crepidatus 
purpureaque amictus toga Graecanica. It was considered unsuitable 
footwear for a sapiens, according to a character in Hor. Sat. 1.3.127-8, 
citing Chrysippus:  
 
[. . .] ‘non nosti quid pater’ inquit 
Chrysippus dicat: sapiens crepidas sibi numquam  
nec soleas fecit; sutor tamen est sapiens.’ [. . .]  
sapiens crepidas sibi numquam | nec soleas fecit 
 
The last adjective in the sequence, auratus, depicts Caligula either wearing 
gold jewellery or clad in gilded clothes, or both. This is ostentation of an un-
Roman manner, more associated with orientals. Also, there may be a 
comparison of Caligula with a sacrificial animal (see also next note on uno 
ictu). The horns of sacrificial victims were often decked with gold; cf. Livy 
25.12.13 (Apollini boue aurato et capris duabus albis auratis), [S.] 
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Hercules Oetaeus 784-5 (Vt stetit ad aras omne uotiuum pecus | totumque 
tauris gemuit auratis nemus).  
 
18.3: ille ceruicem mediam uno ictu decidit: an ironic allusion to 
Caligula’s wish that the Roman people had one neck, so that he could kill 
them all with one blow and on one day (Ira 3.19.2). Also, as Wilcox (2008: 
468 n. 34) points out, with the words uno ictu S. likens Caligula to a 
sacrificial animal, which had to be slaughtered with a single blow. For irony 
as used by S. in the Caligula passages in CS, see also Wilcox (2008: 464-
73).  
 
18.4: Herennio Macro: Herennius Macer is elsewhere unattested: PIR
2 
IV, 
p. 75, no. 111.  
 
18.4: coturnatus: wearing buskins, the footwear of tragic actors, and 
inappropriate for a princeps.  
 
18.5: Ergo hoc . . . consumuntur: reflecting on (presumably) the murder of 
Caligula, S. expresses a rather strange view here. Although the lenience of 
Stoics (nostra facilitas) does not permit revenge, S. will nonetheless be 
consoled by the fact that there will be someone (presumably not a Stoic) 
who exacts punishment from a man who is ‘wanton, arrogant, and revels in 
doing injury’ (tr. Ker). He seems to condone in non-Stoics what he and 
other Stoics would not consider doing themselves. Also noteworthy is the 
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future tense. S. apparently looks forward to similar tyrannicides in the 
future. Given the danger of publishing or expressing such sentiments, I think 
it unlikely that S. has post-quinquennium Nero in mind.  
 
18.5: procace et superbo et iniurioso, quae uitia [. . .] consumuntur: an 
interesting construction, whereby the abstract nouns that correspond to the 
adjectives (procace ~ procacitas; superbo ~ superbia; iniurioso ~ iniuria) 
are assumed in the following relative clause (quae uitia [. . .]). 
 
18.6: ut Socratis . . . accepit: presumably, comoediarum refers to 
Aristophanes’ Clouds, which ridiculed Socrates, among other philosophers 
and sophists. Cf. VB 27, esp. the beginning of 27.2 (Socrates is speaking 
from prison): Praebui ego aliquando Aristophani materiam iocorum, tota 
illa comicorum poetarum manus in me uenenatos sales suos effudit: 
inlustrata est uirtus mea per ea ipsa per quae petebatur. See further the 
references given in Grimal: Cic. Tusc. 3.31; S. Ira 2.7.1; Ep. 104.28; Helv. 
13.4. For the story of how Anytus and his cronies persuaded Aristophanes to 
lampoon Socrates in a play, see Aelian, VH 2.13. 
  
18.6: risitque . . . perfunderetur: the full story, with the addition of 
Socrates’ witty comment, is given in S. Fr. 62 (Haase): Quodam autem 
tempore quum infinita conuicia ex superiori loco ingerenti Xanthippe 
restitisset, aqua perfusus immunda nihil amplius respondit quam capite 
254 
 
254 
 
deterso: ‘sciebam,’ inquit, ‘futurum, ut ista tonitrua imber sequeretur’. The 
story, together with Socrates’ comment, is given at D.L. 2.36.  
 
18.6: Antistheni . . . Idaeam esse: the anecdote is related at D.L. 6.1. 
Antisthenes was considered by some to be the founder of the Cynic school. 
Cynics were commonly spoken of with approval by Stoics (cf. Diogenes in 
Ep. 94), not surprisingly, given that Zeno was a Cynic before he founded his 
own, Stoic school. For a discussion of the insult, see Introduction, § VII. 
 
19: after the false peroration of 15, we now have the actual peroration.  
 
19.1: rixam conluctationemque ueniendum: Grimal thinks that 
conluctatio is military language, but it seems to denote struggle physical 
struggle generally, and metaphorical struggle (see OLD). In Dig. 9.2.7.4 
(Ulpian) it denotes wrestling (in colluctatione uel pancratio). At Quint. 17.8 
it refers metaphorically to a ‘struggle’ at law: redeuntis in damnatam 
colluctationem; and at S. QN 3.18.1, it refers to the ‘struggle’ of a dying 
mullet: ipsa colluctatione deficientis animae.It does not occur before S. (see 
TLL III.1656). 
 
19.2: obirati: according to LS, obirascor is ‘mostly post-Aug.’, and 
according to Bourgery it is not found before S. (249). It is fairly frequent in 
S.: Tranq. 2.11 (obirascens fortunae animus), Ep. 56.9 (obirata), Ira 3.40.1 
(obirasci), Ben. 5.24.2 (obiratus).  
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19.3: memor in prima acie altos ordines stare: military imagery. The best 
soldiers (the alti ordines) stand in the front ranks, the weaker troops in the 
rear. Ker translates ‘tall ranks’. Here, the imagery of height is combined 
with military imagery (‘high ranks’). 
  
19.3: Contumelias . . . uiri: extended military imagery. The sage is stands 
at his post in the battle of life, unbroken and unbowed by the assaults of the 
enemy. Compare the likening of the soul of the sage to an impregnable 
fortress at 6.8. 
 
19.3: saxa sine uulnere circa galeas crepitantia: vivid imagery of rock 
rattling off helmets. For the invulnerability of the sage to the ‘slings and 
arrows of outrageous fortune’ cf. Ep. 45.9; Ira 3.5.8. For crepitare used of 
the rattling of weapons and arms, see Ov. Met. 1.143: crepitantia concutit 
arma.  
 
19.4: Sapienti aliud auxilium est huic contrarium; uos enim rem geritis, 
illi parta uictoria est: the contrast between the sage and the adfectatores 
sapientiae. He has already obtained the victory in life which the others are 
striving to attain; and huic contrarium hints at the contrarium mundo iter of 
the sage at 14.4. 
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